INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN A WORLD OF REVOLUTIONARY CHANGE

By CHARLES EASTON ROTHWELL

A PROJECT of collaborative research concerning major world trends affecting international relations has been launched this year at the Hoover Institute and Library. This project has been made possible by a three-year grant from the Carnegie Corporation of New York.[1]

Beneath the original planning for the project lay the conviction born of wartime experience, that a deeper understanding of the dynamics of international relations could be obtained by pooling the contributions of the social sciences and related disciplines and by taking account of practical experience in the international field. The need for new and more penetrating approaches to international relations had been put by Arnold Toynbee in a few challenging words: "There is nothing to prevent our Western Civilization from following historical precedent, if it chooses, by committing social suicide. But we are not doomed to make history repeat itself; it is open to us through our own efforts, to give history, in our case, some new unprecedented turn." Natural scientists, as well as social scientists are agreed that any "new unprecedented turn" must be sought in deeper understanding of relations among people and among nations.

Those who planned the Hoover project believed that a fruitful working synthesis of the disciplines and of practical experience could best be achieved in a laboratory situation. They felt that the experts and the materials should be brought together in circumstances which would make possible joint planning and frequent discussion across the table as research developed.

[1] In preparing this report the writer has relied frequently upon a memorandum on the scope, methods, and procedures of the Hoover Institute and Library project concerning "The World Revolution of Our Time" prepared by Dr. Harold D. Lasswell following a series of consultations at the Hoover Institute.

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The scope of the investigation has purposely been kept broad and flexible. It was believed that any consequential study of fundamental revolutionary forces affecting the configuration of world politics and the content and method of international relations would have to be within a world perspective. A better understanding of trends within any given country would result if these were seen in relationship to what was happening in other countries and in the world as a whole. Separate revolutionary episodes and movements would acquire more significance when viewed in the broad context of the important historical forces at work around the globe. Hence, the study deals with the broad stream of change in which fundamental transformations are going forward, sometimes rapidly and violently in revolutionary crises such as those of Russia or China, sometimes at the slower pace of non-violent adjustment.

Although the focus of research is upon present trends, the project aims to develop understanding of the direction and rate of current change by following the course of events in the recent past. For reasons of historical convenience, the survey is begun at approximately 1890. It is expected that the lines of development through this time-span, when revealed and understood, will serve as a basis for estimating the probable trends of future change.

For such a study of the historical forces at work in our time, the Hoover Library collections are unusually rich in essential materials. During and since the recent war, the scope of these collections, already extensive on European trends, has been expanded to include the Far East, the Middle East, and Latin America. In all areas, the emphasis is upon factors relating to war and peace and upon political, social, economic, and ideological developments, both revolutionary and evolutionary. There are numerous precedents for the kind of broad survey contemplated in the Hoover project, although they are, for the most part, confined to single nations or regions. Among these is the survey of Recent Social Trends in the United States initiated by President Hoover and completed in 1932. This study, together with others that may be available, are expected to yield much valuable material.

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The present inquiry will be limited to an analysis and description of world trends relating to security, democracy, and fraternity, or, in working terms, shared safety, shared power, and shared respect. These aspects of social development were selected as the focal points of research because it was believed that they are central to present conflicts in world politics, and because they express values which, taken together, connote preference for a world society in which the dignity of the human being and a high degree of social mobility are major considerations. As the research progresses, it may be necessary to add a fourth point of reference, "sufficiency" or "abundance," which would be construed to mean a sharing of goods and services.

One of the first tasks undertaken in the project has been to convert these broad points of reference into more specific measures of both belief and behavior in order to provide workable "yardsticks" for estimating trends. In doing so, the great differences of cultural pattern elsewhere in the world are being taken into account. With the assistance of area experts, non-western civilizations are being studied to discover doctrines and practices reasonably equivalent to those in the west.

The description of world-wide changes relating to security, democracy, and fraternity will be supplemented by studies of important factors conditioning these changes. Those factors selected for analysis are: (1) the development and diffusion of technology, (2) economic developments (other than technological), (3) demographic changes, and (4) changes in the ingredients of national power and the global distribution of power. In the examination of these factors, as well as of the social, political, and ideological developments which bear directly upon the fluctuations in security, democracy, and fraternity, particular attention is being given to the rate of change, under the hypothesis that vast and sudden change will probably involve conflict and will affect adversely security, democracy, and fraternity. For the same reasons, the balance or imbalance between the rate of change and the rate of adjustment to change is being analyzed in various areas throughout the sixty-year period under investigation. Finally, the interaction among trends pertaining to security, democracy, and fraternity, as

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well as the cumulative effect of the conditioning factors, is being studied in order to achieve better understanding of their total impact within any given context.

The analysis of trends in global terms will be checked and supplemented by intensive "case studies" of a selected group of individual countries or areas. Ideally, this group should include representative western and non-western countries with varying power status in the world community, together with folk cultures. Practically, the selection will be determined by available resources and personnel. At the present time, case studies appear feasible for the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, France, Germany, China, Japan, Egypt, and one folk culture group with dependent status.

The approach and method of the investigation have been designed to provide maximum opportunities for pooling the substantive and methodological contributions of all participants. Recently developed social science techniques for obtaining and presenting quantified data are being used, where appropriate. As a means of describing and presenting changes of doctrine and belief concerning security, democracy, and fraternity, the methods of "content analysis" developed during the war for short-range periods are being adapted to the sixty-year period under investigation. In the analysis of democratic trends, studies are being made of the "élites" of selected countries, using models and methods developed in recent years. These and other new social science techniques will be supplemented, of course, by commentaries and analyses in more conventional form.

In the gathering of research data, the emphasis is upon the use of reliable information already available rather than the discovery of new facts. While some primary research will be essential, the project will be governed by the principle that the objective is better understanding, not necessarily new information.

The senior research staff and consultants are chosen to bring together experienced experts of the various disciplines and areas and men and women from public and private agencies active in the field of international relations. Taking part in the enterprise are historians, political scientists, economist, social-

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ogists, anthropologists, psychologists, exponents of combined social science approaches and methods, and specialists on the Soviet Union, Central Europe, Western Europe, the Middle East, the Far East, and non-self-governing areas. Among the consultants are experts in most of the functional fields mentioned, as well as specialists in education, communications, and the countries of the Western Hemisphere.

The junior staff is a similarly diversified team with a wide range of language competence. These young scholars have been selected not only for the research assistance they provide, but also because they are men and women of promise.

Both the planning and execution of the research are being conducted upon the basis of continuing consultation. Isolated monographic research is being avoided in preference for central but cooperative development and review. Although the necessity for individual responsibility is recognized, the emphasis is always upon team work, generally directed by the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Hoover Institute and Library. The project as a whole is regarded as part of a broader international effort to understand the stubborn problems of a changing world. The directors and staff seek every opportunity to profit from the growing body of related research being carried on at other centers, both within the United States and abroad. They stand ready to provide any information at their disposal that may be useful to individuals and institutions.

To find the "unprecedented turn" that Arnold Toynbee believes may thwart historical precedent, is a vast and sobering challenge to the fledgling social sciences. Those engaged in this project, believe that they, in league with others who are probing the frontiers of social understanding, can help discover that turn which may lead our world toward a confident future in which human dignity, freedom and peace can prevail.

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CHOICE IN CHINA

By NATHAN LEITES and DAVID NELSON ROWE

IN Europe the zones of Soviet and non-Soviet dominant influence have, for the time being, been stabilized. Moves and counter moves have become tactical. Despite recurrent impressions to the contrary—which may, in part, be intended by our opponent—there is in Europe hardly an immediate crisis requiring *immediate* counteraction. Such a crisis, and such a requirement, exist, however, in Eastern Asia; and our successes in stopping the Soviet advance in Western Europe will prove illusory if we fail to contain it in the Far East.[1]

It is conceivable that failure in the Far East will have no serious consequences for our future world position. The power potential of Eastern Asia may remain unmobilized for the next generation. On the other hand, Asiatic Communist Parties may attain substantial success in tasks hitherto unsolved. That Japan's recent attempt to "organize" Eastern Asia miscarried should not lead us to assume that future attempts will use similar techniques or meet with similar failure. The same holds true for the earlier and abortive efforts of the Chinese Nationalist Party. Clearly, it is impossible to predict with any certainty how powerful Soviet China would be, say, in 1975.

On the other hand, to allow developments to continue their present course appears to involve great risk. It would seem more dangerous to take no action, on the assumption that Communist efforts sharply to raise the power of China and of the rest of Asia will fail, than to take measures which will guarantee moderate safety for the future. The danger of doing more than may ultimately prove to have been necessary seems smaller than that

[1] The "frontal" attack in Europe came to an end in the middle of 1948 with the stabilization of the airlift to Berlin and of the Yugoslav Politburo in Belgrade. The campaigns of Tulpanov and Zhdanov failed. But they served the purpose, whether so intended or not, of being feints in connection with the Asiatic "rear" attack which gathered force in the fall of 1948 and achieved major victories around the turn of the year.

For the background of our recent policy in the Far East, see David Nelson Rowe, "American Policy Toward China," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 255, January, 1948, pp. 136-145.

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of failing to prevent a sharp deterioration of our future position. Available knowledge of future developments is, in most spheres of policy-making, not complete enough to make it possible to avoid all waste. Our knowledge may, however, already be sufficient to make it possible to avoid disasters, however remote. In this respect, we should probably be willing to imitate our Soviet competitors. They are accustomed to base their calculations upon the assumption that the worst future contingency is the one which their policy must plan to prevent. They believe that the less dangerous contingencies will then take care of themselves. Failure to plan to prevent the worst contingency from occurring is, on the other hand, to invite it to happen.

This makes it necessary to sketch the outlines of current developments in Eastern Asia which may possibly prove disastrous if left unchecked. Similar probabilities were clearly faced by our policy-makers and the public only a few years ago when the Japanese seemed about to succeed in creating a Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. The image of a future Greater East Asia mobilized against us was to a significant extent behind our vast counter-mobilization from 1941 on. Realization of these dangers had for several years placed us in such sharp opposition to Japan as to reduce Pearl Harbor to an almost symbolic occurrence. The Japanese decision to attack us directly came after the American decision to combine action with other powers to stop the Japanese advance on the Eastern Asiatic continent. When stringent economic sanctions were imposed on Japan, the Japanese government was left with the choice of desisting from the final steps in the construction of Greater East Asia or of opposing us by force. At this point the Japanese naval authorities and the government under their influence decided that, in order safely to go ahead in Asia, they would have to destroy the only American weapon which could be brought to bear against them in the western Pacific, the United States Navy. The Soviet Union and its allies do not at present, and in the immediate future presumably will not, possess facilities comparable to those of the Japanese for striking at us directly. Their continental policy, on the other hand, as will be argued below, is more dangerous to us than that of the Japanese. The first circumstance reduces the difficulty, and enhances the urgency, of opposing

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Soviet policy; but it also obscures the necessity of opposing, while there is yet time, a threat greater than that posed by Japan.

In order to marshal the evidence to support the conclusions suggested above, and to clarify their policy implications, we shall discuss the following questions: What is the nature of the Chinese Communist Party? What are its probable objectives for China? What is the probable future power potential of a Soviet China, either by itself or in relation to other regions in Asia and the western Pacific? What is the probable future international alignment of a Soviet China? What will be the probable impact of this on the security of the United States? Do the dangers of current developments suggest new American policies? We submit that they do, and shall offer the outlines of a policy as a basis for further clarification and specification.

Chinese Communism and the Politburo

On the occasion of his April, 1945, visit to the Kremlin, Ambassador Hurley asked Molotov about the attitude of the Soviet government towards the Chinese Communist Party. Molotov answered: "Chinese Communists? They are simple agrarian reformers!" At the Potsdam Conference, Stalin, according to James F. Byrnes, said that "the Chinese Communists were not real Communists at all."[2] One may recall that similar opinions were prominent in this country from the middle thirties until a recent time, and are by no means extinct today. As a matter of fact, "*the mystery is not, are they really Communists? It is only how the question can be raised by any informed and sincere person.*"[3]

For reasons which cannot be elaborated here, the Chinese Communist Party has achieved a maximum of deception with a minimum of surface adaptation. It never arranged for an apparent rupture with the Comintern, as did the American Communist Party in 1940. It never hid the sacred name "Communist Party," as did (and do) a number of Comintern sections in colonial and semi-colonial areas. The records of the Comin-

[2] David J. Dallin, *Soviet Russia and the Far East*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1948, p. 233; James F. Byrnes, *Speaking Frankly*, New York, Harper, 1947, p. 228.

[3] Subcommittee no. 5, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, *Communism in China*, Washington, U. S. Govt. Printing Office, 1948, p. 2. Italics are in the original text.

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tern up to its "dissolution" in 1943 show regular and prominent participation by Chinese Communists in the organs of that body and its deliberations; the "Chinese question" occupied at times a crucial and always a significant position in its prolific output. There was never any special attempt to hide the fact that a high proportion of the leading cadres of the Chinese Communist Party spent many years in the centers of the Soviet Union for purposes of training or political hibernation.

The communications issued by the Chinese Communist Party itself bear precisely that relationship to Soviet policy and propaganda which we have for a long time been accustomed to expect from a section of the Stalintern. The Chinese Communists followed without hesitation or qualification the jerky and profound changes of line decreed by the Soviet Union and the Comintern. As instances, one may recall the sequels to the conclusion of the German-Soviet pact in August, 1939, and of the outbreak of the German-Soviet war in June, 1941. In each case, the immediate and profound changes in the propaganda position of the Soviet Union and the Comintern were instantly and totally taken up in Northwestern China. Further evidence is so voluminous and unambiguous that it seems permissible not to adduce it here, but rather to invite anyone who doubts the complete subordination of Communist China to Moscow to present counter-evidence.

A Communist Party outside Soviet Russia is expected to conform to the Moscow line not only in matters concerning other parts of the world, but also in affairs affecting it directly—and negatively. When the Soviet army occupied Manchuria in the summer of 1945, it proceeded to a wholesale removal of industrial equipment from this most industrialized area of China. Like all Communist Parties, the Chinese Party had been determined to push the industrialization of its territory, and had counted on the capture of the existing industrial base in Manchuria. When Soviet policy upset, for the moment, this major part of the Chinese Communist calculations, there was no public protest from the Chinese Party. According to the *Daily Worker* of July 26, 1946, Li Li-san, recently returned from the Soviet Union, said in Harbin: "I feel that the movement of the machinery is not an important problem at all. Of course the Soviet

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Union moved some machinery, but not a large amount compared with its war losses."[4]

The subordination to the Moscow center which is shown in such abnegation is equally mirrored in innumerable nuances of style and imagery. When, in the fall of 1945, the negotiations between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party broke down, Mao Tse-tung said that the Kuomintang "hoped that certain Allied officers will fill the same role that General Scobie, the British commander, filled in Greece."[5] While this at first sight may seem to be a rather unimportant choice of comparison, an analysis of verbal patterns used by Communist Parties around the world at that very moment would show a considerable incidence of negative reference to British intervention in Greece. This random instance could be multiplied indefinitely.

During the period when it was widely accepted as probable, or at least conceivable, that the Chinese Communist Party was Communist only in name, observers repeatedly commented that they heard practically no Russian spoken during their sojourns in the centers of the Party. While the massive and overt presence of non-Chinese personnel would indeed have been good evidence of organizational dependence on the Soviet Union, their absence or invisibility can hardly be taken as evidence of autonomy. This matter should be viewed in the context of the complicated history of the organizational relations between the Soviet center and its outposts since 1920.

Until the late twenties, the Comintern held to the practice of dispatching to its sections as resident agents those whose political careers had been made elsewhere and whose task it was openly to foster the "bolshevization" of the particular Party on the spot. Little care was taken at the time to hide the existence and dominant influence of such emissaries over the affairs of a national party. The practice still exists, in fact, although much greater care is taken to make a person like Gerhard Eisler invisible. When Stalin prepared the political liquidation of the Trotsky-Zinoviev opposition at the Fifteenth Party Congress in December, 1927, he wanted to show the Congress an upsurge of the "Chinese revolution" which had suffered such a severe

[4] Quoted by David J. Dallin, *op. cit.*, p. 245.
[5] *Ibid*, p. 341.

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setback earlier in the year. Hence, the Comintern emissaries Heinz Neumann and Lominadze were instructed to arrange for an armed uprising in one of the remaining centers of Chinese Communist strength, Canton. This revolt, disastrous as it proved to be to the short-run interest of the local Communists, illustrates how open was their subservience to the dictates of Moscow.

After a transitional period in the early thirties the Comintern evolved, and formulated at its Seventh World Congress in 1935, somewhat changed practices and greatly changed symbols concerning the relationships between the center and the sections. By then a large part of the former leadership of the Comintern had been "politically liquidated." There were a few exceptions, as in the case of the British Party which in this respect adhered to the English tradition of continuity. But the center believed—and continued to believe until it was confronted in the spring of 1948 with the shocking behavior of the Yugoslav Politburo—that the surviving and new local leaders would be able to carry on with somewhat less direct supervision and still be ready to conform at any moment to the absolute obedience standards which had by then been evolved. Thus, figures like Maurice Thorez and Palmiro Togliatti were probably given a somewhat less controlled pro-consular status—although we cannot entirely exclude the hypothesis that the now invisible agent of the center (by now usually an MVD agent) remained almost as powerful as ever. The Chinese counterpart to these developments was, of course, the rise of Mao Tse-tung. The emergence of little national Stalins coincided with the greater use of nationalist symbols which the Comintern now initiated, or resumed. In the case of the Chinese Party, this combination of symbol and practice changes was, as we mentioned above, fairly successful in achieving the desired deception.

In the summer of 1945, the Soviet military and civilian apparatus entered the Manchurian region, towards which the center of the Chinese Communist Party had at the same time been moved. Simultaneously, former Chinese Communist leaders who had been hibernating in the Soviet Union were reintegrated into the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party. Li Li-san had been associated with the earlier attempt to seize power via

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the metropolitan (and certain rural) areas near the eastern seaboard, and had gone to the Soviet Union after the catastrophic failure of this attempt. Now he returned to the Chinese Communist center in Harbin. It is reasonable to assume that the spatial and personnel shifts mentioned—as well as the sharply increasing importance of the Chinese Communist Party and the danger of "Titoism"—have at present led to a reversion (supposing there had been a major departure) to the pattern of very direct control by the center.

The belief that the Chinese Communist Party is really a Jeffersonian Democracy was fostered by the fact that the Party for more than ten years operated in an agrarian area. But this, again, must be viewed in the context of the variegated history of its "mass bases." Following the conception of a Bolshevik Party, which was most clearly presented by Lenin in 1902, the Chinese Communist Party has always sought out that mass basis—or that amalgam of mass bases—which seemed most useful for the unvarying goal of the seizure of power. Chinese Communists seem never to have fallen into the deadly sin of regarding themselves as irrevocably tied to any given social stratum. When Kuomintang repression depleted the ranks of professional revolutionaries and separated them from their largely urban mass connections in the eastern seaboard area, the survivors showed this characteristic of a Bolshevik Party in spectacular fashion by their successive migrations to socially and spatially distant bases. While their choice was largely determined by military exigencies—which placed their bases first in central China and then in the northwest—the Party, once installed in any given habitat, proceeded, of course, to "utilize" its environment and to stress to the outer world the (alleged or real) adoption of certain "progressive" practices. Thus, the mirage of the Communists as "agrarian reformers" emerged and spread. Needless to say, the Party has always looked forward to exchanging the "backward" mass basis forced upon it by earlier Kuomintang successes for more congenial metropolitan milieus—a desire which is now being fulfilled.

It may be that the socio-economic practices of the Chinese Communist Party in the areas under its control coincided more nearly with the interests of the lower strata of Chinese society

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than the practices of the Kuomintang; or that they have at least appeared to do so. Possibly this difference has been of importance in contributing to the successes of the Party in its war with the Kuomintang. Totalitarian regimes of the Bolshevik variety seem at various periods of their existence to confer major benefits on "the masses," and sometimes do confer certain advantages on them. On the other hand, it is important—and should by now be trite—to distinguish this matter from the question of democracy in the western definition of the term. Just as it seemed unnecessary at a previous point in this discussion to give in detail the copious and obvious evidence for the ideological connection between the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union, so it seems unnecessary to show in detail the totalitarian character of the regime in the areas controlled by the Communist Party since the early thirties. As the Chinese Communist Party was the first Communist Party since 1919 to wield power for any length of time over any amount of space outside the Soviet Union, it was the first to apply the camouflage devices which have since been made better known by the Peoples' Democracies in eastern Europe. Observers insufficiently acquainted with Bolshevik practices were often puzzled, and frequently impressed, by the self-denial with which the Chinese Communist Party restricted its representation in the "legislative" bodies in its areas to one-third, leaving an overwhelming two-thirds to the "representatives" of other "parties." In the meantime, enough has been learned about the nature and function of, for example, "Socialist" and "Peasant" Parties in eastern Europe in 1947 and 1948 to make an interpretation of this practice unnecessary.

The Communist character of the Chinese Party has also been doubted because it admitted—with varying emphases at varying times—the "backwardness" of the "stage of development" reached by Chinese society in relationship to the proximate goal of "Socialism," not to speak of the ultimate goal of "Communism." This, however, must be viewed again in the context of certain not too well-known—although quite public—views of Leninism-Stalinism. The first revolutionary crisis with which Lenin was confronted in his political career was that of Russia in 1905. Both Lenin and other Russian Marxists asserted that

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the next stage in the development of Russian society was a "bourgeois revolution." The non-Bolshevik Russian Social Democrats (with the exception of Trotsky, whose peculiar position we do not need to take account of here) believed, in traditional fashion, that that revolution would, and should, be executed by the "bourgeoisie." Lenin disagreed and developed the novel point—which has ever since been a dogma—that in the twentieth century a bourgeoisie tends to be unable to complete a bourgeois revolution, or even to initiate it. That task must therefore fall upon the "proletariat"—in other words, the Communist Party—which should assume the leadership over certain strata intermediate between it and the bourgeoisie, and usually designated as "petty bourgeois." This complex of beliefs was condensed by Lenin into the slogan of the "democratic dictatorship of the proletariat and the peasantry" as a goal for Russia in 1905. The real point, which has been abiding and decisive for Communist Parties in colonial and semi-colonial areas (China, in Communist terminology, belongs to the latter group), is this: every Communist Party should always strive (avoiding "adventurism," to be sure) for the immediate seizure of power, regardless of the stage of socio-economic development of the society in which it is operating.[6] The character of that stage should determine what a victorious Communist Party does with the power thus gained, but should not inhibit it in gaining power.

The Mobilization of Soviet China

Specialists agree that the only area in Eastern Asia where the development of heavy industry on a large scale is feasible is southern Manchuria and the northern and northwestern sections of the north China plain.[7] Concentrations of iron and of coal suited for metallurgical uses are close to each other in this region. Sources of power, food, and such auxiliary materials as light metals are in the immediate neighborhood. The region has the best railway system of Greater China and has at least four sites at which important ports are located or possible.

[6] *Cf.* Mao Tse-tung, "China's New Democracy," in *Communism in China, loc. cit.*, pp. 67-91.

[7] For a detailed discussion of China's resources for military power, *cf.*, David Nelson Rowe, *China among the Powers*, New York, Harcourt Brace, 1945, Chaps. III-V.

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That a massive development of heavy industry in this area may be "uneconomic" will be irrelevant for a victorious Communist Party. While Chinese natural conditions are considerably less favorable for industrialization than those of North America or the Soviet Union, they would permit massive industrial expansion (at great cost, to be sure—but this is not decisive here) *if* the traditional organizational barriers were to be reduced.

China today offers much greater industrial-military possibilities than did Japan when she began trying to lift herself by her own bootstraps. Japan's poverty in resources induced an expensive series of wars as an attempted remedy, and finally a disastrous effort to take over China as a resource base for military power. Japan's advantages in this process lay in the sphere of human organization. The disadvantages of contemporary China, with its much greater strength in raw materials, lie precisely in this sphere. But must we not assume that a Chinese Communist government—once the civil war ends—will make a concentrated attempt to reduce these disadvantages? And can we assume that this attempt will largely fail?

For reasons similar to those which impelled the Soviet ruling group, a Chinese Communist regime will probably attempt a forced tempo of industrialization.[8] (This is equally likely if one were to assume "Titoism.") The regime will be apt to believe that its internal stability depends on the construction of a sizeable industrial base, which will furnish it with a controllable working class and with the military means for frightening discontented elements into submission, apathy, or consent. In addition, the regime will be apt to believe—regardless of an ostensible atmosphere of friendliness in international affairs at any given moment—that it is potentially threatened by us; hence, that forced industrialization is an indispensable preventive device against being overwhelmed by us. Furthermore, the leading group of the Chinese Communist Party presumably shares the

[8] This need not exclude the economic integration of China and Eastern Siberia, particularly by placing Chinese unskilled manpower, certain tropical products, and ingress and egress by water at the disposal of the Siberian economy. The Soviet interest in Japanese prisoners, and the MVD empire in northeastern Asia are among the many indicators of Siberia's demand for manpower—which China will be in a position to satisfy.

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general Communist belief that the maximization of its power is required for further progress in world expansion.

A rapid rate of industrialization will involve the procurement of a considerable food surplus for the expanded industrial sector of the economy. This will probably presuppose a good deal of collectivization.[9] Collectivization will, in its turn, further force up the rate of industrialization for at least two reasons: first, in order to produce the necessary agricultural equipment; secondly, in order to strengthen the more easily controlled industrial centers as human and material arsenals, to counterbalance agrarian disaffection resulting from collectivization in the countryside.

Thus, the mechanisms which led to the forced industrialization and collectivization tempos in the Soviet Union are likely to be operative in China too. In fact, in view of the greater difficulty of producing a food surplus for the cities, they are likely to operate in China in an even more ruthless fashion.

A Communist China, it is sometimes argued, would not be able to emulate to any substantial degree the rate of industrialization of the Soviet Union between the two wars because it would not be able to procure the capital goods and skills from abroad which were a necessary condition of the Soviet achievements. While one cannot deny such a possibility, there are other not improbable variants of the future to which we should like to direct attention.

First, what are the possibilities of what the Marxists call "primitive accumulation"—pulling oneself up by one's bootstraps—in a Chinese society driven by its Politburo? While they are surely not unlimited, they may well be substantial.

Second, what are the chances of the Soviet Politburo allocating critical amounts of capital goods and skills to a Communist China in the early stages of forced industrialization? There is no evidence that the Politburo is nationalist in the usual sense of the term and hence unwilling to "help foreigners" out of its own very scarce resources. There is much evidence that its members are empire-builders, whether utopian or disillusioned, who

[9] Agricultural collectivization is apt to begin in Manchuria, the area most suitable for large-scale mechanization, and most capable, in view of its population structure, of yielding regular and substantial agricultural surpluses.

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are accustomed to disciplined economic calculations and quite likely to recognize the value, for the construction of a Eurasian empire, of diverting certain resources to Eastern Asia in the early stages of that area's industrialization.[10] However, the great difficulties which the Politburo might encounter as soon as it envisages the diversion of very scarce resources to the industrialization of China may well be one of the most severely limiting factors on this process.

Thirdly, what are the chances of obtaining certain amounts of Western capital goods and skills by making a temporary show of conciliatory behavior; by the exploitation of illusions concerning Titoism; and by the utilization of possible economic stresses in the West? The recent "You-can-do-business-with-the Chinese-Communists" reactions of certain Western business groups show possibilities which would probably increase if a Communist Chinese government were set upon increasing them.

Specialists may differ about the degree of intractability of Chinese society when faced with the determination of the Chinese Politburo to achieve a high rate of industrialization. There are reasons to believe, however, that this intractability will affect the cost of forced industrialization more than its rate.[11] The Chinese Politburo will in all probability be set upon achieving certain rates of military-industrial development at whatever cost. On the whole, Soviet experience seems to show that this can be done—provided, of course, that one is not interested in a balanced development, but in the driving forward of certain sectors vital for military power; that one is willing to impose on "the masses" whatever sacrifice in terms of human misery and loss of life may be required.

[10] The massive 1945-46 removal of Manchurian industrial equipment to the Soviet Union was probably not so much motivated by a Soviet conception of Manchuria as a permanently "colonial" region ancillary to Eastern Siberia as by Soviet uncertainty about the postwar territorial status of the Chinese Communists. It seems likely that the Politburo envisaged in 1945-46 the possibility of an American-Kuomintang entry into Manchuria, and characteristically oriented preventive action on this most unfavorable variant of the image of the future. North Korea was not stripped.

The Politburo may come to consider the transfer of sectors of Eastern European industry to Eastern Asia, following its long-standing practice of compelling vast migrations of men and matériel in peace and war. The migrating installations might be less vulnerable militarily; the losses involved in migration might be compensated by the "trigger" impact on East-Asiatic industrialization.

[11] *Communism in China, loc. cit.*, p. 49.

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Such a policy would certainly impose tremendous suffering on the Chinese masses, but it might also bring certain advantages to them. For example, forced industrialization demands a large-scale decrease in administrative "corruption," an increase in educational levels, and development of the transportation system with incidental benefits to consumers. Even in the Soviet Union—which started from a higher level than China—these incidental advantages were important in contributing to the stability of the regime.

An additional factor—which may be particularly important in China in view of certain bureaucratic traditions—would be this: the regime will offer large opportunities for social ascent in a vastly expanded bureaucratic apparatus; and it is likely to use "popular" selection techniques in this respect, for reasons of expediency as well as of ideology, at least for a protracted initial period. This device tends to decapitate opposition by depriving it of potential leaders; to foster the belief in the "democratic" character of the regime despite its totalitarian features.

Those who are impressed with the difficulties facing any group striving for the rapid modernization of China would do well to recall the successes of the Japanese. Despite the fact that they were clearly foreigners, set on the exploitation of China for their own advantage, the Japanese, particularly in Manchuria, achieved considerable industrial results. The Communist Party with its native leadership will not labor under the handicap of being thought of as foreign. In addition, it will have available more effective techniques to prevent overt mass resistance and to force the execution of its successive Five Year Plans.

Since 1911, there has been no substantial period of internal and external peace in China and no government with the power to achieve the rapid modernization of China. Despite this, China's modernization during the early and middle thirties increased at a rate which Japanese strategists were inclined to consider a threat to the security of their own country. A Chinese Communist victory would bring about both conditions just mentioned and thus strongly increase the possibility of rapid industrialization.

The Chinese Politburo's use of the organizational techniques and physical weapons of the twentieth century, is apt to prevent

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a repetition of those cases in Chinese history in which the Chinese are supposed to have "swallowed up" their alien conquerors. Even though traditional despotic regimes (the Mongols) and traditional authoritarian regimes (the Manchus) were unable, or would have been unable, to force the rate of social change, modern totalitarian regimes with up-to-date twentieth century methods—first and most fully developed by the Soviet teachers of the Chinese Politburo—may well be able to do so. As it has been stated:

> Some of those who know most about the past of China are relatively innocent of knowledge of the techniques of tough modern politics. The modern police state can do many things in the realm of human control impossible for earlier tyrannies . . . . Russia, as measured by performance in the second World War, had grown [since the first World War] in power relative to almost all others [i.e., other powers] . . . . There is no good reason to assume that they [the Communists] could not do the same in China. To believe that they could not carry out a Communist program in China should be classed as one of the varieties of the "Maginot mind," one of the products of faith in a line of defense based upon wishful thinking.[12]

What is more, the "swallowing up" of former invaders included the easy absorption into their service of great numbers of the trained government personnel of the previous regime. Thus, if the Mongols and the Manchus became Chinese, the Chinese bureaucracy allowed their domestication to take place under conditions which maximized the power of the "foreign" regime.

The prospect that a victorious Communist Party would avoid being swallowed up is even more favorable than these considerations suggest. Some of the major resistances, latent or manifest, of Chinese society against its Mongol and Manchu conquerors were either caused by their foreign origin or could more easily find expression because of it. In this respect the Chinese Communist Party makes the best of both worlds. It will be foreign in the sense that it will model its intensive drive towards the concentration of Chinese national energy on a spectacular foreign achievement—that of the Soviet Union, which to eastern Asia appears as the bearer not only of a recipe for social salvation, but also of advanced technique. With all this, the Party,

[12] *Communism in China, loc. cit.*, pp. 51-52.

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since the thirties, appears as Chinese in its leading personnel and in much of its public ideology. We may, of course, expect Moscow to do a great deal to prevent the infiltration of nationalism into the Chinese Politburo. But it seems reasonable to assume that the Soviet Politburo will be able to achieve this end without relinquishing one of its most important devices developed during the last fifteen years—that of nationalist mimicry which allows the agents of the Center to be accepted as indigenous everywhere.

Besides appearing to be Chinese, the Party presumably wears the aspect of a popular movement from below. There is an aura of the common man (*lao pai hsing*) around it; in contrast, the Kuomintang has increasingly appeared to be a set of cliques pursuing the interests of power-holders and of certain upper-class groups connected with them. The old-fashioned Kuomintang elite was not able to hide its face as well as the new Communist elite. This latter group has drawn upon the experience of one of the greatest camouflage successes in modern history, that of the Soviet elite.

One may expect in Soviet China something similar to a well-known sequence in Soviet history. In the initial phase of the regime, policies are adopted which procure a considerable amount of genuine mass support—the "nod head" phase. This phase is used for the construction and expansion of a totalitarian apparatus of overwhelming weight which subsequently—in the "shake head" and "chop head" phases—allows the regime to adopt policies which tend to reduce mass support severely. Under totalitarian conditions such a development is quite feasible on at least three grounds. First, the violence apparatus of the regime —made into a relatively independent sector of society—allows for the accumulation of considerable discontent which finds no way to make a dent in the regime without being annihilated in the attempt. Secondly, the might of a totalitarian apparatus creates the kind of fear which the subject tends to experience as apathy or as a special kind of loyalty. Thirdly, to come back to the "common man" façade of the regime, the totalitarian apparatus built up is, of course, one which does not rely only on violence but also on direct attitude manipulation. While the regime will move farther and farther away from its original

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popular connections, it will not cease to stress these connections as being of its very essence. By presenting itself to the people as their own government, it contributes to the decapitation, in very early stages, of oppositional attempts.

Furthermore, the probable techniques of the Chinese Communist Party are likely to resemble certain traditional Chinese methods of imposing political unity on a vast and heterogeneous area. Unity of control has repeatedly been achieved in Chinese history by a single-minded group of military leaders showing little toleration of dissent. Such toleration (even the partial kind practiced by the Kuomintang) is apt to create the impression that the aspirant to power who exhibits it is weak and illegitimate—two concepts most closely interwoven in the Chinese tradition. In fact, the very existence of a serious rival or obstructionist to a claimant of central power tends to show the illegitimacy of his claim. Conversely, the full attainment of the goal tends not only to create the feeling of overwhelming power to which it is expedient to submit, but also provides legitimacy.[13]

It would thus seem unsafe to base American policy on the assumption that the military power of a Soviet China will remain roughly stationary, in absolute or relative terms, during the next generation. However, it might still be argued that a sharp increase of that power need not be taken as a threat to the United States.

Titoism in Soviet China

Our present policy seems related not only to the belief that China will continue not to matter much, but also to the forecast of "Titoism" in China. There has always been a tendency to assume that Chinese Communists are different. Now that the earlier forms of this belief have declined, the same belief seems to reappear under the guise of predicting Titoism.

[13] A full conquest of China by the Communist Party is thus likely to have a profound impact on the loyalties of the vitally important Chinese communities in Southeastern Asia. Those marginal regions of China in which much of the old Chinese political pattern survives are known to be among the "best governed" areas of non-Communist China. Oddly enough (from a Western point of view), these are the areas in which any government under Kuomintang auspices enjoys the greatest amount of mass support. Instances are Kwangsi, Chinghai and Ningsia. The fact that they are all "owned and operated" by Mohammedan leaders does not detract from the bearing of this on China at large.

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The Tito affair is the one major failure—in the most important instance, it is true—in the longstanding Soviet policy of preventing elite sectors, at home or abroad, from becoming both dissident and powerful. There have of course been innumerable dissidents, but the Center always managed to deprive them of power by the time their dissidence declared itself; or to declare their dissidence after it had rendered them powerless. The latest instances are Gomulka in Poland, and probably Markos in Greece. The case of the Yugoslav Politburo was, no doubt, an organizational catastrophe for the Soviet Politburo.

Hence, we can be certain that it is a major objective of Moscow to prevent a recurrence of this in the most important area where it could happen—China. Soviet concentration of effort on this goal may possibly prove self-defeating. But it seems hazardous to base our policy on this assumption—*if* there is ground to believe that the prevention of Titoism in a Communist China will jeopardize our security in the middle and long run.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union, in regard to Titoism in China, will probably not face difficulties of the sort which have prevented it from liquidating Tito. Presumably the main deterring factor was not the heavy cost of Soviet military action against him, or of such action by satellites plus Stalinist Yugoslav groups. The decisive deterrent was probably the nearness of Yugoslavia to our containment fronts, which would mean that a direct attack would involve great dangers. The contrast between Tito and Gomulka is clear: Poland is within the safe interior of the Soviet sphere.

The position of a Soviet China vis-a-vis Moscow will be more like that of Poland than that of Yugoslavia. If any Titoist faction were to arise in a future Chinese Communist government, the Moscow Politburo would find it easy and safe to support the Stalinist against the Titoist faction, or to intervene directly. At that moment we would presumably have written off China, and it is unlikely that we would militantly intervene in favor of one or the other.

Soviet chances of preventing Tito-in-China are further increased by the crucial position of Manchuria-Northern China in the military potential of a future Soviet China. This area may

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continue to be a Soviet-Chinese condominium—which would optimize the Soviet "veto position" in any factional struggle in the upper layers of the Chinese Party. Or, this area may be transferred, predominantly, to Chinese Communist control. Even in this case, its proximity to the center of Soviet military power in northeastern Asia would make it quite vulnerable to threats or actual violence. The prospects of a Chinese Tito serving American interests by declaring independence from Moscow are not great enough to justify basing United States policy on this contingency.

American Choices in China

At this point it becomes relevant to ask: How will the policies available to us after the abandonment of China, and imposed upon us by that abandonment, tend to affect the alignment of Soviet China?

A major factor here will be the location of our future East Asian "Stettin-Berlin-Trieste line." It is at present sometimes argued that the choice of such a definite line is expedient in Europe, but inexpedient in Eastern Asia. Our argument implies that we cannot avoid such a line; the only question is when to choose and where. Schematically, there seem to be three possibilities. Our containment policy may apply to the borders of Greater China and northern Korea; it may apply to the outlying islands—the East Indies, the Philippine Islands, Formosa, the Ryukyus, Japan; it may apply to Australia and the islands of the western Pacific now owned by us or held under mandate.

The first two choices would leave us with a "live frontier" with a Communist China. In both cases our policy would appear to the Chinese Politburo—or could be made to appear to the Chinese population—as being "imperialist" and "anti-Chinese." It would be "imperialist" since it would support the positions of Britain, France, and Holland as well as the position of Japan. A policy of containment at this border would require the overt presence of American power in such proximity to China as to foster—if this were necessary—a "defensive" Soviet-Chinese alignment. In addition, such a containment policy would be "anti-Chinese" in view of the strategic position of Chinese minorities in this area, and in view of their probable alignment,

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under duress if necessary (e.g., by the hostage system and by selective assassination), with the Communist government.

We could attempt to avoid these difficulties—we may even be tempted to do so—by retreating altogether from areas inhabited by large Asiatic populations; that is, to let containment begin with Australia and the small islands of the western Pacific. This would indeed reduce direct friction with a Soviet China—but at what cost to our position in the world balance of power?

We have attempted to establish that the substantial probabilities on which current American policy ought to be oriented are those of the rapid increase of the military potential in East Asia during the third quarter of the century, and of the alignment of this potential on the side of the Soviet Union. These developments—"colossal" or "grandiose," in totalitarian language—would of course in themselves greatly affect the American position in the world balance of power. This could be spelled out in detail with regard to the various kinds of weapons—material and non-material—employed in twentieth century warfare. We do not propose to do so at this point, but instead to direct attention to certain probable secondary—but major—effects of the developments we are assuming.

We distinguished above three possible containment borders in the Far East. Those who argue in favor of the abandonment of China, or entertain a moderate view of the loss which this would entail for our position, sometimes imply that our residual positions behind these containment borders would have about the same military worth which we attribute to them today. Presumably, however, the emergence and consolidation of a Soviet-aligned Communist China would reduce the military value of these positions to us. It seems on the whole evident that this would be the case if they came within close range of Soviet or Soviet-allied military power.

In addition, these less valuable positions would be increasingly costly to hold. Apart from the greater protection required by their more exposed position vis-a-vis a Communist China, non-military factors would work in the same direction. A low level of economic exchange between the Soviet and non-Soviet sectors of Eastern Asia would maintain and increase the sort of dependence on us now exemplified by the economy of Japan.

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We would either have to subsidize an area like Japan sufficiently to make up for the economic opportunities we would be denying it, or use the threat and the actuality of military repression against increasing sectors of Japanese society. In general, the existence of a Soviet China—and of American policies attempting to contain it—will reinforce anti-American nationalist and Communist tendencies in the elites and masses of the rim areas.[14] Such internal disaffection will not only reduce the contribution of these areas to their own protection, but also make that protection (against internal as well as external dangers) yet more costly, and much more morally repulsive, particularly in view of the values attached to our anti-imperialist record in the areas involved.

One might well imagine a future situation in which American policy-makers will consider whether the declining security "output" from these positions is not falling below our rising economic and military "input" into them. If we then decide to withdraw from some or all of the Asiatic rim areas bordering on Greater China, we will greatly foster the rate of increase of Chinese military power. If the riches of the rim areas, in raw materials and in vast and skilled manpower, are joined to the resources of China, the conditions for rapid industrialization under Communist impetus will be unambiguously favorable. Many of the obstacles which it would be difficult to overcome if China alone were to proceed towards Five Year Plans would disappear if the regime were free to draw upon the resources base of a Communist Greater East Asia. The economies of Southeastern Asia and of North China-Manchuria would complement each other; they are easily connected by sea.

American policy is thus likely to be faced in some perhaps not too remote future with a distasteful choice of alternatives. Either we shall choose to continue indefinitely a military occupation of Asiatic areas, despite their reduced security value, a holding operation involving a very high and rising economic,

[14] In Burma, Indo-China, and Indonesia, Communists have, since the end of World War II, adopted a strategy and tactics similar to those which the Chinese Party adopted after its near-extermination by the Kuomintang in 1927-28: the creation of highly mobile politico-military units as nuclei of a future state. In Japan, following the Bolshevik doctrine of utilizing all legal opportunities, the Communists are acting in part through the new democratic channels which the occupation has provided.

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military, and moral cost;[15] or we shall, because of these costs, cease denying the economic use of these areas to a Soviet China and thus greatly enhance the rate of increase of its military power.

The abandonment of China is also likely to alter the "psychological peace-fare" positions of the two world blocs. At present, the prevailing conception is still that of a non-Soviet world with a Soviet sector. With the incorporation of much of Eastern Asia into the Soviet bloc, the previous "one-sixth of the world's surface" would have been transformed into one-third of the world's population. The scale of Soviet advance, and of Western retreat, would be likely to create the feeling that we are entering into a new, a Soviet world which *still* contains a non-Soviet sector.[16] Again, one could spell out in detail the probable direct and indirect impact of this not only on Western Europe, but on India and the other non-Soviet parts of Western Asia. We are dealing with possible chain reactions which a sober sense of reality makes unpalatable to many policy-makers and social scientists. But we should not exclude the probability of what seem at first sight to be political counterparts to "Buck Rogers" developments unless we have cogent reasons for doing so. It will be argued below that in view of the peculiar characteristics of Soviet foreign policy, the risks involved in our acting on a "Buck Rogers" assumption are moderate; while the risks involved in our not acting to prevent such developments are severe.

The point is not so much that developments in Eastern Asia, if unchecked, will "make war inevitable," if, indeed, war can

[15] The recent Delhi conference of 16 Asiatic nations on the Netherlands East Indies issue indicates the gravity of the conflict between ourselves and the Asiatic nations, with whom we want to be friends and allies, which such a policy is almost certain to involve. This conflict would extend to both Australia and the Middle East.

[16] Until a very recent date the Soviet directive has—wisely—been not to refer to these perspectives. But in his speeches at the Fifth Congress of the Bulgarian Communist Party in the second half of December, 1948, Dimitrov alluded to them; in his January 31, 1949, Moscow speech, the *Pravda* editor, Pospelov, did likewise—in the presence of the Politburo —and spoke about the twentieth century as that of the world triumph of Communism; and on December 5, 1948, J. Raymond Walsh said in New York: "In six to twelve months when Chiang Kai-shek is dead in his grave and the Kuomintang is scattered in the rubble of history and the Liberation forces have taken over in China and we must recognize them in the United Nations; and all the colonial areas of Asia have also been liberated, then, when the representative of the Soviet Union in the U.N. rises and says he speaks for more than half of mankind, we Americans will have to hang our heads in shame."

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ever be thought of as "inevitable." The point is rather that our abandonment of Eastern Asia, or of the major part of it, the consequent rise in power of the Soviet bloc, is apt greatly to increase the cost to us of the peace—the cost in the widest sense of the word. That this will be so much more in the long run than in the middle run, and more in the middle than in the short run does not reduce the gravity of the matter. Such a rise in the cost of peace involves not only a considerable increase of the fraction of the national incomes of the non-Soviet world which will have to be spent on the sterile task of deterring the Politburo. It also implies a threat to our democratic values if our society is to be under the strain of a permanent alert which our abandonment of major portions of Asia will have made so much more arduous. If the Soviet bloc includes a third, or more, of the world's resource potential, the possibility of checking the further spread of Soviet influence while preserving a substantially non-totalitarian way of life would be greatly reduced.

A reversal of our current China policy seems therefore highly desirable; an enterprise which would warrant, in the short run, the expenditure of a not inconsiderable part of our national resources in order to avoid the unfolding of disastrous sequels in the long run.

The case for a reversal of our China policy, it has already been declared, is largely related to long-run considerations. This by no means implies that the timing of any changed policy, or the rapidity of its execution, has no short-run urgency. The contrary seems to be the case. Our knowledge of the structure of twentieth century history strongly suggests that certain sequences may take a long time to run to completion, but are practically irreversible from a very early moment on. Russian democrats failed to recognize, in the summer of 1917, the full import of the army fatigue, urban hunger, and peasant hunger for land. The results of this have not yet fully unfolded themselves in 1949; but the task of interfering with the sequence set up was infinitely more difficult—and proved unmanageable —after the summer of 1917. The spring of 1949 may well be comparable.

It is sometimes suggested that the sagacity of American

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policy shows, or ought to show, itself in "waiting" for the "confused" Chinese events to "crystallize." If our argument is correct, that would be a policy of reducing ourselves to impotence.

However desirable, a reversal of policy might still be impossible to execute. In fact, opinions to this effect are not lacking; they caution against an attempt as wastefully futile as it would be exacting.

Just as certain current views of what the loss of China would mean to us seem over-optimistic, this seems unduly pessimistic.

Two questions arise: Are policies available to the American government which would enable us to stabilize and reverse events in China? If they are, can they become "practical politics" in the America of 1949?

At the time of writing (the middle of February 1949), the Communist conquest of China is still far from completion. There is still much room for maneuver in China, militarily and politically. The widespread Chinese desire for peace is not uncomplicated by considerations of price. If American policy were to arouse expectations of successful military resistance to the Communists, attitudes and behaviors on both sides would drastically change, no matter how long—within reason—the accomplishment of the new designs would require.

As of early 1949, the Communists probably do not expect in any case to be able to keep up their rate of advance of the last months of 1948. Suppose the new factor of an impressively conveyed, though not necessarily immediately and massively implemented, American determination to hold the present lines were to be added to this situation.[17] Given the cautiousness and flexibility of Leninist-Stalinist strategy, the Communist objective would be apt to shift jerkily: the consolidation of the great conquests of late 1948 would attain first priority rather than the pursuit of a further advance, which would suddenly appear as "adventurist." Communist strategy is acutely aware of the dangers of getting out on a limb and of provoking overwhelming counterattack; it has always resolved to protect itself against

[17] The course of events in Europe, after Congressional approval of the Marshall Plan, but before Marshall Plan goods began to arrive in any quantity, suggests that the mere announcement of a new policy may have profound immediate effects. In Europe, it made possible an immediate rallying of anti-Communist strength.

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these dangers at the cost of missing what may superficially seem enticing opportunities.

Furthermore, Communist strategy is very sensitive not only to "the relationship of forces" actually present at any given moment, but equally, if not more so, to the probable development in the impending future. The Communist strategist, in political as well as military matters—a distinction of notoriously small importance for a Communist—is expected to hear the grass grow beneath the soil; it is the mark of "degeneration" to become aware of its shoots only when everybody else can see them too. If we can in the first half of 1949 impressively convey our determination to strengthen the foes of Communism in China by, say, late 1949, the time interval necessary for the actual implementation of our announced policy would probably not at all defeat its purpose. There is a strong likelihood, once our new determination were known, that any further Communist gains which it would appear feasible to snatch during that interval would be inhibited by the Party's awareness that they would be untenable once our policy reaches the stage of implementation. The Party—following a well-established Bolshevik pattern—would probably begin to regard a part of its unexpectedly huge recent gains as affording it comfortable retreat space should the necessity arise. The history of the Party has been marked by advance-and-retreat fluctuations of unusual amplitude. Its formative years in the later twenties have left it with a deep awareness of the catastrophes which may come from over-boldness. The caution which has arisen from such experiences would presumably be strongly supported by Stalin who was largely responsible for them. He may now be particularly unwilling to jeopardize the very creditable results already achieved, by rigid insistence on the immediate all-out conquest of China.

A detailed analysis of Soviet and Chinese Communist behavior since the end of the war would, we believe, show that it was rather consistently based on the expectation of a possible American turn to effective containment in China at any time. Once we have convinced Moscow and the Chinese Party—who are doubtlessly surprised and puzzled by what seems like a needless retreat contrary to the "interests" of the "American

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ruling class"—that the turn has come, we may expect them to adjust rather serenely.

While the responsiveness of the Chinese Communist Party to our effective intervention is apt to be as high as it always, potentially, was, the responsiveness of the non-Communist Chinese authorities, regional and supra-regional, to shifts in American policy has greatly increased during the last few months. Two developments transformed the Chinese scene in late 1948: the rapid advance of the Communists, and the rapid shift of attitude and of influence within the top level of non-Communist Chinese authorities, greatly increasing the possibilities of *effective* Chinese-American cooperation. The Chinese Government has specifically requested increased American control over the war against the Chinese Communists. The hitherto prevailing relations between Chinese and American military and civilian agencies made for a low degree of utilization of American skill and material, but there is no need for those particular relations to survive. Past disappointments should, in the present critical situation, not stand in the way of insight into the fact that a new departure in Chinese-American *combined operations* has become feasible. Genuine agreement between American and Chinese authorities can now be reached on a new type of relationship which would sharply reduce the waste which prevailed in 1947-48. Thus, there is no reason at all to regard the shape of Sino-American relationships as fixed. A fresh and imaginative new pattern is needed, one which will satisfy the common and overwhelming interest in rescuing China from capture by the Communist Party. Many feats of American engineering have become possible because we have been unwilling to take for granted what appeared to be limiting factors. A less adventurous technology would have been unable to find a satisfactory solution to pressing problems. The same boldness in breaking precedents for the sake of major moral and security interests is required in the sphere of Chinese-American inter-agency relations. We can now rely upon the willingness of Chinese authorities to agree with us on techniques of combined work *which would leave success or failure largely up to us.*

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The long-run success of any American action in the China of 1949 depends upon the effectiveness of its short-run military impact. The first aim must be a stabilization of the military situation which will provide time to build up strength for the later counterattack. With such a stabilization we shall gain the time for more roundabout methods of a socio-economic and political nature to create the conditions which will ultimately force a general Communist retreat.

This analysis has not sought to develop a detailed program of United States action to stiffen the opposition to Chinese Communism. Such a program can, in the authors' opinion, be formulated and enforced. It can only be elaborated on the basis of classified data and detailed knowledge available to policy-making officials. What we have sought to demonstrate is the need for some kind of vigorous short-run policy. Whatever form it takes, it would have to meet the following conditions:

(1) American determination of the kinds and amounts of weapons and equipment to be supplied to Chinese forces, with emphasis on types appropriate to the Chinese geography and technology;[18]

(2) Enough American personnel to permit Chinese-American liaison at both strategical and tactical levels;

(3) Over-all military direction by a prominent American military personality with successful experience in China, whose appointment would be an earnest of the serious intentions of the United States; and

(4) A mature United States information program in China, coordinated with the other aspects of our policy.

The nature of warfare in China is such that all that is required can be achieved—with a probability amounting to practical certainty—without throwing in resources on what *to us* would be a large scale. For the time being, then, we submit, a commitment of something between one-half of one per cent and one per cent, roughly speaking, of the American national income is likely to spell a huge difference to our future national security position. Our total military plus ECA plus China bud-

[18] The military supplies most needed in China are small arms, light artillery, light transport equipment, ammunition, fuel—rather than, say, jet planes whose distinctive capabilities would seem superfluous in view of the nature of the Communist opposition.

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get would remain far below the fraction of our national income devoted to military expenditures during the late war. Our assumption, however, is that our national security is—for the long run, but therefore not less importantly—as much threatened today as it was during any phase of the recent war. This order of magnitude of expenditure in China would not be such as to interfere in any major way with present plans for domestic rearmament and European recovery.

We should from the start vigorously present to the Chinese people, to our own public, and to the rest of the world the full moral case for our actions. President Truman's inaugural address of January 20, 1949, expressed those ethical and political concepts from which the necessity to save China from Stalinist totalitarianism derives. Political warfare must be an integral part of our action. Our struggle, of course, is not against any section of the Chinese people, but against a small group of aspirants to despotism who "use" the symbols of democracy. The policy here proposed is merely the implementation—under disastrous conditions—of the traditional American goal of democracy, independence, and welfare for China.[19]

Soviet-American War?

Is the Soviet reaction to an American policy of this type likely to bring about general war?

This would seem to us an extremely unlikely outcome. But even if the Soviets did so react, this might not be a valid objection to the policy proposed, for the following reasons.

The prediction that the Politburo will, in effect, regard a reversal of our China policy as a *casus belli,* must be based on one of two assumptions. First, the Politburo may choose China as the appropriate ground upon which to have a showdown which it has decided to be desirable or unavoidable by virtue of its global analysis of the situation (we must assume that most major analyses underlying Politburo behavior are global).

[19] In this article we abstain from discussing the problems of democracy in China. We do of course regard the democratization of China as a major and attainable goal for the latter half of the twentieth century—provided China escapes the 1949 danger of absorption by totalitarianism, a process notoriously difficult to reverse. *Even in the context of this urgent task certain immediate measures of democratization may be indispensable.* Discussion of this major point lies beyond the confines of this article. For an analysis of basic factors see David Nelson Rowe, *op. cit.,* Chap. VIII.

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If this were so, we must also assume that the Politburo will not lack other contact areas within which to begin a general conflict for which they feel the time now to be optimal. We could therefore not escape this crisis by abandoning China.

The other possibility is one particularly relevant in the context of our analysis: the Politburo may have revised its presumable 1945 estimate according to which the incorporation of China into the coming Soviet world empire was to come later. It may feel in 1949 that this incorporation must come now in order to allow for the proper development of history during the rest of the century. Therefore, an effective American intervention may have to be prevented even at the cost of war. While, again, this seems unlikely to us, it should be noticed that this assumption is hardly an argument for the policy of abandoning China. The assumption, in fact, implies that the Politburo agrees with the substance of this paper with respect to the role of China in the next phase of history. If the Politburo were to infer from this that it cannot afford to miss the conquest of China at this late stage of its accomplishment, we would certainly have to infer from the facts—and doubly from such a Soviet interpretation of the facts—that we cannot afford to allow the incorporation of China into the Soviet empire.

It might be said that the Politburo may overestimate the importance of China, and that we should not let ourselves be induced to join in such an overestimation. An overestimation of China by the Politburo, however, would be likely to fall into that class of false forecasts which become more or less correct by virtue of their being made the basis of major actions. If the Politburo "overestimates" China, it is, for example, likely that it will envisage the allocation of substantial amounts of capital goods from, say, the third Soviet post-World War II Five Year Plan to, say, the first Chinese Five Year Plan in the middle fifties—with all the consequences this would entail, as discussed above.

However, the two major assumptions listed above are unrealistic, and we have discussed them merely because an undue apprehension of immediate war sometimes seems to play an inhibiting role in the formulation of American policy. Most

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available evidence seems to suggest that the Politburo would not regard a setback in China as a sufficient cause for reversing its over-all policy, whose supreme (though, of course, not exhibited) postulate seems to be to avoid a general conflict now, even at considerable price.

The Far Eastern policy of the Politburo since the end of the war makes it likely that it did not in 1945 and does not in 1949 regard the expansion of the Communist area in China beyond that attained in the second half of 1945 being of such vital necessity for the survival of the Soviet Union at this moment that it would be prepared to fight for it. (It is our belief—which we cannot elaborate here—that the Politburo would accept war *now* only for survival.) The lack of massive direct military support to the Communists outside of Manchuria makes it almost certain—despite its secondary deception intent—that the Soviet line was and is to have the Chinese Party attempt to push ahead as far as possible—hoping, of course, that its expansion by its own strength will succeed, but also willing to have it cut its losses if American counteraction should make that necessary. There is evidence to suggest that the Politburo never expected—and still does not understand—the divergence between our adoption of an effective containment policy in Europe and the absence of such a policy in China.[20] They are apt to be neither surprised nor provoked by the beginning of containment in Asia. Almost every act of Soviet policy towards China during 1944-45 (as, for instance, the insistence upon closer integration of Mongolia into the Soviet Union) pointed to concern with a probable dominance of the Kuomintang within the traditional Chinese boundaries. Soviet policy in Manchuria in 1945 and 1946 seems, as we noted above, to have been based upon the anticipation of a Kuomintang-American entrance even into that vital Soviet border region.

Suppose, however, that the Politburo, while not envisaging going to war for China now, would want to test the "seriousness" of our policy reversal, and attempt to limit its effectiveness, by intervening in the Chinese war more directly. There

[20] *Cf.* the discussion of the Soviet decision to strip the factories of Manchuria, *supra*, p. 280, which would hardly have been taken if Russia had expected to retain full control there.

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is some fear in this country that this might "automatically" set off the Third War, and hence that our policy reversal in China would mean "playing with fire." The Politburo is apt to be quite free of such apprehensions, as its behavior in Berlin and elsewhere has shown. Communist policy-makers are extremely disinclined ever to feel themselves "committed" to any course of action; extreme elasticity in deciding about the next moment on the basis of what one learns in any given moment is a major rule of theirs. Soviet policy does not recognize uncontrollable sequels of any given action, extreme as that action may be. Also, there is evidence[21] to show that the Politburo tends to imagine the operational rules of our policy as similar to its own, unless we furnish *too* impressive evidence to the contrary.

Let us make the *extremely unlikely* assumption that direct Soviet intervention in China in response to ours would involve not only the appearance of Soviet matériel at the front and of Soviet personnel behind it, but also the actual participation of Soviet military units in battle; that our intervention would involve the same; and that a direct clash would ensue. Then *the Politburo* will not at all be apt to feel that this "automatically" means a general conflict, nor will it assume that we will look at it that way. This is no mere conjecture—the record of the undeclared Japanese-Soviet war in Manchuria, 1938-39, with the two major battles of Changkufeng and Nomonhan, seems suggestive in this regard. So is the recent record of the near-battle of Berlin which, for good and predictable reasons, did not become a battle, despite the short distance between American transport planes and Soviet fighter planes which were buzzing them.

It is sometimes argued that the policy sketched in this paper may be required by the situation but that it would be unacceptable to the American public.

There is very little evidence that American public opinion would not accept rather far-reaching courses of action on one condition: that the indispensability of such action *now* be demonstrated to it by its democratically chosen leaders. There is probably a widespread feeling of how difficult it is for the

[21] This and other points on Politburo strategy and tactics draw on an overall study of Bolshevik behavior which is at present being prepared by one of the authors.

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citizen who is not a specialist on a certain political problem to arrive at a reasoned set of opinions about it; hence sometimes a lack of definite initiatives from the public. But there also seems to be a deepening and already intense awareness of the fact that the vast dangers of the new era in world affairs may at any moment call for quite unusual action and that security interests must dominate.

There is a danger of a vicious circle between government and public opinion as to new departures in foreign affairs. The government may hesitate to initiate certain courses of action because it believes that public opinion will not stand for them. The public may underestimate the extent to which government policies are oriented on assumptions about public opinion. Hence, public opinion, in the absence of government initiative, may not be aroused on issues that are really pressing. This in its turn reinforces policy-makers in their belief that they would not be able to secure public acceptance of far-reaching courses of action.

In the immediate past the American public has conclusively shown its willingness and eagerness to examine on their merits even very bold policy initiatives proposed to it by its chosen leaders. Our European policy in 1948 has shown this. We have also taken bold action—with risks—where the odds seemed all against a successful outcome. Stripping our own arsenals in 1940 to send arms to England was such a case. Our Asiatic policy in 1949 is not burdened by national weaknesses of the 1940 type. It should show again the boldness of our 1940 reaction to calculated dangers.

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AMBASSADOR HENRY MORGENTHAU'S SPECIAL MISSION OF 1917

By WILLIAM YALE

ATTEMPTS to explain world politics in terms of the clashes of sharply defined national interests have an air of unreality. This is because of the unequal interest of groups of the population in any particular course of official action. The little known and obscure, but historically important episode with which this article deals, describes the impact of one influential private group on foreign policy, even after the President of the United States had made an official determination of policy. It also throws light on the way in which a private group can operate through and with a foreign government, whose interests are parallel to its own, to change the direction of American policy. Similarly it illustrates how a foreign government can mould its relations with the United States (or with most countries) by developing a policy with a special appeal to particularly influential groups in that country.

The episode in question took place in the British fortress of Gibraltar on July 4, 1917. There a Special Mission which President Wilson had confided to Henry Morgenthau, Sr., suddenly came to an end. Three men decided that the times were not propitious for the United States to enter into negotiations for a separate peace between Turkey and the Allies.[1] As a result the way was cleared, first, for the campaign in 1917 in Palestine, which gave the British possession of the Holy Land, and then, for the Balfour Declaration of November 2, 1917, which assured the Zionists of a National Home for the Jewish people in Palestine.

The idea of persuading the Young Turks to terminate their alliance with the Central Powers seems to have originated in the mind of Henry Morgenthau, Sr., former American Ambassador to Turkey. As early as 1913 Mr. Morgenthau had taken a deep interest in the affairs of Palestine. He seems to have nursed the idea of persuading the Ottoman Govern-

[1] See below, conversation in 1920 between Dr. Chaim Weizmann and William Yale.

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ment to cede Palestine to the Khediviate of Egypt, inspired, perhaps, by the example of the great founder of Zionism, Theodor Herzl, who had carried on negotiations with the Sultan of Turkey between the years 1898 and 1903.[2] At the time of his trip to Palestine, early in the year 1914, Ambassador Morgenthau, while passing through Egypt, had a conference with the Khedive, Abbas Hilmi.[3] Mr. Morgenthau informed the Khedive that negotiations between the Zionists and the Ottoman Government were nearing completion and that the Zionists were on the point of realizing their hopes and ambitions in Palestine.[4] The Ambassador said that he hoped the negotiations would soon be closed and that he could then return to Egypt with more interesting and definite information with regard to the plans of the Zionists for Palestine—plans which would concern His Highness, whose aid would be solicited.[5] That Mr. Morgenthau had not been unduly sanguine in his hopes was later attested to by General Clayton, chief of the British Intelligence Service in Egypt. In a statement to the Syrian Committee, in 1917, the General affirmed that before the war the Young Turks had agreed to give the Zionists a free hand in Palestine.[6] Earlier negotiations with the Turks thus may have led Mr. Morgenthau to believe that the Turkish leaders in 1917 would consider peace terms which would be acceptable to the Zionists as well as to the Allies.

On the afternoon of May 16, 1917, Mr. Morgenthau had a conversation with Robert Lansing, Secretary of State, in which he expressed the opinion that there was a possibility of prevailing upon the Turks to make a separate peace.[7] Mr. Lansing was the more impressed with Mr. Morgenthau's idea because that very morning the Secretary had had an interview with the private secretary of the American Ambassador to Turkey, who had left Constantinople on April 6 and who held the same views that Mr. Morgenthau did.[8] Furthermore, Mr. Lansing had just recently asked Mr. Balfour, the British Foreign Secre-

[2] Chaim Weizmann and Richard Gottheil, *What is Zionism?* The Zionist Organization, London Bureau, 1918, p. 31.

[3] Henry Morgenthau (in collaboration with French Strother), *All in a Life-time*, Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, Page, 1923, p. 221.

[4] William Yale, Special Agent, *Notes on the Zionist Question*, Report to the Department of State, no. 10, Cairo, December 31, 1917. [5] *Ibid.* [6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Foreign Relations of the United States, The Lansing Papers, 1914-1920*, 2 vols., Washington, 1939-40, vol. II, pp. 17-19. [8] *Ibid.*

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tary, what chance there was of making a separate peace with Turkey; and Mr. Balfour had replied that though he had nothing very definite on the subject, he had been advised that the Turks were "nibbling."[9]

Feeling that this might be an opportune time to get Turkey out of the war, and convinced that such negotiations should be attempted by the American Government because of Turkey's friendly attitude toward the United States, Mr. Lansing promptly reported to President Wilson on May 17, 1917.[10] He told the President that Mr. Morgenthau could get in touch with Enver, Talaat, and Djemal, the triumvirate who then ruled Turkey, by going himself to Switzerland where he felt sure that he could contact two former members of the Turkish Cabinet.[11] Mr. Lansing stated his own doubts about the success of such an attempt but said that if there were one chance in fifty of its succeeding, it ought not to be missed. The Secretary of State then asked the President whether he thought it worth while to send Mr. Morgenthau to Switzerland to make the attempt.[12]

The prospect of negotiating a separate peace with Turkey evidently interested the President, for after giving the matter further thought, he had a talk with Mr. Morgenthau on May 28 and again on June 7 when the question of the desirability of having Felix Frankfurter accompany him was discussed.

Mr. Morgenthau records in his memoirs that "In June, 1917, the President asked me to go abroad upon a secret diplomatic errand. . . ."[13] Interestingly enough it was Justice Brandeis, one of the leading American Zionists, who suggested that Mr. Frankfurter should accompany Mr. Morgenthau on his secret mission.[14] Justice Brandeis was even at that time playing a leading role in directing the affairs of the Zionists in the field of international diplomacy. He had had one or two interviews with Balfour, during the latter's visit to the United States in May, 1917, at which Zionism had been discussed. During these interviews Mr. Balfour had pledged his own personal support to Zionism, and Justice Brandeis had told the British Foreign Secretary that American Zionists emphat-

[9] *Ibid.* [10] *Ibid.* [11] *Ibid* [12] *Ibid.* [13] Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, p. 255.

[14] Unpublished Lansing Papers, II-B, Morgenthau, June 7, 1917, in Library of Congress; see also *Lansing Papers, op. cit.*, vol. II, pp. 17-19.

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ically desired to see a British administration in Palestine.[15] The *New York Times* even reported that Mr. Balfour had conferred with Justice Brandeis on a Zionist Republic in Palestine.[16] Influential British leaders had long since begun to realize that the sympathy of American Jews for the Allied cause could be won by promising to try and obtain Palestine for the Zionists; and in this connection it had been suggested that Justice Louis Brandeis, as an intimate friend of President Wilson, should be approached.[17] Mr. Balfour, after his conversations with Justice Brandeis, and on his return to England, felt assured that the President's attitude toward Zionism was sympathetic.[18]

Justice Brandeis was at that time in close touch with the Zionist leaders in England and it is possible that it was he who informed Dr. Weizmann of Mr. Morgenthau's Special Mission to make a separate peace with Turkey.[19] On learning from America of this mission, Dr. Weizmann went to see Mr. Balfour and insisted that the attempt to negotiate a separate peace with the Turks should not be made.[20] The Zionist leader, who probably knew of the British War Cabinet's decision to launch a vigorous campaign against the Turks in Palestine in the late summer of 1917, did not look with favor upon a separate peace with Turkey which might have left the future disposition of Palestine in a very uncertain condition. The conquest of Palestine by an Allied military force would create a situation far more favorable to the plans of the Zionists.

Justice Brandeis may also have suggested that Mr. Felix Frankfurter should accompany Mr. Morgenthau to see that the former Ambassador did not do anything that would run counter to the plans of the Zionist leaders in the United States and Great Britain.

Naturally the President and the Department of State did not want the Germans and their allies to learn in advance that an attempt was going to be made by Mr. Morgenthau to sound

[15] Blanche E. C. Dugdale, *Arthur James Balfour*, 2 vols., London, 1936, vol. II, pp. 168-69.

[16] *New York Times*, May 11, 1917.

[17] J. M. N. Jeffries, *Palestine: the Reality*, London, 1939, p. 135. [18] *Ibid.*, p. 154.

[19] Editor's note: Dr. Chaim Weizmann's autobiography, *Trial and Error*, New York, Harper & Bros., 1949, published after this article was written, confirms the fact that Dr. Weizmann received his information from Justice Brandeis. See p. 195.

[20] See below, conversation between Dr. Chaim Weizmann and William Yale.

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out the Turkish leaders in regard to a separate peace. Consequently, rather devious means were used to camouflage the Special Mission. The American press was informed that Henry Morgenthau, Felix Frankfurter, and Mr. Lewis Epstein were going to the Near East on an important mission connected with the prevention of massacres of Jews in Palestine and elsewhere.[21] The press notices went so far as to state that although the Special Mission had an official status, it had no connection with the plan to form an independent Jewish state in Palestine.[22] Even to its diplomatic agents abroad the Department of State gave no inkling of the true purport of Mr. Morgenthau's instructions. In a cable to the American Consul at Alexandria, Egypt, for Hoffman Philip, the former Counselor of the American Embassy at Constantinople, the Special Mission was described as being for the purpose of ameliorating the conditions of the Jews in Palestine.[23]

Nevertheless, there were those besides Justice Brandeis and Dr. Weizmann who knew of the somewhat romantic and quixotic nature of the Special Mission. Colonel House carefully recorded in his diary that Henry Morgenthau was leaving on a mission of his own devising. According to the latest plan Mr. Morgenthau intended to go to Egypt and endeavor to obtain an invitation from Turkish leaders to enter Palestine, on the excuse of aiding the Jews there. His real purpose, however, remained that of negotiating a separate peace.[24]

Shortly before Mr. Morgenthau sailed from New York the Colonel wrote him to say that those who knew the real nature of his Special Mission were looking forward eagerly to word from him.[25] Already arrangements had been made for Mr. Morgenthau to meet two leading Zionists en route to Egypt. This House considered inadvisable, and warned Mr. Morgenthau that the Zionists would not agree to his plan to make a separate peace with the Turks. Such, in fact, were the Colonel's doubts that he suggested that it would have been a better plan to see these two emissaries on the way back from Palestine.[26]

[21] *New York Times*, June 17, 1917. [22] *Ibid.*, June 20, 1917.

[23] *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917*, Supplement no. 2, 2 vols., Washington, 1932, vol. I, p. 108.

[24] Unpublished Diary of Colonel E. M. House, entry of June 11, 1917.

[25] Unpublished letters of Colonel E. M. House; letter to Honorable Henry Morgenthau, June 13, 1917. [26] *Ibid.*

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Despite Colonel House's warning not to talk about the real nature of the mission,[27] Mr. Morgenthau had discussed it with so many people in New York that it was a well-known "secret" among the Jews of the city.[28]

I myself learned of Mr. Morgenthau's Special Mission on June 20, in New York, having arrived there the day before, after a long trip from Jerusalem. Newly come from Turkey, I at once called upon Mr. Morgenthau. He told me that he was sailing the next day for Alexandria, Egypt, on a special mission for President Wilson to attempt to negotiate a separate peace with the Turks. He invited me to accompany him, but this I was unable to do and only went as far as the dock to see him and his party sail on the S.S. *Buenos Aires*.

Four days after Mr. Morgenthau had sailed, Secretary Lansing cabled Ambassador Page at London and advised him that Mr. Morgenthau had started and was due to arrive at Cadiz about July 1. The Secretary of State requested Ambassador Page to notify Mr. Balfour and to secure his consent to have Dr. Chaim Weizmann meet Mr. Morgenthau in Spain, as it was considered most important that Morgenthau see Weizmann.[29]

Mr. Lansing's cable to Mr. Page seems a trifle naïve, since Mr. Balfour had already agreed that Dr. Weizmann should attempt to persuade Mr. Morgenthau to abandon his mission. But at the time Mr. Lansing had no reason to be aware of such an understanding. In fact, there still is no data available on the agreement between Mr. Balfour and Dr. Weizmann other than a conversation between Dr. Weizmann and the writer in the winter of 1920. After the war was over, and when I had no official connections with either the Department of State or the War Department, I went out to Egypt on private business. One evening, on board an Italian liner sailing from Trieste to Alexandria, I had a talk with Dr. Weizmann in the smoking room after dinner. In discussing Turkey and Palestine, I told him about the strange invitation that I had received from Mr. Morgenthau to join his Special Mission of 1917 to make a separate peace with the Turks. I said that,

[27] Unpublished Diary of Colonel House, entry of June 11, 1917.
[28] *Ibid.*, entry of July 14, 1917.
[29] *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917*, Supplement no. 2, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 109.

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neither in my capacity as Special Agent of the Department of State in 1917 nor as American Military Observer with the British Forces in Palestine, had I been able to learn what had happened to the mission. Dr. Weizmann laughed and said that he would relate a very strange piece of history. He then told me the following story, which so astonished me that I can almost recall word for word what he said. Dr. Weizmann's account of the affair was substantially as follows:

Learning of Mr. Morgenthau's proposed trip to the Near East, Dr. Weizmann went to see Mr. Balfour and told him that Mr. Morgenthau's mission must be circumvented.[30] Mr. Balfour was surprised to hear that Dr. Weizmann knew of Mr. Morgenthau's plan and jokingly asked whether the Zionist leader had spies in the Foreign Office. Dr. Weizmann told the Foreign Secretary that friends in America had informed him of Morgenthau's mission.[31] Mr. Balfour said that an attempt to negotiate peace with Turkey at this time did not fit in with the plans of the British Government, which was as anxious to frustrate it as were the Zionists. But, said Mr. Balfour, this was a pet project of President Wilson's which the British Government could not openly oppose because Great Britain was so completely dependent upon aid from the United States. He added, however, that he would do everything he could to help Dr. Weizmann and his friends sidetrack Mr. Morgenthau. Dr. Weizmann replied that he could stop Morgenthau if Mr. Balfour would arrange to have Mr. Morgenthau stopped en route to Spain, and if he would make it possible for Monsieur Weyl, the French Zionist, and Dr. Weizmann to meet Mr. Morgenthau at Gibraltar.

Mr. Balfour had the British commander at Gibraltar instructed to invite Mr. Morgenthau on his arrival in Spain to inspect the fortress, where a banquet in his honor, at which Monsieur Weyl and Dr. Weizmann would be present, was planned. In the meantime, Monsieur Weyl and Dr. Weizmann were secretly smuggled on muleback across the Franco-Spanish frontier by an obscure pass in the Pyrenees. They waited in

[30] This meeting occurred after Mr. Balfour's return from the United States, hence sometime in June, 1917.

[31] As Justice Brandeis, a leading Zionist, knew all about the trip, and as Mr. Morgenthau had told several Jewish leaders in New York, Dr. Weizmann would certainly have been informed by some of them about a matter so close to Zionist interests.

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Algeciras for Mr. Morgenthau's arrival at Gibraltar. Dr. Weizmann called the conference at Gibraltar a historical meeting, taking place, as it did, on America's national holiday in Britain's greatest fortress. There, he recounted, three Jews,—Weyl, a French Jew, Morgenthau, a German Jew by birth, and Weizmann, a Russian Jew by origin—decided whether or not the Allies should attempt to make a separate peace with the Turks. Dr. Weizmann said that the meeting was the more dramatic because their only common language was German.

After the banquet, the British commander and his staff withdrew, leaving the three men alone. Dr. Weizmann explained to Morgenthau that an attempt to make a separate peace with Turkey was foolish and would result in a failure which would make Mr. Morgenthau appear ridiculous. Dr. Weizmann said that he threatened Mr. Morgenthau with the opposition of the Zionist Organization because the plan ran counter to those of the Zionists, and proposed to Mr. Morgenthau that he give up his mission and make a visit to the Allied front in France where due honors would be accorded him. As a result, Dr. Weizmann said, Mr. Morgenthau abandoned the Special Mission.

The story as told by Dr. Weizmann was highly dramatic and very personal. However, it corresponds closely with the facts as known through official documents, letters, and diaries. On June 25, 1917, the Secretary of State cabled the American Ambassador to Spain, Mr. Willard, and informed him that Mr. Morgenthau had sailed from New York on the S.S. *Buenos Aires* and should arrive at Cadiz about July 1. Mr. Willard was instructed to telegraph, in special secret code, the American Consul at Cadiz to meet Mr. Morgenthau and inform him that British and French representatives would meet him at Gibraltar, and that Monsieur Weyl would go to Gibraltar also.[32]

On July 8, 1917, the two Special Agents, Morgenthau and Frankfurter, cabled the Secretary of State from Madrid a rather extraordinary and confused message about the conference at Gibraltar.[33] The cable stated that a conference, begun at Gibraltar on July 4, had lasted for two days, and that the reports of

[32] *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917*, Supplement no. 2, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 109.
[33] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

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the representatives of England and France to their respective governments would contain a statement made by the American representatives to the following effect: that President Wilson had received intimations indicating Turkish dissatisfaction with the war and a readiness to free Turkey from German domination; that he was fully aware of the difficulties of detaching Turkey from Germany, and that the chances of doing so immediately were distinctly unfavorable. Nevertheless, the President had deemed it advisable to make the attempt in view of the great advantage to the Allied cause if such a detachment could be brought about. Moreover, the President, on approaching England and France, had obtained cordial support from their governments for the dispatch of a mission abroad for the purpose of sounding out the Turkish leaders. Contemporary concern in the United States about the Jews in Palestine furnished a ready excuse for sending such a mission composed of former Ambassador Morgenthau and Professor Frankfurter of the Harvard Law School.[34]

Morgenthau and Frankfurter further stated that in the light of a full report from Schmavonian, the former special legal adviser to the American embassy at Constantinople, and as the result of a thorough canvass of the situation by the British and French, the Special Agents (Morgenthau and Frankfurter) were convinced that, as a feeling of greater confidence prevailed at Constantinople because of a serious defeat of the British at Baghdad and the consequent insecurity of the British forces there, the time was not ripe to enter into negotiations, and that it was therefore useless to proceed to Egypt.[35]

This cable to Secretary Lansing is quite evidently an attempt by Morgenthau and Frankfurter to explain why they so suddenly abandoned the Special Mission they had been sent on by President Wilson less than three weeks before. In actual fact there had been no particular change in the political and military situation in Turkey. Rather the changes, if any, had taken place in London.

Mr. Schmavonian was an Armenian who did not enjoy the confidence of the leader of the Armenian Nationalists, Nubar Pasha. The latter remarked on September 20, 1917, at Les Ambassadeurs in Paris, that Mr. Schmavonian was unreliable

[34] *Ibid.*, pp. 120-22. [35] *Ibid.*

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and was considered by the Armenians as a creature of the Committee of Union and Progress whose leaders ruled Turkey.[36]

The situation on the military front in Mesopotamia, in the Baghdad area, had actually undergone little change. British operations there throughout April "were very successful." Although there were indications that the Turks intended to regain Baghdad, nevertheless General Maude, the British commander, was confident of his ability to deal with any counter-offensive by the enemy; and, in the summer of 1917, the British Force in Mesopotamia had actually won for itself a position which was reasonably secure.[37]

But in London the attitude of the British War Cabinet toward Turkey had changed considerably. General Smuts had expressed very decided views upon the strategic importance of Palestine to the British Empire. And in May, 1917, the Prime Minister had come to the conclusion that Palestine could be made a decisive factor in the war. Lloyd George rested his conclusion on the belief that Turkey could now be knocked out of the fight, and that Palestine was the area in which to deal the final blow.[38] It was on June 5 that the British Cabinet decided to offer General Allenby command of the British forces in Egypt. Before Allenby left for Egypt, Lloyd George told him that "the Cabinet expected Jerusalem before Christmas."[39] This was two weeks before Morgenthau and Frankfurter sailed from New York on their Special Mission to make a separate peace with the Turks.

Mr. Balfour, having sailed from Canada for England on May 31, was in London shortly after the British Cabinet made its decision to appoint General Allenby commander-in-chief of the British forces in Egypt, with instructions to make a determined attack upon the Turks in Palestine.[40] Thus, before Mr. Morgenthau arrived at Gibraltar for the ill-fated conference with Dr. Chaim Weizmann and Monsieur Weyl, Mr. Balfour knew that the British War Cabinet was planning a serious offensive in the Holy Land.

[36] Unpublished Diary of William Yale, Special Agent of the Department of State.

[37] Roger Evans, *A Brief Outline of the Campaign of Mesopotamia, 1914-1918*, London, 1926, pp. 120-21.

[38] David Lloyd George, *War Memoirs of David Lloyd George*, 6 vols., London, 1933-36, vol. IV, pp. 1830-32. [39] *Ibid.*, pp. 1834-35. [40] *Ibid.*, vol. III, p. 1687.

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Furthermore, Mr. Balfour had become increasingly interested in Zionism, and his relations with the Zionist leaders had grown more and more intimate. He had helped Dr. Weizmann, who was worried about French and Italian claims in Palestine,[41] to bring the French around, so that by April 24, 1917, the Quai D'Orsay had agreed that an Allied victory in the Middle East would mean recognition of Zionism.[42] During June the negotiations of the Zionists with the British Government entered their final phase.[43]

Lord Rothschild and Dr. Weizmann called on Mr. Balfour at the Foreign Office in June and insisted that the time had come for a definite declaration by the British Government. Mr. Balfour asked them to prepare a draft of such a declaration so that he might obtain sanction for it from the War Cabinet.[44] The Foreign Secretary felt more assurance about his policy of supporting Zionism since his trip to the United States, where his conversations with Justice Brandeis had convinced him that he would have the sympathetic support of President Wilson.[45]

But Morgenthau's Special Mission for President Wilson did not fit in either with the War Cabinet's planned offensive in Palestine or with the proposals of the Zionists which had Mr. Balfour's support. Since it would hardly do for the British Government openly to oppose a pet project of the President at this crucial time, an alternative course had to be devised. Weizmann's offer to intercept Morgenthau at Gibraltar, and stop the Mission, provided that alternative.

The affair worked out as planned by Dr. Weizmann and Mr. Balfour; but the Morgenthau-Frankfurter cable of July 8, 1917, profoundly surprised and perturbed both the President and the Department of State.[46] In view of the real nature of Morgenthau's Special Mission, it is rather surprising to find that the Department of State's cable of July 14 to Special Agent Morgenthau reminded him that his "final instructions were to deal solely with conditions of Jews in Palestine." The President was annoyed that his Special Agents had expressed to representatives of the Allies views purporting to be his.

[41] Dugdale, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 167. [42] *Ibid.*, p. 168. [43] *Ibid.*, pp. 169-70.
[44] *Ibid.*, pp. 169-70. [45] *Ibid.*, p. 154.
[46] *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1917*, Supplement no. 2, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 129.

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Morgenthau was ordered to report in detail on the purpose of the Gibraltar conference, and, together with Frankfurter, was instructed to proceed to Cairo to fulfill the publicly announced purpose of his mission.[47]

Mr. Morgenthau who, together with Professor Frankfurter, had left Spain for France, was worried by the cable from Washington. He replied on July 17 from Paris that nothing had been "done or said" by him which in any possible way exceeded instructions. He suggested that Professor Frankfurter should return to America to make a detailed oral report to the President, and stated that he and Mrs. Morgenthau would remain at Aix-les-Bains. He further said that he was prepared to proceed to Cairo, if the President wished him to after hearing Frankfurter's report.[48]

The irritation of the Department of State and of President Wilson was aggravated by Morgenthau's failure to telegraph on July 8 what his intentions were; and on July 12 the Department cabled Ambassador Willard at Madrid and inquired "by what route is Morgenthau proceeding to Cairo . . .?"[49] However, Mr. Morgenthau's cable of July 17 allayed the fears of the Department of State and of the President. The Acting Secretary instructed Morgenthau to remain in France until Frankfurter reported. But the Special Agent was politely warned to refrain "from discussing in any way, matter discussed with Department before your departure."[50] What had annoyed the President most was the impression Mr. Morgenthau gave that he had been authorized by Woodrow Wilson to express certain views in regard to the settlement of peace terms with Turkey.[51] The President, in an interview with Colonel House, asked the Colonel to assure Balfour that Morgenthau had not been authorized to express the President's views to anyone, nor to approach any Turkish leaders officially. Although he (Wilson) had expressed to Morgenthau his ideas about the disposition of Turkey, he had not expected that they would be revealed and he had not authorized Morgenthau to communicate them to anyone.[52]

[47] *Ibid.*, p. 129. [48] *Ibid.*, pp. 130, 131. [49] *Ibid.*, p. 127.
[50] *Ibid.*, p. 139; cable of July 20, 1917
[51] Unpublished Papers of Colonel E. M. House; notes on an interview with the President, July 13, 1917. [52] *Ibid.*

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The Colonel noted in his diary on July 14, after a talk with Acting Secretary of State Polk, that "Morgenthau's trip had turned out to be a fiasco."[53]

The indiscretions of Mr. Morgenthau resulted in many rumors about the real nature of his Special Mission. Ambassador Elkus, returning from Turkey, told Colonel House that it was well-known everywhere that Morgenthau was on his way to Turkey to attempt to arrange a separate peace.[54] The *New York Times* published on August 15 a news item from the Foreign Affairs News Service to the effect that Mr. Morgenthau, on reaching the British lines in Palestine, intended to seek conferences with Turkish officials and to discuss with them the possibilities of a separate peace with Turkey.[55] But by this time the Special Mission was definitely at an end. The conference with Dr. Weizmann and Monsieur Weyl at Gibraltar on July 4, 1917, had terminated it effectively.

Mr. Morgenthau remained in France during July and August, and visited the British front there in August.[56] Mrs. Morgenthau received the ribbon of the Legion of Honor on August 15.[57] Dr. Weizmann had successfully accomplished the mission which he had been sent on by Mr. Balfour, and had sidetracked President Wilson's Special Mission to make a separate peace with Turkey.

Mr. Morgenthau never forgave the Zionist leader, and some years later publicly announced his opposition to the Zionist Movement in a statement issued by several prominent Jews, wherein they said: "We reject the Zionist project of a national home for the Jewish people in Palestine."[58]

It is well-known that pressure groups influence foreign policy in its formative stages. It is equally well understood that such groups frequently endeavor, and sometimes contrive, to reverse policies once publicly announced. It is also a matter of historical record that foreign governments, even intimate allies, do not always accept the American lead. What is unusual about this episode is the fact that the leaders of a private interest group not only succeeded in circumventing the objects of secret diplomacy, but did so without attempting to mobilize public opinion.

[53] Unpublished Diary of Colonel House, *op. cit.* [54] *Ibid.*
[55] *New York Times*, August 15, 1917. [56] *Ibid.*, August 30, 1917.
[57] *Ibid.*, August 15, 1917. [58] Morgenthau, *op. cit.*, pp. 249-50.

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KASHMIR AND HYDERABAD*

By PHILLIPS TALBOT

BOTH India and Pakistan have made long strides toward stability since winning their freedom from British rule in 1947. What are the prospects for stability in the immediate future, and for their exerting a steadying influence throughout Southeast Asia?

Despite the disorganization and bitterness that accompanied the partition of India, the two young Dominion Governments have thwarted severe early threats to their internal security and have restrained their respective extremists from precipitating a war on the sub-continent. They have each proceeded with political reorganization of the largest populations extant—since the disintegration of China—in non-Communist Asia. Other Asian nations have tentatively accepted the leadership of India in such international issues as Indonesia. In an Asia hard-pressed to adjust to new conditions, the future roles of India and Pakistan may have critical importance. One or both may consolidate a position as a new Power in Asia, where a steadying influence is needed. The extent to which the closely interdependent Dominions can achieve such status, however, depends on their further progress toward internal stability and more amicable mutual relations.

Although the obstacles remaining in the way of internal and inter-Dominion security are far less critical than those that confronted the governments immediately after independence, they are still impressive. A flow of reports emphasizes the continuing sharp economic dislocations, the social upheaval within the aroused peasantry and working classes, and the political and administrative unbalance resulting from partition. The Dominion Governments can grapple with these problems, however, only in a miasma of fear, suspicion and hatred that has blocked agreement even on mutually advantageous policies. Hardly any issues have more seriously clouded the atmosphere than the controversies over the disposition of Kashmir and Hydera-

* Based on a paper presented at a meeting of the American Historical Association, December, 1948.

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bad, the two largest Princely States of the Indian sub-continent. These struggles have not only exacerbated Indo-Pakistan relations and thus stood in the way of necessary working relationships, but in each Dominion and State have also consumed energy and material resources urgently needed elsewhere. Only India's military intervention ended a protracted struggle by Hyderabad groups to keep their state independent, while Indian and Pakistan troops still held face-to-face positions in the Kashmir mountains in 1949 while a United Nations Commission sought a compromise. Tentative solutions have now been reached in Hyderabad and marked out in Kashmir. Their final success would brighten the whole aspect of southern Asia.

II

It is not surprising that a few Princely States should have ignited post-independence fires. For many years earlier, political advance had stumbled over the problem of the States, that complex of 562 scattered entities which then functioned as a counterpoise to the restive Provinces of British India. They remained a major difficulty even after World War II when Britain, exhausted at home and confronted in India with revolution and civil strife, determined to relinquish the Crown's once "brightest jewel." Constitutional lawyers declared an end to British paramountcy, the device by which the States had been subordinated and integrated into India despite their legal autonomy. This interpretation was based on legalities and on commitments previously made to Indian Princes by British Monarchs. It posed to each new Dominion the problem of organizing not only the provinces falling under its jurisdiction but also the Princely States lying within or alongside its borders. To recognize the autonomy of hundreds of States within the sub-continent would have been to accept national chaos, for no rational separation of Provinces and States was possible in geography, strategy, communications, or economics, not to speak of political administration. Yet, each State ruler was given technical freedom to join either Dominion or to stand aloof from both. The noteworthy fact is not that some trouble resulted, but that peaceful settlements were made with all but three States. The handful of States within Pakistan quickly reached agreements with Governor General Mohammad Ali

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Jinnah's Government. The bulk of the remainder acceded to India under the persuasion of Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhbhai Patel and of Lord Mountbatten, the last British Viceroy.

Of the hold-outs, Junagadh, a small Principality in Western India whose Muslim Nawab had made the tactical error of acceding to distant Pakistan, was brought into line and eventually absorbed into a regional administration under India. That left Hyderabad and Kashmir.

The struggles in both Kashmir and Hyderabad have both been characterized by communalism, *i.e.*, the distinctive form of controversy that sets off one social community (*e.g.*, Muslim) against others (*e.g.*, Hindu and Sikh). Often this is interpreted as religious strife. In part it is, and no doubt exists that religious fervor is a powerful and fanatic impulse especially when riots break out. The anarchy which followed partitioning of the Punjab Province in 1947 caused ten million people to flee their homes in Northern India. Muslim refugees struggled toward Pakistan, while Hindu and Sikh refugees from the West sought the protection of India. Many thousands were murdered only because they were identifiable as Hindus or Sikhs or as Muslims. Yet communalism is more than a religious phenomenon. Its social and economic overtones appear when peasants who happen to be Muslims are oppressed by Hindu money-lenders or when Muslim weavers strike against Hindu mill owners. In recent years a more important aspect of communalism had been the struggle for political power. As British authority weakened, the Indian National Congress party's majority bid to inherit power was effectively challenged by Jinnah's separatist movement, which labeled its opponents as Hindu communalists. At a cost of casualties running into the hundreds of thousands, communalism came to epitomize the Indian political struggle. Hyderabad and Kashmir fell readily into the same pattern, especially as the Muslim Nizam's subjects were predominantly Hindu while the Hindu Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir ruled mostly Muslims.

III

The Nizam governed Hyderabad largely with a Muslim elite class that spread like a thin crust over the State's population, which was 87 per cent Hindu. The Muslim nobles sought an

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independent Hyderabad that would stand on equal international footing with India and Pakistan. Indian Dominion leaders judged their national independence a mockery without Hyderabad, which was imbedded within Indian territory. Pakistan discerned in a free Hyderabad a useful Muslim ally *vis à vis* India. The political problem was whether one of these viewpoints could gain predominance without plunging the subcontinent into renewed strife.

Hyderabad advanced strong arguments. With 82,000 square miles and 17,000,000 inhabitants, it compared with Korea or Yugoslavia. The Nizam made a case for his right to rule independently, when freed of the strictures of British paramountcy, by virtue of British declarations and of legal status stemming from the eighteenth century. In 1713 an ancestor, the Mughal Governor Asaf Jah, had attained *de facto* freedom from the Imperial Government at Delhi. These factors of territory, population, and sovereignty, the Nizam argued, constituted nationhood.

The State was nevertheless vulnerable to the political tides of India. Landlocked, it was completely dependent on India for import and export facilities. Nor could it hope to become independent even under an announced ten-year billion-dollar scheme of industrialization. The Hyderabad peasantry, eking out a living on uncertainly watered soils, reported an even lower literacy rate than the Indian average. Political workers from outside the State found the peasants responsive to nationalist (and, to some extent, Communist) agitation. One Muslim Prime Minister was dismissed shortly after warning the Nizam's Government of rebellious tendencies among Hindu subjects and urging the Ruler to placate them.

Advocates of the Indian case argued that Hyderabad was unquestionably a part of India. Its people were Indian, its history was Indian, its territory lay entirely within Indian precincts. The position of Hyderabad raised important strategic considerations. Spread over the Deccan plateau, it lay athwart main communication lines from north to south. Indian statements revealed a fear that "foreign interests," by which they transparently meant Pakistan, might use an independent Hyderabad in fomenting trouble against India. Arguing that Hyderabad was an issue "involving the defence of India, the

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integrity of her territory, the peace and security of the country and above all the common interests of the State of Hyderabad" itself, India forthwith rejected the Nizam's *firman* which proclaimed his "Resumption of independence" when the British withdrew. New Delhi made clear its determination to bring the State within its orbit regardless, as it later declared, of "mere legalistic claims of doubtful validity."

The struggle for control of Hyderabad had begun earlier. After World War II, when British departure was plainly imminent, the Nizam kept his army at war strength. Limitations in constitutional changes of the same period brought on a political agitation by the Hyderabad State Congress Party, the local agency of the Indian National Congress, supported by the Communist Party. In opposition, a militant Muslim organization, the Majlis Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen, built a fighting arm called the Razakars. Like other armed bands then breeding in India, this was intended as a private army. Its role was to support the Muslim ruling class against upsurges of the Hindu majority; in fact it intimidated many villages. Later the Communists switched fronts to attack Congress groups. Communist activities, according to New Delhi, contributed to India's subsequent decision to intervene in Hyderabad.

In this atmosphere of disorder, negotiations proceeded between the Indian Government and the Nizam. They had reached no agreement by independence day, when British paramountcy lapsed. Three successive prime ministers represented Hyderabad in the struggle against the implacable demands of India's Vallabhbhai Patel. In October, 1947, one negotiating committee for the State agreed to a stand-still agreement that would extend for a year the arrangements that had been in force between Hyderabad and the British Crown Representative in India. Muslim mobs in Hyderabad City prevented members of this committee from returning to New Delhi to sign the document. They demanded nothing short of full independence. A month later a new committee found itself obliged to sign the same agreement. Within another two months India was accusing Hyderabad of violations. The Nizam, in his part, complained with justice that his state was being blockaded. His agents failed to obtain shipping space for many supplies for Hyderabad. The Indian government did not admit the block-

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ade, and denied that normal quantities of drugs and other medical supplies were being held back.

Conditions within Hyderabad and relations between the State and New Delhi deteriorated during the first half of 1948. Lord Mountbatten, who had directed the transfer of power from Britain to the Governments of India and Pakistan, failed to resolve the Hyderabad impasse. A further contretemps occurred in June when the Nizam disavowed an agreement which provided the substance but not the form of accession and which had been initialed by his negotiators. This set the stage for the final act. By now India had raised its demands. It insisted that the Nizam not only accede but also establish responsible government, leaving himself only as constitutional head of state. The Muslim elite of Hyderabad were increasingly determined to resist these demands, which meant their liquidation. The Razakars intensified their activities. Outside of Hyderabad Indian newspapers carried on a campaign of vilification against the Nizam, while in Pakistan the press attacked India with equal vigor. Indian Muslims pleaded with the Nizam to yield so that majority Hindu groups in India would not attack Muslims and renew the communal rioting which had died down after Gandhi's assassination. Finally, in September, the Indian Army marched into Hyderabad on the ground that the breakdown of law and order in the State threatened the peace of South India. The troops met no significant opposition.

The successful "hundred-hour war" gave India full control of Hyderabad. The Nizam was kept on his throne, though his power was sharply curtailed and his lands have since been nationalized. An Indian military governor mopped up resistance and laid the basis for an interim government and a constituent assembly. The Nizam, who was now under Indian influence, disavowed a Hyderabad complaint that had been laid before the United Nations and denied the substance of a Pakistan communication which protested against India's invasion and the "iron curtain" that was said to conceal Indian "excesses" in Hyderabad.

Indians were surprised at the severity of criticism that came from many parts of the world after the military action. Even supporters in the Government of Gandhian principles of non-

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violence had finally approved the action, and they vigorously denied the charges of imperialism. Beginning with the premise that Hyderabad is part of India, they argued that they had exhausted all other means of settling the controversy before resorting to arms. Whatever may be said of the means employed —and several members of the United Nations Security Council criticized them—subsequent events demonstrated that the *de facto* resolution of the Hyderabad issue was followed by relaxation of communal tension in India and by closer national integration.

IV

The dispute that turned the Himalayan State of Jammu and Kashmir into a high-altitude battleground evoked broader forces than were visible in Hyderabad. Unlike the Nizam's Government, the Kashmir regime was a pawn in the struggle for control of its territory. The chief contestants were, and remain, the Indian and Pakistan Governments, with latterly a United Nations Commission as mediator. Any solution in Kashmir can be ratified only in the Dominion capitals and will affect not only the State itself but relations between the two young nations.

When British rule ended, Kashmir, like Hyderabad, delayed accession to either new Dominion. The Maharaja's hesitation exposed a more awkward and confused situation than existed in any other Princely State. The national partition had been effected on the theory that contiguous Muslim-majority areas should go to Pakistan. Kashmir, bracketing the upper frontiers of both Pakistan and India, had 73 per cent Muslims. Its trade was linked to cities and communications lines in Pakistan. Pakistan therefore considered Kashmir within its hegemony; indeed, in one version of the origin of the word *Pakistan,* the "k" stands for Kashmir which was from the beginning conceived as an integral part of the future Islamic State.

The Hindu Dogra Maharaja and the small Brahman and Dogra ruling classes were expected to, and did, recoil from linking Kashmir to the avowedly Islamic Dominion. Pakistan leaders did not regard this opposition as definitive, especially after the Muslim Nizam of Hyderabad had been impressed into relations with India (which Jinnah's followers continued

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to regard as "Hindu-stan," despite India's repeated claims to official secularism). They could not so easily dispose, however, of the tenacious resistance against Jinnah and Pakistan of Kashmir's largest political party, the Kashmir National Conference, which was Muslim-led and largely Muslim-supported. The Conference had long associated with the Indian National Congress. Its leader, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah, had developed close and friendly relations with the Indian leader Jawaharlal Nehru, who is himself of Kashmiri descent.

Abdullah recognized the difficulties in store for his State. At an early stage, when the luxury of a semi-neutral view was still possible, he observed: "We cannot line up with one Dominion against the other. Unless we have peaceful relations with both India and Pakistan, Kashmir is finished."

The problem failed of settlement, however, because Kashmir is strategically so placed that neither Dominion felt able to yield its interests there. Whichever nation controlled Kashmir could flank the other's frontier in a military action. Furthermore, with Kashmir abutting Central Asia and looking on Soviet territory, each Dominion felt domination of the outer passes a matter essential to national security.

Within Kashmir deep-rooted social and political conditions affected the pattern of events. The beauteous valleys and rugged mountainsides support an impoverished, illiterate and insecure population of peasants and herdsmen. These unprivileged Muslim villagers have long depended mostly on the Brahman and Dogra classes for governmental favors and trade essentials. The unequal relationship between rulers and ruled led naturally to communal bias when political consciousness spread to Kashmir in the 1930's. A countering factor, however, was Abdullah's popularity. Abdullah had risen to prominence in a rebellion against the Maharaja in 1931. Thereafter, in intervals between jail terms during the next 15 years, he organized an agitational movement that finally included Hindus and Sikhs as well as thousands of Muslims. During the war he raised the banner for a socialistically conceived "New Kashmir" in which the Maharaja's authority would be drastically reduced. Until after Indian independence he was still in jail on a sedition charge for having led a "Quit Kashmir" campaign against the Maharaja in 1946.

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In the meantime he had continued his close relations with Nehru and the Congress Party. Jinnah's followers called Abdullah a tool of the Hindus. They were frankly communal. Revitalizing the Kashmir Muslim Conference, in which Abdullah had once been active, they developed a program generally in opposition to both the Maharaja and Abdullah. When the political pace quickened as independence approached, therefore, Kashmir was caught up both in communalism and in interparty maneuvering.

Kashmir could not escape the frenzy that seized the neighboring Punjab province on the advent of independence and partitioning in August 1947. Refugees from outside, both Muslim and non-Muslim, carried tales of terror into the State. As in other parts of northern India, Hindu and Sikh gangs attacked Muslims in some centers while elsewhere Muslims rose against non-Muslims. In the Kashmir fiefdom of Poonch, where the population is Punjabi Muslim, Dogra troops of the Kashmir State Army dealt vindictively with turbulent villages. The stage was set for a large-scale explosion, which promptly occurred.

The immediate detonation was caused by Pathan tribesmen from the Northwest Frontier Province to the west of Kashmir. They entered the State intent on revenge against Hindus for attacks on their co-religionists of Kashmir. As the Pathans were one of the most uncertain elements in the generally anarchic situation, some Pakistan officials welcomed their diversion into Kashmir as lessening the threat they might otherwise offer to Punjab villages. Food, gasoline and military equipment were made available to the tribesmen going to Kashmir.

To Pakistan enthusiasts the fight in Kashmir quickly took on the appearance of a Muslim struggle for independence against the Hindu Maharaja and his government. Pakistanis besought their leaders to send regular troops to help the fight. Individuals and groups of soldiers took up the cry. Major Khurshid Anvar, deputy commander of the unofficial Muslim League National Guards, led an expedition intended, as he later declared in press interviews, to seize the Kashmir valley and Srinagar, the capital.

Almost the first impact in October shattered the Maharaja's tiny army and State administration. Muslim elements of both

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deserted in large numbers when the onrush of tribesmen, Pakistan sympathizers, and in-State Muslims entered the main Valley of Kashmir. With a quick plea to India for help, the Maharaja fled to Jammu. The Indian Government promised to send troops as soon as the Maharaja signed an Instrument of Accession to India. This was done within the hour, but even before the Accession reached New Delhi Indian air-borne troops were being flown to the Srinagar airport, which was already endangered by the outsiders and insurgents. Later an Indian official declared: "We saved the air field, and thus the whole situation, by just 12 hours." The action officially committed India to the war in Kashmir.

Thereafter Kashmir was effectively bifurcated. Indian military operations gradually restored the authority of the legal government over the Kashmir Valley and its approaches, and also over the Ladakh highlands and parts of Jammu Province. This remained roughly the area of control throughout 1948. New Delhi caused the Maharaja to establish Abdullah (who had been released from jail only a few weeks earlier) as head of the Administration. Abdullah functioned in close liaison with the Government of India and Nehru, now the Prime Minister. Meanwhile in parts of Kashmir not cleared by Indian forces, civil administration was drawn under control of the former Kashmir Muslim Conference, which now styled itself the Provisional Government of Azad (Free) Kashmir, and worked closely with Pakistan. In the summer of 1948 the Pakistan Government revealed that its army general staff exercised overall command of regular and irregular Azad forces. Kashmir was thus the scene of a war between two nations who were officially at peace.

While military commanders directed battles in passes more than two miles above sea level, the controversy between India and Pakistan became one of the many issues with which the United Nations sought to deal. India complained against "unwarranted aggression, at first indirect and subsequently direct, of the Pakistan Government on Indian Government territory in Kashmir." She argued that no plebiscite or other solution of the Kashmir issue was possible until tribesmen, raiders, and other incursive elements had been cleared out of the State.

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While classifying the Maharaja's act of accession as provisional, India insisted that it was legal and that until some agreed settlement was achieved there could be no diminution of Indian sovereignty in Kashmir.

Pakistan, in its rebuttal, denounced the "fraudulent procurement" of the Maharaja's act of accession by India. Pakistan also asked the United Nations to consider the Kashmir issue in the context of all the controversies between India and Pakistan.

Throughout the diplomatic maneuverings, India placed emphasis on the legality of her position in Kashmir and the illegality of Pakistan's intervention. Pakistan, arguing at a different level of abstraction, laid great weight on religious, cultural and economic factors. The principle of some internal test to determine the will of Kashmir residents in respect to final affiliation was accepted by both Dominions. The issue became not whether, but how, a plebiscite should be held. India urged that as the sovereign power she should conduct any referendum. Pakistan demanded strict international precautions to insure an "honest" vote. This was the crux of the dispute, for spokesmen on either side indicated confidence that a plebiscite held in the way they preferred would result favorably.

After detailed examination of the two briefs, the Security Council passed a lengthy resolution on April 21, 1948, which opened the way for a five-nation Commission to seek a settlement in Kashmir. For the remainder of 1948 this Commission worked to achieve a cease-fire agreement and truce. India complained vigorously against third-nation observations made in the Security Council, while Pakistan rejected the United Nations Commission's proposals put forward on August 13, 1948. Not until the beginning of 1949 was a sufficient area of agreement reached for the two countries to accept a cease-fire arrangement. By then new forces were at work in Southern Asia, and had come together to protest Dutch action in Indonesia. Whether cooperation on that issue helped substantially to moderate views on Kashmir remains to be seen.

Basic issues remain to be resolved in Kashmir. The terms of a plebiscite are not yet settled, and difficulty is to be expected in designing mutually satisfying methods and controls. How,

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for example, shall it be determined that all non-residents (*i.e.*, Pathan tribesmen and Pakistan or Indian nationals) have left the State, and that all bona fide refugees from the State have been returned for the vote? Should a single majority dispose the whole State, or should the vote be on a regional basis to make partition possible in the event of conflicting trends in different districts? What is to happen if one or both Dominions declare frauds to have occurred in the polling? These are matters that will be determined by the political climate existing between India and Pakistan and by international action rather than by conditions within Kashmir.

Viewed in their correct proportions, the Hyderabad and Kashmir controversies are phases of the power readjustment that inevitably accompanied Britain's withdrawal. The struggle between the heirs had begun as soon as it became clear that no single party could achieve dominance over the whole sub-continent. For the most part these power conflicts were fought out around the conference table, and it is to the credit of the negotiators—British, Indian and Pakistani—that in settling the details of partition they averted overt jurisdictional conflicts in all the Provinces and in nearly all the States. They failed in their task to the degree that Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir became inter-Dominion crises.

With Junagadh and Hyderabad now under effective Indian control, Kashmir remains the principal threat to peace in the sub-continent and therefore to the contributions toward stability that India and Pakistan could make to Asia. Leaders of both Dominions and spokesmen for the rival Kashmir factions have recognized the danger. The cease-fire agreement achieved in January 1949 is a start toward peaceful settlement. More substantial compromises are necessary, however, for final agreement. If, perhaps with the further assistance of the United Nations Commission, India and Pakistan are able to adjust their ambitions in Kashmir, they can turn their attention to more fundamental problems and opportunities.

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THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL WAR

By SIGMUND NEUMANN

THIS is the age of revolutions. No longer are they the domain of the theorizer or the peripheral plotter. They have moved into the center of the average man's daily thought. They are on everybody's mind and in every newspaper's headline.[1]

No continent is exempted. The whole of Europe is in upheaval. Her political parties are aligned in the name of, or in opposition to, revolution. China's four decades of civil war, India's final attainment of independence, the awakening nationalism of the Near East and South Eastern Asia spell not only the end of historical empires, but also call into action socio-revolutionary forces that break the frame of established society. Even those areas that are not engulfed by revolution are confronted with its threat. Fascism and National Socialism, though they proved in the test of history to be mere pseudo-revolts, were nourished by grievances of modern society that are not overcome by military defeat and—as long as they remain unanswered—still represent a challenge to our democratic world. Revolution has gained a new momentum, direction, and

[1] The term revolution, as used in this paper, is defined as a sweeping, fundamental change in political organization, social structure, economic property control and the predominant myth of a social order, thus indicating a major break in the continuity of development.

For a comprehensive discussion of the controversial concept consult: Alfred Meusel, "Revolution," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences,* 15 vols., New York, Macmillan, 1930-1935, vol. XIII; Theodor Geiger, "Revolution," *Handworterbuch der Soziologie,* Stuttgart, 1931; Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution,* New York, W. W. Norton, 1938; George Soule, *The Coming American Revolution,* New York, Macmillan, 1934; George S. Pettee, *The Process of Revolution,* New York, Harper & Bros., 1938; Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. *Out of Revolution,* New York, W. Morrow, 1938; V. I. Lenin, *State and Revolution,* London, 1919; Henri See, *Evolution et Révolutions,* Paris, 1929; Dale Yoder, "Current Definitions of Revolutions," *American Journal of Sociology,* Vol. XXXII, No. 3 (November, 1926), pp. 433-41; R. M. MacIver, *The Web of Government,* New York, Macmillan, 1947, Chapter XII, pp. 360-400.

It is significant for the spiritual climate of our time that the concept of revolution has been used frequently, loosely and often contradictorily. While the 19th century applied it almost exclusively in respect to spectacular political change, it is now-a-days widely referred to in other fields by the suffix of a qualifying adjective such as industrial, managerial, colonial, cultural, scientific, technological, etc., in which case not so much a sudden upheaval as a long-range process is emphasized together with the far-reaching change caused by the "revolution" in this specific field. This confusing usage is even visible in

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urgency by the drive of contemporary Bolshevism. It is not only the greater frequency and wider spread but the new quality and intensity of revolution that makes it penetrate the whole fiber of today's international, national, and personal existence.

Revolution—commonly regarded as a mere internal upheaval—has become a world phenomenon. The international character of the revolution is of the very essence.[2] Wherever its effect remains isolated (as in historical Spanish pronunciamentos, in South American coups d'états and in shifting ruling cliques of palace revolts) it may be discounted as a significant movement. Radical upheavals, as all great revolutions are, must now be played on an international scene. In fact, they constitute the

politics proper, *e.g.*, in the coining of phrases such as "New Deal Revolution," "Revolution of the British Labour Government." As a matter of fact, any significant evolutionary process will appear as a revolutionary change provided that this transformation is observed over a sufficiently prolonged period as to present a fundamental shift. True, the violent outburst is usually preceded in all great historical revolutions by an extended preliminary period that initiates and largely accomplishes the change long before the actual seizure of power through revolution sets the final stage by openly breaking outmoded institutions, power relations and social usages. In this sense revolutions represent only an acceleration and crystallization of the evolutionary process. See Lyford P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolutions*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927; Gaetano Mosca, *The Ruling Class*, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1939; Vilfredo Pareto, *The Mind and Society*, 4 vols., New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1935, Vol. IV; Robert Michels, *Umschichtungen in der herrschenden Klassen nach dem Kriege*, Stuttgart, 1934.

Hazy though the border lines may be, drawn between revolution and evolution, it is still imperative not only for a much-needed conceptual housecleaning, but even more so for appropriate policies, meeting the contemporary revolution, to distinguish between radical breaks in the continuity of development and persistent transformations that are accomplished within the framework of existing institutions, flexible enough to make the necessary adjustments, to integrate rising strata into the ruling system, and to relinquish outmoded forms and groups. The effective prevention of the revolution will depend on the existence and cultivation of certain prerequisites for peaceful change. On the other hand, the attempt to forestall the revolution by declaring the *status quo* as a desirable aim is probably one of the surest shortcuts to the very revolution which the "forces of stability" are eager to prevent. It is a fatal fallacy to identify significant change with revolution. Every living society must allow for far-reaching change. The study of the processes and channels through which it is effected constitute the key problem of constructive politics. It has been correctly stated that the warning signal for any society, internal and international, is the petrification of its controlling powers. Thus, promising forces are frustrated from joining in the "circulation of elites" and are finally pushed into revolution, breaking the natural fluctuation within society. See Pitirim A. Sorokin, *The Sociology of Revolution*, Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott, 1925; and, Max S. Handman, "The Bureaucratic Culture Pattern and Political Revolutions," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XXXIX, No. 3 (November, 1933), p. 307; Emil Lederer, *Einige Gedanken zur Soziologie der Revolutionen*, Leipzig, 1918; J. F. Wolpert, "The Myth of Revolution," *Ethics*, Vol. LVIII, No. 4 (July, 1948), pp. 245-55.

[2] "All revolutions start in principle as world revolutions. . . . Their symbols and principles must, in the opinion of their initiators, become universal or nothing." Quincy Wright, *A Study of War*, 2 vols., Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1942, II, 1110.

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dynamic element of world affairs today. Even our wars are fundamentally revolutions and the interwar periods merely an uneasy armistice between drastic, sweeping transformations.

This "global" era has made every region sensitive to the developments of far-distant lands; moreover its "popular" base has changed the decisive forces in the conduct of international affairs. The time-honored concept, since Ranke's day, of the "primacy of foreign affairs," defining the internal nature and needs of the nations, has been increasingly replaced by the "preponderance of domestic forces," pushing into world domains and circumscribing international actions. The frontiers between internal affairs and world politics—despite neat differentiations by the academicians—are irreparably blurred. This change calls for a new "international relations," the outer contours of which are only dimly recognized. All fundamental concepts such as nationalism, sovereignty, intervention must be redefined.

This holds equally true of the concept of revolution. In fact, the clear recognition of its changed character, structure and strategy has become a *conditio sine qua non* for more adequate directives in contemporary international politics. We are still living with an outdated reality, specifically that of 1848. The centennial of this year of revolutions has recently given us the opportunity to evaluate afresh its meaning for the mid-twentieth century. It was a "romantic" revolution, and if we retain this romantic model as our stereotype for interpreting today's revolution, we shall surely be defeated in the international civil war, the form in which the revolution of our time finds expression.

Conceptual Changes and Contemporary Complexities

"Revolution" as a concept in the social sciences has undergone fundamental changes. Three distinct stages can be observed in the development of the idea. They may be characterized as the natural, romantic, and realistic concepts of revolution.

The term as originally used by Dante, Copernicus,[3] and

[3] Copernicus, *De revolutionibus orbium caelestium*, 1543. On the chronological development of the concept see Eugen Rosenstock-Huessy. *Revolution als Politischer Begriff in der Neuzeit*, Breslau, 1931.

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Galileo connoted a *natural* phenomenon outside of human control (and it still does in the terminology of the natural sciences). In astronomy it referred to "the rotation of the celestial bodies around an axis or center following the iron laws of the spheres." In transferring this "scientific" observation into the field of human history, the Renaissance meant to recognize in revolution "the power of the stars," *i.e.*, the interference of super-human forces within world affairs. *Rivoluzioni*, thus defined, was a fundamental, total, objective transformation. It was *rerum commutatio* and this concept prevailed until the French Revolution. When the courtier Duc de Liancourt informed Louis XVI of the storming of the Bastille (July 14, 1789), the King exclaimed "But good god that is revolt!" "No, Sire," answered the Duc, "C'est la révolution"[4]—which meant that this force of nature could not be controlled by human power.

It is during the French Revolution that this "objective" natural concept of radical transformation changes its meaning to that of a "subjective" *romantic* deed. Now, the individual hero becomes the main actor of the revolution. Robespierre, *révolutionnaire sans phrase*, makes himself its declared spokesman. In fact, this underlying conceptual development is foreshadowed in the writings of the Enlightenment, as when Voltaire discusses "la révolution dans les esprits" and Condorcet speaks of the revolutionary who makes liberty the object of his attack and defense.[5] This new concept not only reflects the reality of "la grande révolution" but characterizes the structure and strategy of the whole nineteenth century, especially the upheavals of 1848. Individual action can overthrow the normal "course of history." It is the age of the barricades where the romantic revolutionary may do his heroic deed. It is this romantic concept of revolution which is still foremost in the people's mind even in this twentieth century.

Yet, our age has reached a new stage of the revolutionary process: the *realistic* phase. On this third level, the two preceding views have been dialectically raised to a higher plane. No

[4] Egon Friedell, *A Cultural History of the Modern Age*, 3 vols., New York, A. A. Knopf, 1930-1932, II, 368.

[5] "Sur le sens du mot révolutionnaire," Condorcet, *Oeuvres complètes*, 12 vols., Paris, 1847, XII, 516.

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longer is the revolution simply the result of unpredictable super-human forces nor the whim of individual action. The revolution comes when the time is "ripe" for it. In this sense it is dependent on objective sociological constellations. It occurs in the "revolutionary situation," but in order to become effective a decided leadership must recognize, articulate, and direct the revolutionary forces of the time. The modern revolution is a calculated, planned, long-range process and not an unexpected, uncontrollable, sudden event.[6] It builds on the preceding upheavals and gives them new life and meaning. The whole nineteenth century is interpreted as an articulation of the French Revolution. Revolution changes from a unique phenomenon to a series of consecutive turning-points in an extended, historical process. Such a conscious recovery of historical experience may lead the contemporary to become the prisoner of past revolutions. This is exactly the peril that threatens today's strategy of revolution. Oriented on an outmoded reality the revolution as well as its democratic response may miss the real challenge of our time.

Barriers to understanding the contemporary crisis result not only from the conceptual changes in the idea of revolution but also from the complex co-existence of different types of revolution in the same historical period as Bolshevism, Fascism, and the revolt of the backward nations today. They cannot be isolated in neat separate compartments. They fight, they influence, they imitate each other. Cultural borrowing goes on in war as well as in peace. The contemporary revolutions are interwoven and inextricably mixed in structure and strategy, patterns and politics. Still every era has its predominant type. The stronger revolution sets the style.[7]

[6] This definition corresponds to the concept of "social revolution" in Marxist terminology. "Social Revolution is distinguished from Revolution in society (as any social phenomena of nature) by the fact that it is not the result of the action of the blind, spontaneous forces of nature. Social Revolution is made by people, by social classes, who pursue definite interests and have put up definite goals . . . ." (*Malaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedia*, Moscow, 1930, Vol. VII). It is on the basis of this concept that contemporary Bolshevism believes that it has invented and developed a science of human society that allows it to foresee and to engineer the course of history. "Marxist-Leninist theory is science of the development of society, science of proletarian revolution, science of the construction of Communist society." J. Stalin, *History of the Communist Party*.

[7] "Wenn zwei Krisen sich kreuzen, so frisst momentan die stärkere sich durch die schwächere hindurch." Jakob Burckhardt, *Weltgeschichtliche Betrachtungen*, Stuttgart, 1905, p. 179.

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Three outstanding types in modern history may be identified: the democratic, the national, and the social revolution. While the first and the second kind have been the characteristic revolutionary expression of the Great World in the nineteenth century, they are now finally evolving in the erstwhile colonial areas. Yet, their belated appearance in China, Southeast Asia, the Near East, and Southeast Europe makes them contemporaries of the twentieth century social revolution. And, as in earlier upheavals, a stronger nationalism had penetrated and conquered the weaker liberal forces, so today the dynamic social revolutions easily take command of the budding democratic-national movements and direct them into the stream of the "coming world revolution." This may not be surprising in view of the difficult plight of these newcomers among nations (the effect of long-lasting foreign political and economic domination, of "imported" revolutions, of inexperienced leadership and of a weak middle class basis), and in view of the master strategists of the Soviet Revolution who, in accordance with Lenin's threefold slogan—peace for the masses, land for the peasants and control over the factories by the victorious proletariat—have succeeded in uniting different revolutions under the banner of Bolshevism.

The Leninist-Stalinist theory of imperialism, indeed, represents an attempt at the coordination of social and colonial liberation and therewith a claim to revolutionary world leadership. It has not been without success in the areas of awakening nationalism. And this despite the fact that the drive for Westernization has been the clarion call for the "undeveloped peoples," the U.S.S.R. included. In fact, Bolshevism itself has directed from the very beginning a twofold revolution: Russia's catching up with the West while at the same time challenging it with a new expansive social order. The often conflicting drives for national self-assertion and world revolution no doubt have created tremendous tensions, internal and international, for the Soviet system. At times even the most circumspect observers of the Soviet scene could not be sure which of the two drives would prevail. And though the earlier hopes for an eventual rapprochement have been fading of late, the attainments of the Western World still stir Soviet ambitions for a richer

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"fatherland." "The U. S. too was born of revolution." Agents of unsettlement and change, the Americans are "presiding at a general reorganization of the ways of living throughout the entire world."[8] The American example has certainly aroused world-wide expectations though this nation may hardly be aware of its appeal and attraction. President Truman's Inaugural Address is a first call to mobilize the imagination of the colonial world and of the American public too. It may be late in this great competition for the support of the new protagonists, just passing the threshold of their conscious history. Yet these very choices before the "awakening peoples" reflect the confluence of different streams of revolution and their consequent confusion. It also indicates the widespread uncertainties as to the true nature and direction of the revolution in our time.

Patterns of the Twentieth Century Revolution

While the aims, spread, and directions of the contemporary revolution are still ambiguous and confusing—proud pronunciamentos of the revolutionaries notwithstanding—its patterns seem to be more clearly drawn by now. Their full recognition can make possible an up-to-date analysis of the structure and strategy of revolution. Such a recognition may also lay open the raw material of contemporary society, its fundamental drives and desires, its hopes and fears. What should properly start as a mere "anatomy of the revolution" may well be suggestive of a better understanding of its life-stream and purposes.

What are the patterns of the twentieth century revolution? For one, they are fundamentally different from those of their historic forerunners. A study in contrasts may serve as a fruitful approach to a realistic appraisal, and may best convey the specific nature of the contemporary upheaval.

Gone are the individual exploits, the spontaneity of action, the romantic hero, the intimacy of localized encounters—those familiar stereotypes of the revolution of story books and more learned texts. Today's spasm reflects a different atmosphere and attitude altogether—cold, calculated, coordinated. Four basic features seem to characterize the new movements. They

[8] Isabel C. Lundberg, "World Revolution, American Plan," *Harpers Magazine*, December, 1948, pp. 38-46.

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are totalitarian and institutionalized; they command mass support based upon a militant myth of unlimited expansion.[9]

1. Totalitarianism

The all-embracing revolution is first of all totalitarian. It extends into all spheres of life (politics, economics, education, religion, family). This is the end of any privacy, of fundamental and inalienable rights, of individuality. *Gleichschaltung*, in other words, the enforcement of conformity, takes the place of the free interplay of competing parties and spontaneous social agencies. Nothing is left to chance, not even the surprise of romantic deeds. There is no place for the individual hero—for a poet like Ferdinand Freiligrath or an artist like George Sand or Chopin—to become the spokesman of the revolution. The dictator alone and his elite can express the will of the whole and give the marching orders.

Discipline becomes the password of the movement. Said Lenin in 1900: "We must train men and women who will devote to the revolution not merely their spare evenings, but the whole of their life." His call for professional revolutionaries indicated the new stern political climate. The father of the modern totalitarian party defined it as the revolutionary vanguard of the future state. His fight at the turn of the century for a small centralized revolutionary Bolshevist elite, as opposed to the Menshevists' idea of a loose democratic mass organization, laid the foundations for such a disciplined totalitarian party. It never mustered more than 30,000 members before it seized the power of state. Lenin thus anticipated what revolutionary parties a generation later experienced when they had to choose between thoroughly revolutionary policies and mass followings and, in their wavering attempts "to steer between sectarianism and opportunism," lost many a battle.[10]

[9] These patterns ascribed to the contemporary international civil war parallel essentially those of modern dictatorship as analyzed in my earlier *Permanent Revolution, The Total State in a World at War*, New York, Harper & Bros., 1942.

The main difference derives from the fact that this dictatorial rule is now being transposed to an international plane. This wider field of action naturally calls for more complex strategies taking due account of national differentiations, social conditions, historical traditions, "sovereign rights." Mere size obviously accentuates the strains and stresses of the new dictatorial empires. To predict, however, their early breakdown merely under the weight of these inner tensions may be as erroneous as were the many forecasts of the Third Reich's collapse from within before its final defeat from without.

[10] See Franz Borkenau, *The Communist International*, London, 1938.

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Only in a "revolutionary situation," that is, at a time when complete victory brings a rush of adherents to the revolutionary cause, is it possible for a radical party to win and hold the masses. Revolutionary parties reckoning with a long struggle can count only on a small elite of unrelenting fighters who do not care for rewards today and who are ready to make the revolution their life's calling. The young Bolshevist party comprised, above all, those professional revolutionaries who took their orders from the central party organization. With such reliable cadres at hand the Bolshevist Revolution could reach for power—when the time was "ripe."

The machine character of the revolution has been even more strengthened since the days of Lenin and the establishment of the regime. In fact, one may detect in this Stalinist age a change in the personal quality of leadership, national and international, even on the top level. In its progression from the humanitarian Rosa Luxemburg to the unscrupulous Ana Pauker the movement has lost its once appealing warmth and has become a stranger to its original protagonists.

Two major factors may account for this change. First, the revolution has found a "fatherland"; it has been transformed from a mere myth to a political reality. Fulfilled is the dream of one of its romantic forerunners, Blanqui: "The revolution is an idea that has found bayonets to support it." Yet, having finally found them, it has attained a *raison d'état,* vested interests, national ambitions. Moscow's dual role as the center of Russian politics and as the fountain of the world revolution begins to play havoc with the party lines and national loyalties of the revolutionary leaders all over the world.[11] It calls for bound satraps ready to take orders from above, not for revolutionary free-lances who take fate into their own hands. The rules of selection and rejection of leadership have changed under the centralized direction of the Kremlin.

There is a second reason for the transformation in the ruling elite. The revolution has ceased to be a unique act and has become an extended process in time and space. No longer can it trust to the appearance of the dynamic dilettante whom the spirit moves to enter meteorlike and to disappear when the

[11] See Ruth Fischer, *Stalin and German Communism,* Cambridge, Massachusetts, Harvard University Press, 1948.

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excitement of the heroic battle is over; he has to make room for the sober rationality of the patient professional. Settling down to the prosaic order of married life, the revolution has no more use for the perpetual honeymooners. It expels a Trotsky from its ranks ruthlessly and without thanks. It now depends for its fulfillment on a "reliable" staff of lieutenants. They reflect the "daily life" of the revolution, the persistence of its efforts, the peculiarities of its national environment, the differentiations of its manifold functions. The specific types, called into action by the supreme command of the World Revolution, correspond to the composite elements of the national dictator's henchmen. They are bureaucratic, feudal, quasi-democratic, and militant. All key men of the satellite states have spent an extended period of indoctrination and schooling in the science of revolution at Moscow and in this sense have proved their trustworthiness—at least until they fall prey to the sin of defection—as executors of the central authority's will. Dimitrov of Bulgaria, the grand old man of the late Comintern, stands out as a reliable bureaucrat of the international order. Ana Pauker, unchallenged chief of the Rumanian party, put into power by the victorious Red Army, derives her commanding position from her direct liaison with the Kremlin as Stalin's "truest paladin." Gottwald, operating within the apparent democratic framework of Czechoslovakia, endeavors to bring this rich industrial prize into the Soviet orbit. Tito's Yugoslavia of traditional fighters is the only satellite nation born out of its own efforts. The partisan state, loyal to its condottiere leader, guards its proud independence, insured by a safe geographic distance from the commanding center. Its own Politburo unites a carefully balanced leadership, among them Serbian General Rankovic in control of the Ministry of Interior, Montenegrin General Djilas, chief of Propaganda, and Slovene Eduard Kardelj in charge of Foreign Affairs and second only to Tito. Tito himself stands in the limelight today—the object of envy, loathing, and vituperation in the Red Empire's circle of number two men, the deep concern of the authorities of the Cominform, and the secret hope of the world revolution's foes. Yet the fights among the satellite lieutenants, like the bitter quarrels between a Goering and Goebbels, do not spell the end of the revolution. They only indicate

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that it has reached international dimensions and is suffering the strains of the overgrown Leviathan.

2. *Institutionalization*

The institutionalization of modern revolution is closely tied up with its totalitarianism. Paradoxical though it may seem to put a revolution on a permanent basis, this is exactly the purpose for which is created a complex pyramid, from the leader and his henchmen, down through the party and an all-inclusive net of mass organizations, to the lowest level of society. The fully institutionalized dictatorship promises the perpetuation of the revolutionary regime beyond the dictator's life. No further revolutions are to be tolerated. The new masters play for keeps, even if this calls for continuous purges and eternal vigilance. Welcome justification though these threats are for "totalitarian control," they hardly hit the core of its power. Despite significant daily tensions among the lieutenants, a revolution from within is well-nigh impossible. Monopoly over military power of highly mechanized weapons spells the end of the barricades and of the romantic revolution.[12] Military defeat from without becomes almost the only chance for the dictator's fall. Benes realistically understood that all too well; after Munich he welcomed the coming of the war as the only opportunity of liberating his country.[13]

[12] Friedrich Engels already testified to the necessary changes of revolutionary strategy in the introduction of the newly edited *Class Struggles in France, 1848-1850*, London, 1895, reprinted under the title *The Revolutionary Act*, New York, New York Labor News, 1922. "The fighting methods of 1848 are obsolete today in every respect . . . . The barricade had lost its charm; the soldier saw behind it no longer the people but rebels . . . the officer . . . had become familiar with the tactical forms of street battles." See also Sigmund Neumann, "Engels and Marx: Military Concepts of the Social Revolutionaries," in Edward M. Earle, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1943.

While the kindergarten stage of the 1848 revolution may impress today's sophisticated as naïve, incongruous, and aimless it would be wrong to underestimate the military threat of the barricades at the time. The writings of military experts at the time give ample testimony of the deep impression left by the revolutionary fighters. However small their number, they were looked upon as a superior and insurmountable power as puzzling to the professional military class as were the Riffs to the colonial armies of twentieth century Europe. Cavaignac who first succeeded at Paris in breaking the "myth of the barricades" was celebrated as the great military genius of the century.

The new urban architecture originated in the Paris of Napoleon III under the very impact of these June battles of 1848.

See Hugo Schulz, *Grosskampftage der Revolution 1848-49*, Wien, 1929.

[13] See Sir Robert Bruce Lockhart, "The Czechoslovak Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XXVI, No. 4 (July, 1948).

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To expect in our time the sudden rise of a militant underground behind the Iron Curtain, answering the far away and tender "Voice of America," is to misunderstand the character of modern dictatorship and to persist in an image of revolution appropriate only to a bygone era. The disappointed bystanders 4000 miles away can easily decry the cowardice of the people under totalitarianism.

There has been no lack of quiet courage and moral integrity even in the darkest of dictatorships. Yet such individual heroism, symbolic though it may be of human stamina and greatness, cannot break the Leviathan machine. If the present-day patterns were not clearly known before, the demise of Fascist dictatorships leaves no excuse for misunderstanding their real nature and that of their opposition too. The flood of first-hand documents on the German underground in the Third Reich affords a full picture of its desperate existence, its fatal limitations, and its eventual futility. The only agency able to bring about a revolutionary upheaval in the modern police state is the army—an institution, however, whose constitutional weakness in policy-making and political courage has been evidenced not only in Fascist dictatorships.[14]

The modern revolutionary has learned his lesson long before. To win and to hold the revolution he must seize and control the key positions of political society—the ministries of Interior, Defense, and Popular Information. These were exactly the three offices that the Czech Communists took over in the first postwar coalition cabinet of the "National Front." The conquest of the whole state proceeded from this vantage position and the consolidation of power after the coup was based on control of the army, the police and the media of mass communication. This important strategy of infiltration was no less successfully applied in all eastern European countries.[15] On the other hand, the exclusion of the Communists from the French and Italian

[14] See Allen W. Dulles, *Germany's Underground*, New York, Macmillan, 1947; Hans B. Gisevius, *To the Bitter End*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1947; *The Von Hassell Diaries*, Garden City, Doubleday, 1947; Rudolph Pechel, *Deutscher Widerstand*, Erlenbach-Zurich, 1947; Fabian von Schlabbrendorff, *Offiziere Gegen Hitler*, Zurich, 1946; Hans Rothfels, *The German Opposition to Hitler*, Hinsdale, Ill., H. Regenery, 1948; Ruth Andreas-Friedrich, *Berlin Underground, 1938-1945*, New York, Henry Holt, 1947; H. R. Trevor-Roper, *The Last Days of Hitler*, New York, Macmillan, 1947.

[15] Andrew Gyorgy, "Political Trends in Eastern Europe," *Foreign Policy Reports*, Vol. XXIX, No. 3 (November 15, 1948).

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governments signalized the revolutionaries' loss in power and prestige in the West—for the moment at least—and even the prospects of irresponsible opposition could hardly console them.

3. Mass Basis and the International Civil War

Modern dictatorship, despite popular misconceptions, is utterly unlike the earlier autocratic regimes; it cannot afford to neglect the masses. They are awakened now. They have experienced some kind of democracy. The people can no longer be forced back under an "unpopular" autocracy. It may deceive them, but it cannot neglect them. The post-democratic dictator knows that he must counteract this "democratic memory." Whenever he can, he seizes power legally by adroit use of democratic institutions, thus re-inforcing himself with the help of the prevailing myth of the time. After he has won power he debunks democracy's decadent deeds and then proceeds to establish an "ennobled democracy" of his own.

The formation of a mass basis is a primary concern of twentieth century revolutionary regimes. They capitalize on the failures of rational and democratic leadership and on its inability to satisfy and integrate large segments of society. Their propaganda derives its successes from the grievances it finds in society and from the promises it holds out. Modern industrialization, rapid urbanization, and total war have brought forth major groups of discontent: the frustrated middle class, the rootless unemployed, and the militant irregulars who have made fighting their life's calling. In agrarian societies, especially where feudalism rules, a discontented peasantry longing for liberation may also become a staunch supporter of the revolution, even if used only temporarily by the astute strategists of the movement.

It is in the plight of these social forces that one finds an important key to understanding the appeal, strength, and persistence of the twentieth century revolutionary pattern. China, Southeast Asia and Southeastern Europe are its natural field of operations today and democracy has already lost critical battles on these fronts.[16]

[16] John K. Fairbank, *The United States and China*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1948; Andrew Gyorgy, *Governments of Danubian Europe*, to be published in 1949; Charles Wolf, *The Indonesian Story*, New York, John Day, 1948; Rupert Emerson, "The Indonesian Case," *World Politics*, Vol. I, No. 1 (October, 1948), pp. 59-81.

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Czechoslovakia does not so obviously fit into the pattern, and yet it was here that in 1948 a model in contemporary upheavals was unfolded—a shocking illustration of the international impact of revolutions and a supreme warning to a world that still does not recognize the character of modern revolution and the strategy of its leaders.

What was the social basis of the Czech revolution? No doubt, the trade unions played an important role. The conquest of the unions, this mass arm of industrial society, became the first aim of the power-conscious, revolutionary strategists. The chaos of Hitler's New Order and the ensuing turmoil of the war years had disrupted the established power of the old-line trade union leaders. Control over the loyal proletarian masses had slipped out of their hands. The power vacuum, here as in international affairs, gave the alert strategists of the revolution a chance at gaining wide support from depressed, confused, leaderless masses.

In many lands the entering wedge was the resistance movement where after some somersaults and tight-rope walking on the "party line," the Communists soon won respect and repute as daring fighters. Militant activism and underground operations had been their *métier*. No wonder they often proved superior to the peaceful middle class and the stodgy Social Democrats. They made good use of their wartime appeal. To the surprise of Europe, awakening from the stupor of the Nazi "millennium," the Communists emerged in the dawn of victory as possessors of the precious trade union organizations in a number of nations. Since then they have been partly dislodged from this power position in Belgium. In France and Italy, their predominance has been increasingly challenged.

In Czechoslovakia, however, the Communists were from the beginning well entrenched. Their strong position was partly based on historical circumstances. That country's traumatic experience at the time of Munich fundamentally altered what originally had been a western-oriented attitude. Russia had not been a partner to this vivisection and mutilation of Czechoslovakia. Thus, it was as early as 1938 that the first bastion was won by the Communists and their international "protector," Soviet Russia. When finally, in 1945, the Russians and

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not General Patton's Third Army "liberated" the country, it was easy to establish the myth of the U.S.S.R.'s commanding victory and trustworthy friendship. True, it did not take long for the myth to fade. The behavior of the Russian troops and the generous UNRRA help from the United States changed the political balance and undoubtedly led to a decline in the influence of the Communists who were dreading the forthcoming election of 1948.

Revolutionaries usually strike, not when their opponents seem to be weakest, but on the contrary, when they show first signs of recovery—signs which are not yet strong enough to re-establish confidence in the existing "order" but sufficiently visible to indicate the passing of the revolutionary situation. This was the hour of Mussolini's march on Rome in 1922, of Hitler's "gentlemen's agreement" with his arch-enemies Papen and Hugenberg in 1933. The danger point may be most acute when recovery of strength is looming.

It was at such a strategic point that the Czech revolutionaries had to strike; yet they could do so successfully because they were fully entrenched in their complete internal control of labor and party organizations and in their international connections with the Slavic big brother and "good neighbor" Russia. Their political opponents on the other hand were divided, disorganized and without any substantial hold over mass organizations. Moreover, their international allies in no way made their influence felt. They could not meet the revolution because they had not recognized its storm signs in time.

The most promising and positive move to meet and counteract the revolutionary assault is to destroy its mass basis. What is imperative in order for a long-run strategy to encounter the revolutionary assault of our time is to help create the conditions—economic, political, psychological—for the reintegration of the uprooted masses. The social basis of Europe can no longer be restored by national action alone. International support is essential to spread the revolutionary pattern; and international action, from another quarter, will be necessary to check its spread and to achieve the rehabilitation of strife-torn nations. This, in fact, is the original and fundamental meaning of E.R.P. Its success or failure will define the future and the frontiers of

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the contemporary revolution. The U.S.S.R. knows that too. The fight against E.R.P., therefore, has become the front line of the international civil war.

Czechoslovakia, which proudly had called itself the bridge between East and West, became the first victim of their split. The in-between nation was forced into the Soviet camp on June 4, 1947, when the Marshall Plan was proclaimed. While even Moscow-trained Premier Gottwald wanted to join E.R.P., the Czech government—hurriedly ordered to Moscow—had to accept the revolutionary fatherland's command to stay out and to join instead the Cominform front of the international civil war.

The Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) of September 1947 is not a simple revival of the Comintern, disbanded opportunely at the height of Allied war coalition in 1943. International Communism has learned some lessons from its failures during the inter-war period. It tries to avoid the mistakes of the rigid Comintern strategy and to mobilize instead, if only for short-run tactical purposes (as it behooves a system of permanent revolution), all elements of unrest within the nations on the road of the revolutionary drive.[17] Now a shrewd and realistic appraisal of the dynamics of modern society calls for more than a mere proletarian base of recruitment. While still insisting on the fundamental Lenin formula of "class loyalty above national loyalty," the party appeals to powerful national ambitions. The strategists of the revolution had done so before in the Europe and China of the twenties;[18] but these peripheral trials with esoteric groups of national Bolshevism were soon discarded by the Politburo, which was pursuing its policy of "socialism in one country." Still, in the light of the Second World War's aftermath, these feelers two decades back can well be detected as dress rehearsals of portentous policies. Mao Tse-tung and Pieck may take their line from Borodin and Radek. Revolutionary activists of the war resistance,[19] an

[17] On the essential differentiation between momentary tactics, flexible strategies and rigid fundamental policies see Historicus, "Stalin on Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (January, 1949), pp. 175-214.

[18] Sigmund Neumann, *The Future in Perspective*, New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1946, pp. 96 ff. and pp. 170 ff.

[19] Gabriel A. Almond, "The Resistance and the Political Parties of Western Europe," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. XLII, No. 1 (March, 1947), pp. 27-61.

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awakened peasantry in the shadow of feudal Southeast Europe, China and Southeast Asia, even a deeply disillusioned middle class all over the map, can be steered into a new "Fatherland Front," united by the militant appeal of a grass-roots, partisan nationalism and by the fear of American "imperialism." The Cominform's line of attack can be detected in the title of its official semi-monthly publication, *For a Lasting Peace and for a People's Democracy*. But while the new Communist combine of the U.S.S.R. with the six satellites and two prospective candidates (France and Italy), as compared with the old Comintern, allows for greater national autonomy and a more decentralized system of Red Internationalism, its main purpose still remains the establishment of a strong arm of Soviet foreign policy in a definitely polarized world.[20] Wherever the new nationalism comes into conflict with Russian interests, it must be denounced, in the name of the revolution, as a nationalist deviation.[21] It must be crushed the more so as this may well be the first battle with the centrifugal forces, threatening the far-flung Red Empire. Central command must be guaranteed if the advantages of the strategies of the international civil war are to be preserved.

In the age of the international civil war it is not always necessary to move armies across national frontiers in order to win major battles. A central revolutionary authority, enforced by the new weapons of psychological warfare, can direct its orders by remote control through the well-established revolutionary pipelines of the disciplined party within the border.

One may wonder whether a Marshall Plan, had it followed immediately upon the end of hostilities, might have prevented the spread of the revolution through positive measures in time. Timing is of the essence in great periods of transition. When help rendered is too little and too late it cannot turn the tide. By then the revolutionary forces may be too well entrenched ever to be dislodged. The great decisions of social alliances must be made early in the struggle of the international civil war. They can be fatal if the democracies merely let themselves be

[20] Andrei Zhdanov, *The International Situation*, Moscow, 1947.

[21] *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute* (Text of the published correspondence), Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1948.

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pushed into a tardy defense of the *status quo* and an alliance with the forces of reaction.

Moreover, a Marshall Plan and a Western Defense Alliance will not suffice. Arms and economics are not enough to combat the deep-seated defeatism of a world torn by war and revolution. If democracy does not want to go under it has to restore in itself and in the world at large the confidence in its ability eventually to bring about lasting peace, to guarantee security, and to establish an integrated community that can meet the challenge of the revolution.

In order to do that successfully, a realistic appraisal of a nation's promising forces is as important on the social battle line as is the proper evaluation of its war potential for military conflict. In both cases the outcome is often decided long before the actual declaration of hostilities. In fact, the well-planned modern revolution is all over but for the shouting at the time of its official outbreak. By February 1948, Gottwald's party had already won control over Czechoslovakia. All Gottwald had to do was to call the workers into the street for a demonstration of power. The workers' militia and the Communist Action Committees were geared for the final push. Democracy had gone under long before.

To attribute the destruction of the once model democracy to Benes' serious illness or to the indecision of U. S. Ambassador Steinhardt at the moment of the coup is as totally inadequate an explanation as to credit the communist victory to former Soviet Ambassador Zorin's presence in Prague. This is still seeing the carefully planned, long-range revolution with the eyes of the dreamy romantic who expects heroes or villains like miracle men to determine suddenly the fate of nations. This is not the pattern of the twentieth century revolution. It is totalitarian and institutionalized, operating from a powerful mass basis and militantly organized to play its role in the international civil war.

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THE PLANNING OF FOREIGN POLICY IN CANADA

By R. BARRY FARRELL

IN the past fifteen years Canada has emerged from the position of a somewhat obstreperous exponent of isolationism and Canadian nationalism to become a leading middle power. This rapid rise to international importance has brought in its train many significant developments in Canada. Few are more interesting than the process by which Canadian foreign policy is presently being made, for its examination throws some light on the substance of Canadian foreign policy and provides the student of comparative politics with an important example of the planning of foreign policy under a Cabinet form of government. It also shows some of the problems and possibilities of a rapidly developed governmental organization.

Though a full examination of the making of Canadian foreign policy would include not only that country's equivalent to the Department of State—the Department of External Affairs—but also most of the departments of Canadian government, and most of the ecology of Canadian politics, such a study cannot be attempted here. This survey will treat these matters as "givens" in the policy planning process. The planning process itself will be discussed in two parts: first, the determination and preparation of policy, and secondly, democratic control and responsibility. The first part will concern the Cabinet, the Secretary of State for External Affairs, and the Department of External Affairs and its relations with other Departments; the second, public opinion, Parliament, and those characteristics of the government organs discussed in Part I which relate to democratic control and responsibility. Throughout, the major subject of attention will be the planning of foreign policy in Ottawa rather than the activities of Canadian missions abroad.

I. The Determination and Preparation of Policy

The making of foreign policy under Canadian Cabinet government is in many respects different from the comparable

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process in the United States. The Cabinet in Canada is a very much more important organ for the determination of policy. The Canadian system to a much greater extent tends to release the permanent official from politics by focusing all political responsibility in the Cabinet. It is of the nature of Canadian Cabinet government that a distinction must be made between determining policy and recommending policy. It is the function of a Cabinet minister called the Secretary of State for External Affairs together with his colleagues in the Cabinet to determine Canadian foreign policy.[1] It is the function of the Department of External Affairs to make recommendations on policy and to carry out the policies decided upon by the Cabinet or the Secretary of State for External Affairs. This distinction may seem rather artificial in terms of working human relationships in a policy making process and it may be contended that the line between determining policy and convincing the Cabinet minister on a certain proposal is not a sharp one. While this is true, the distinction in Canada is a very much more real one than is usually the case in most areas of American government. In Canada the division of functions between determining policy and recommending policy derives from the fundamental nature of Cabinet responsibility.

The Secretary of State for External Affairs is a member of the House of Commons, member of the Cabinet, and head of his department. He must initiate departmental legislation in the House of Commons, defend his department's actions to the Cabinet, Parliament, and the electorate, and scrutinize its work and judge its policies so that he can defend them. He must take full political responsibility for the work and policies of his department. Whatever discretionary judgment he delegates to others

[1] In this discussion of the role of the Cabinet in the making of Canadian foreign policy the technical distinction between the "Cabinet" and the "Council" will not be made. On this as well as on various aspects of Canadian Cabinet procedure and organization, see A. D. P. Heeney, "Cabinet Government in Canada: Some Recent Developments in the Machinery of the Central Executive," *Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science*, August, 1946, pp. 282-301. Excellent brief discussions of the role of the Cabinet in Canadian government are in Robert MacGregor Dawson, *The Government of Canada*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1947, pp. 228-81, and in J. A. Corry, *Elements of Democratic Government*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1947, pp. 74-104. The latter provides some comparative material on American, British and Canadian executive organization. I am indebted to Mr. Heeney for making available to me certain information on developments in Canadian Cabinet organization since 1946.

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he must still defend as though he exercised the discretion himself. On all matters of policy he has complete power of veto over the recommendations of his department. In so far as he chooses to define policy himself he may do so and even if members of his department disagree with his decisions they must carry them out. The official can resign if he wishes. In practice this seldom happens because of differences of this kind. Normally the official recognizes that his function is to recommend policies and that of the minister and the Cabinet to make the final decision on what policies shall be.

This division between politics and administration makes it possible for the official of the Department of External Affairs to be less concerned with placating politicians than his American counterpart. If he appears as a witness before the House of Commons Committee on External Affairs he is not pressed to answer questions concerning "government policy," as by Parliamentary practice these are directed to the Secretary of State for External Affairs or his Parliamentary assistant in the House of Commons. Nor has any External Affairs official to negotiate a departmental budget through a legislative appropriations committee determined and able to whittle it down, partly at least for political reasons. Nor must the official personally "sell" a plan of action to a legislative body or committee which has shown any inclination to change it seriously or reject it. Likewise the responsibility for balancing group interests or dealing with their spokesmen in Parliament is transferred from the official's shoulders to those of the minister. This buffering of the permanent departmental officer from political and policy criticisms requires as a necessary concomitant that he, in his official acts, be politically non-partisan and that in his private activities he not engage in political promotion. It is then possible to assure him of permanence of tenure regardless of what party is in power and thereby gain the advantages of stability and long-range wisdom which are so essential to consistent policy planning recommendations. It is probable that the official is freed from the necessity of placating political forces in the field of foreign affairs to a greater extent than in those areas of government regulation where the official by the nature of his work is in more

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direct contact with interest groups and political representatives, though even in these fields the Cabinet and the minister concerned assume full political responsibility for officials' acts.

Reference has been made to the Cabinet as the final policy making body. The rule of collective responsibility which, in the Canadian Cabinet, is similar to the English practice, makes it possible to refer to the final policies of the Secretary of State for External Affairs as indistinguishable from those of the Cabinet, since all members of the Cabinet must publicly say the same thing on matters of policy and collectively stand or fall on what they say or do. In practice, of course, there are many matters which the Secretary of State for External Affairs can determine himself and many more which he must submit to the attention of the Cabinet. The Cabinet considers recommendations of interdepartmental committees, instructions to conference delegations and the control of representatives abroad, appointments of ambassadors or delegations, proposed legislation and Orders-in-Council. It discusses and decides upon the broad outlines of Canadian foreign policy and such specific aspects of foreign policy as ministers bring before it. Since, like the British Cabinet, it can control the legislative machinery of the House of Commons, it prepares the legislative program, plans the time of debates on foreign affairs, organizes the necessary House of Commons support to ensure the passage of its foreign affairs legislation, and decides who will be in charge of debates. Though most foreign affairs debates are directed in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Cabinet may decide that another minister should do so. This is usually the case in international financial relations (Minister of Finance or Minister of Trade and Commerce), and international defense arrangements (Minister of National Defense), and some of the activities of the United Nations specialized agencies where the minister most directly concerned may lead the deliberations. An important function of the Cabinet is exercised by a six-man Cabinet committee, the Treasury Board, which must pass on the financial estimates of the Department of External Affairs and exercise a general supervision over its financial administration.

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In performing all these functions the Cabinet serves as a focal point, not only for co-ordinating the work and policies of the Department of External Affairs and other government departments concerned with foreign policies, but also for integrating foreign policy with the whole range of government policy. The Cabinet must approve, control, co-ordinate, and assume political and legislative responsibility for all policy.

Many of the forms and procedures presently used by the Cabinet in dealing with foreign affairs and other matters of government policy are products of innovations introduced during the war to cope with the heavy burdens of decision making which faced Cabinet ministers at that time. During the war the most important Cabinet organ was the War Committee. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and various other military and civilian permanent officials attended its sessions regularly. A Secretary to the Cabinet was appointed in March 1940 and a small secretariat consisting largely of staff seconded from other departments was brought together. A large part of their time was devoted to the work of the War Committee. A record was kept of the War Committee's discussions. The Secretary was charged, under the Prime Minister's direction, with the preparation of agenda before meetings. Procedures were developed for placing matters on the agenda by ministers, providing explanatory memoranda, distributing the agenda before meetings, and circulating a "follow-up" on conclusions reached. In addition to the War Committee there was developed an impressive structure of standing and *ad hoc* committees dealing with particular areas of policy. Senior officers from the Department of External Affairs and other departments attended sessions of these committees. Cabinet committees were generally served also by working committees of permanent officials from the various interested departments. They prepared material, pointed out issues, and if possible agreed on joint recommendations for submission to the ministers. The Cabinet Secretariat became increasingly important for liaison between the various Cabinet and working committees.

When the war ended the responsibility of determining major issues of policy reverted from the War Committee back to the

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Cabinet as a whole. Many of its innovations were transferred at the same time to the Cabinet. The Cabinet Secretariat, in addition to attending sessions regularly, now provides most of the same services for the whole Cabinet that were provided for the War Committee. On the other hand the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and officers of other departments are rarely admitted to sessions of the full Cabinet. At the same time the system of standing and *ad hoc* committees has been retained, though, of course, some new committees have taken the place of the old as the subject-matter of government changed with the return to peace. The Secretary of State for External Affairs is a member of the Defense Committee, the Committee on External Trade Policy, the Committee on Immigration, and other committees set up from time to time. There is no Cabinet Committee on general foreign policy. Most of the present Cabinet committees are not executive committees. Normally their recommendations must be accepted and appraised by the whole Cabinet. The Treasury Board, mentioned before, and the Special Committee, a committee which disposes of routine business of Council, are among the most important exceptions.

Following the wartime procedures it is the current practice to have appropriate senior officials from various departments attend meetings of Cabinet committees. They attend not of course as members but in an advisory capacity and at the committee's discretion. They are commonly present when their departments are directly interested in the general subjects of a committee's deliberations or when particular items of business are of concern to their departments. Thus, for instance, the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Deputy Minister of Trade and Commerce, and the Deputy Minister of Finance are normally present at meetings of the Cabinet Committee on External Trade Policy. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs may be invited to meetings of the Cabinet Wheat Committee dealing with aspects of foreign relations, such as the World Wheat Agreement. In addition to such interdepartmental co-operation at the official level as may take place in connection with Cabinet committees, the wartime usage

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of interdepartmental committees of operating officials to provide services and recommendations has been continued.

The Cabinet Secretariat continues to serve and act as liaison between the various committees. Its staff is made up mainly of officers seconded from various departments for a period of from one to three years. The departments represented in the Cabinet Secretariat vary with the major trends of government business. Because of the obvious advantages of close relationship between the Cabinet Secretariat and the Department of External Affairs there has nearly always been at least one officer of the latter department seconded to the Secretariat. There has also been very close contact between the Department and the Cabinet Secretariat since the appointment of a Secretary to the Cabinet in 1940. One obvious reason for this is the large volume of questions coming before the Cabinet which involve Canada's external relations. This close relationship will no doubt be further enhanced as a result of the appointment of the former Secretary of the Cabinet, Mr. A. D. P. Heeney, as Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs and the appointment of Mr. Norman Robertson, formerly one of Canada's senior career diplomats, to fill Mr. Heeney's former post of Secretary to the Cabinet.

It is a prerequisite of Cabinet government that the Prime Minister must occupy a pre-eminent and controlling position in the Cabinet. This is particularly essential in Canada where regional and functional interests are represented in the composition of the Cabinet; as a consequence the burden of compromise and final policy determination falls heavily on the Prime Minister. This position of the Prime Minister has been very important to the Department of External Affairs. Until 1946 the Prime Minister was also Secretary of State for External Affairs and the Department was sometimes described as "a sort of adjunct to the Prime Minister's office." Prime Minister King's retention of the External Affairs portfolio was not in later years motivated by a belief that foreign affairs were not sufficiently important to Canada to justify the appointment of a full-time Minister. Quite the contrary. Mr. King regarded foreign affairs as so important and so all-pervasive in character that he preferred to keep control in his own hands despite his other heavy responsibilities. Even after another minister became responsible

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the relationship of the Department to the Prime Minister's office was somewhat ambiguous. It does not seem that there has been any significant change in the relationship between the Department of External Affairs and the Cabinet since this portfolio has been held by a Minister other than the Prime Minister.

The first full-time Secretary of State for External Affairs was Rt. Hon. Louis St. Laurent. When Mr. St. Laurent succeeded Mr. King as Prime Minister in the fall of 1948 he did not keep the portfolio of External Affairs. Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs Mr. L. B. Pearson was asked to join the Cabinet as Secretary of State for External Affairs. Thus personal relationships will probably encourage continued close relations between the Prime Minister and the Department of External Affairs.

The elevation of the former Under-Secretary to the Cabinet in Canada brings to mind Mr. Acheson's appointment in the United States a few months later. Some of the same problems may be suggested but it is unwise to push the analogy too far, as the personalities and the constitutional and administrative responsibilities are not parallel. It is, of course, very unusual under a Cabinet form of government to select the senior permanent departmental officer to be the Cabinet Minister for his Department. The literature on Cabinet government abounds with references to the political neutrality of the official and to the character of the Cabinet Minister as a political expert but an administrative amateur. If it were not for the fairly wide support given Canadian foreign policies by opposition political parties in Canada and Mr. Pearson's high personal abilities and popularity his selection might justify some apprehension. Though rare cases such as this one may be justifiable, it is doubtful if the same could be said if the practice of so departing from the conventional pattern of Cabinet government became common.

We turn now from the Cabinet to the Department of External Affairs and the "official level" in the planning of Canadian foreign policy. The Department of External Affairs is responsible for making recommendations to the Secretary of State for External Affairs and through him to the Cabinet on matters of Canadian foreign policy. It is responsible, too, for gathering and weighing information regarding international developments,

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and, with Cabinet approval, negotiating treaties and agreements and representing Canada in foreign countries and international conferences. More than thirty Canadian diplomatic missions abroad and several more trade representatives furnish the Department in Ottawa with information. The Department is also responsible for the Canadian consular service and the dissemination of information about Canada abroad. In the latter connection it issues various documents and releases including the excellent monthly publication *External Affairs*. With a few minor exceptions, such as certain Post Office correspondence, there is normally no direct official intercourse between any foreign government and any department of the federal or provincial governments of Canada. All official external communications are channeled through the Department of External Affairs and thence to the Cabinet Minister or Department involved. Official foreign communications for provincial governments normally go first to the Department of External Affairs, then to the Department of the Secretary of State, and finally to the provincial government concerned. The Department of External Affairs is not responsible for the promotion of foreign trade. This is the concern of the foreign trade service of the Department of Trade and Commerce.

To carry out its duties the Department of External Affairs has a total staff of something over twelve hundred. Departmental work in Ottawa is allocated among several functional divisions, three geographical political divisions, and an additional political division of a more specialized functional character. All are responsible either directly or indirectly to the Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, and ultimately through him to the responsible Cabinet Minister, the Secretary of State for External Affairs. The otherwise rather broad span of control of the Under-Secretary has been reduced by the use of staff assistants and the establishment of senior positions for the supervision and coordination of the work of the divisions. Groups of political and administrative divisions are responsible in the first instance to Assistant Under-Secretaries.

The main functional divisions of the Department are the Protocol Division, Consular Division, Legal Division, Information Division, Economic Division, Personnel Division, Admin-

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istrative Division, and the Defense Liaison Division. The divisions mainly influential in working out the political substance of Canadian foreign policy are the three geographical divisions and the United Nations Division. The geographical divisions are the European Division, the American and Far Eastern Division (which includes Latin America), and the Commonwealth Division. These divisions deal with political matters falling within their geographical classifications and in addition are consulted on the political aspects of matters which are primarily within the jurisdiction of other divisions.

It is obvious enough that the living reality of any private or government organization must rest on something more than such a rudimentary catalogue of work divisions as has been presented here. This is particularly so of the Canadian Department of External Affairs. As a new department whose size and responsibilities have multiplied many times during the past decade and a half, its organization has of necessity been in a fluid and expanding state. It has had to adjust rapidly to new situations and the shortage of top-level staff has often made it necessary for members of its senior staff to cut across formal organization lines and combine several functions in order that the work at hand might be completed. The importance of looking beyond formal departmental organization is further underscored by the fact that the Department of External Affairs has had neither the time nor the incentive to settle in its ways. It has not developed the quantities of established procedures and formalities or collected the numbers of unimaginative middle-aged routine worshippers to be found among older departments dealing with less dynamic work. Thus clearly it is even more necessary than usual to examine some features of the working organization of the Department which do not appear on an organization chart. How, for instance, are recruitment and personnel policies articulated with departmental functions? How is responsibility allocated for work and decision making? What means exist for co-ordinating the work and thought of members of the Department? And how are issues which involve other government departments dealt with?

Almost all work directly concerned with foreign policy as distinct from the mechanical work of running the Department

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is done by foreign service officers or those on temporary status who will probably shortly be eligible for inclusion in the foreign service. Foreign service officers serve in both geographical and functional divisions. In the functional divisions there is no large senior staff concerned with international problems other than foreign service officers. Slightly less than a quarter of the total departmental staff fall within the officer group. As they are the ones directly concerned with the making of foreign policy they will receive our attention here. For them recruitment and personnel policy seems to be based on the belief that the best type of person to carry out the Department's work is one with a university degree based on undergraduate and possibly graduate training in the social sciences or law. Such a person is also expected to have a broad familiarity with and interest in the major problems of national and international relations, and the capacity to analyze a wide variety of data and assume responsibility. The emphasis throughout is on the general view rather than specialization.

The written examination for the entrance rank of Foreign Service Officer Grade I consists of three parts: (1) essay and précis writing, (2) essay-type questions to test the candidate's interest and general range of knowledge in national and international affairs, and (3) more probing questions in the particular discipline in which the candidate has done most of his academic work. In addition to the written examination grades a rating is given on academic and other experience. If his experience and examination ratings are satisfactory the candidate is given an oral examination. Its purpose is to evaluate further his thinking processes, adaptability, and personality, and is conducted by a five- or six-man board composed of representatives of the Civil Service Commission and the Department, and of prominent outside citizens. Permanent appointment for those who are successful in passing all these tests now comes only after at least a year of satisfactory probationary service in Ottawa. In the past the probationary period has been shorter in many cases because the Department has been understaffed. Since 1947 Foreign Service Officer competitions have been open to women as well as men.

Personnel policies are intended to foster a broad perspective

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of foreign affairs and discourage fractional approaches resulting from prolonged attention to a particular series of problems or the affairs of one country. Officers are moved frequently from place to place and job to job. Three and a half years is the maximum term in any one place and after a maximum of two such terms in foreign countries officers must return for a period to Ottawa. In practice the changeover is far more rapid. Officers stationed in Ottawa are also moved freely from division to division. Further to develop wide perception the Ottawa staff hear regular lectures on developing aspects of foreign policy by members of External Affairs and other departments. Overseas staff receive digests of Canadian and foreign policy information.

The salary scale allows security from financial worries but not opulence. The starting salary of $2,700 is raised to $3,000 at the end of the probationary period and promotions are made thereafter by various criteria of merit in accordance with a regular salary scale. Various retirement and other benefits are provided. Staff stationed outside Canada are given living and representation allowances scaled according to rank and Dominion Bureau of Statistics cost of living estimates. Thus, for example, a married man of the beginning grade of F. S. O., I, stationed in Washington, receives his regular salary plus an additional allowance of close to $3,000. Unmarried he gets an allowance of about $2,000.

Essential not only to efficiency but also to administrative responsibility is the development of departmental morale and *esprit de corps*. This the Personnel Division has attempted to foster. It has been aided by a variety of factors. Promotion has been quite rapid. The nature of the work is interesting and important. Downward devolution of responsibility and efforts to relate parts of the picture to the whole promote in officers a sense of personal significance. Permanence of tenure and the opening up of the most important departmental and ambassadorial posts to career men provide stimuli for maximum effort and high hopes for the future. At present approximately half of these posts are held by career men. The small size of the department's officer group, the similarity of their intellectual backgrounds, and the frequent informal social contacts further foster easy working relationships and *esprit de corps*.

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Partly because of the pressure of rapid expansion and the consequent shortage of trained personnel, and partly as a deliberate administrative policy, there is in the Department of External Affairs a large degree of devolution of responsibility to junior personnel. It is not uncommon for suggested courses of action to originate with Grade I officers or to find men of this rank with some responsibility among Canadian delegations to international conferences. Such work is of course subject to approval by higher authorities but it would be rash to assume that these higher authorities normally reject recommendations submitted. Sometimes a senior officer may be less familiar with a particular problem than a junior who has been able to devote prolonged attention to it. It may be argued that juniors have neither the experience nor the maturity of judgment to warrant placing responsibility on them for recommendations which may influence policies. It is nevertheless difficult to work out a convincing case that the sacrifice has been one which has worked to the disadvantage of the Department. By placing relatively junior personnel in positions of responsibility and thereby making them conscious of their significance in the work of the organization it has probably been possible to develop their capabilities more rapidly and obtain larger quantities of enthusiastic and responsible work. It is possible too to over-emphasize the advantages of age and experience, as the job adaptability of relatively young military personnel demonstrated during the war.

Most members of the Department of External Affairs seem to feel that on the whole, given the unavoidable difficulties of inadequate trained staff, personnel policies have adequately met functional needs. Nor is it clear that understaffing has been an unmitigated evil. While it has resulted in placing heavier burdens on some people and giving responsibility to young, partially trained, officers there have been definite gains in morale, personnel relations, and a maximum development of staff potentialities which may be attributed in considerable measure to the pressures and dynamics of an understaffed organization. Quite apart from budgetary considerations it may be wise to follow a policy of planned understaffing in the future. In any case the Department would be unwise so to fill up its vacancies at present as to

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make it impossible in the future to take in new blood each year. Staff planning should be such as to allow the Department to recruit some men of the highest quality each year, at the higher as well as lower grades. At least half of the present officer staff of the Department have been recruited since the end of the war and most are fairly young men within a rather narrowly limited age group. Nothing would be more conducive to sterile rigidity of thought and intellectual inbreeding than to restrict future recruiting by filling up all current vacancies, allowing this group to grow old together, and keeping the age distribution permanently out of balance.

In the future other developing problems of personnel may require consideration. Salaries may be inadequate to attract and hold men of the high standards the Department wants. In the past the low salary scale has been offset by rapid promotions. As the Department reaches a less fluid state and personnel must spend longer periods in each grade, the salary scale may require revision. It must be admitted that the starting salary of $2,700 is not exorbitant for a top-level Ph.D. educated abroad in international relations, though it may be adequate for a recent college graduate or an inferior graduate student. Thus to a certain extent the present undifferentiated starting salary may tend to exclude some of the most thoroughly trained potential personnel from joining the Department. So far the Department has had no difficulty in getting far more people to try its admission examinations than it accepts. This may not be unrelated to the abnormal postwar volume of university graduations; 1950 and 1951 departmental examinations may show some lowering of the quality of applicants if salaries are not raised. The problem is of course most serious for Ottawa salaries where no allowances are available. It is true that the nature of the work makes unnecessary a scale of salaries equal to those of competing business or professional alternatives. In fact there is a saying in the Department that it does not want any man who cannot make at least twice as much in private employment. That may be so but economics recognizes a limit to the pulling and holding power of non-monetary incentives and that limit is not ordinarily static in a dynamic economy. Another question of personnel policy which bears consideration is the desirability of appointing

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more trained specialists and the intensive training of selected officers at graduate schools of international relations subsequent to their joining the Department. More experts may be needed to deal with the increasingly complex and rapidly changing problems of the modern world. There are no doubt great advantages to the generalizing mind and the sort of temporary *ad hoc* specialization frequently emphasized by the present system. There remains the danger of superficiality if the expert is not available to advise the man with the broader view.

Before leaving the subject of personnel relations a word of praise is in order for the Department's policy of operating a single career service whose officers serve abroad or throughout the Department at home. Canada has not made the mistake of those countries which divided their Home and Foreign Service. That division has generally produced home office personnel with inadequate familiarity with on-the-spot foreign diplomacy, and personnel abroad with little world-wide perspective and an increasingly oversympathetic approach to the country in which they were stationed. Rotation of personnel has largely eliminated this problem in Canada. It must be noted, of course, that too rapid rotation may not allow officers time to make the most of their opportunities to familiarize themselves with local problems and conditions.

The determination of division of work and discretionary authority is a recurring problem of informal organization. In the Canadian Department of External Affairs all incoming communications, including dispatches from missions abroad, normally go to a central registry which allocates each to that division which the distribution clerks know to be responsible. In cases about which there has been no previous correspondence or where the divisional jurisdiction is unclear the distribution clerks must use their judgment in allocating communications. Within each division the person who is for the time being assigned to the particular field with which a communication deals will prepare recommendations or draft a reply for submission to a senior officer. Only the top officers of the Department have signing powers. A problem regarded as "important" will, in all likelihood, go eventually to the Under-Secretary and the Sec-

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retary of State for External Affairs. In the process several divisions may be involved.

In working up replies, memoranda, and communications, a large amount of human discretion is required all along the line as files move from desk to desk. The allocation of an incoming communication of a borderline character to one division rather than another and even within a division to one man rather than to another may affect its treatment and the recommendation which emerges as a result. Likewise a most difficult and significant responsibility facing officials is the determination of those things they have authority to dispose of themselves and those which must go to a higher authority. Each such decision determines whether few or many people will think about a given problem, whether the perspective will be that of the Under-Secretary or the division, whether all interested people will be consulted, and whether the level of disposal may possibly have any effect on treatment by other governments. The decision will affect the efficiency of the work process by increasing or reduction the pressure of work on the time and capabilities of senior officers. It may affect personal working relations if anyone feels he should have been consulted and was not.

These problems are made less serious by the existence within the Department of External Affairs of several means for internal departmental co-ordination. The responsibility of the office of the Under-Secretary for the work of all divisions provides, of course, top-level co-ordination and ensures that if any interested division has been overlooked in preparing an important policy recommendation it will be referred back to that division. There is also a regular weekly conference of division heads at which the activities of the Department during the week are reviewed. Minutes of this conference are circulated to all overseas missions. On currently developing issues of importance the Under-Secretary and divisional officers most directly concerned meet at a departmental conference twice weekly, usually in the morning, and here policy decisions are made for execution. In addition regular departmental meetings are held on personnel, administration, and other matters. On particular subjects informal discussions in somebody's office are frequent. Lunch at the Rideau Club, the University Club, the Chateau Cafe-

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teria, or Murray's, is another familiar means of internal liaison. Finally there are the obvious but very important methods of talking over the telephone or circulating files and memoranda.

It may be noted in passing that though the problem of internal co-ordination is an important one in the Canadian Department of External Affairs, it has not been as serious as in the United States Department of State. This is partly to be explained by the absence of significant divisive factors between the functional and political divisions, by the somewhat more fluid Canadian personnel allocation policy which gives officers experience in several divisions and stresses the broad view, by the fact that the staff involved is smaller in the Canadian Department and the number of possible interrelationships and necessary work compartmentalization is less, and by the close physical proximity of the Canadian government buildings in which foreign policy in Ottawa is made.

The obvious fact that the ramifications of foreign policy extend to many departments of government in addition to External Affairs was mentioned at the beginning. Though space prevents an examination of the functions and operating processes of each of them, the working of interdepartmental co-operation will be discussed briefly. Such co-operation takes place in foreign missions, international conference delegations, established and *ad hoc* interdepartmental boards and conferences in Ottawa, in day-to-day interdepartmental business such as the transmission of communications from foreign governments to appropriate domestic departments, and in the Cabinet.

In missions abroad particularly close relations exist between the Department of External Affairs and the Department of Trade and Commerce. It was mentioned before that the latter has a foreign trade service which is responsible for promoting foreign trade and caring for Canadian trade interests in other countries. Officers of the Department of Trade and Commerce foreign service are attached to almost all diplomatic missions. On such service they are responsible formally to the head of the mission, though in fact most of their working relationships are with the Department of Trade and Commerce in Ottawa. In some secondary posts a trade commissioner of the Department of Trade and Commerce performs certain consular and repre-

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sentative functions as well as his trade duties, and, in regard to the former, is responsible to the Department of External Affairs. In larger missions officers of Agriculture, National Defense, and other departments are present in addition to representatives of the Departments of External Affairs and Trade and Commerce. The majority of Canadian delegations to international conferences and organizations likewise contain representatives of several departments. Though they act under instructions with Cabinet approval and are responsible to the head of the delegation, they may be expected in discretionary matters to represent the interests of their respective departments.

Reference has already been made to interdepartmental committees. The Department of External Affairs has been represented in the past two years on at least forty inter-departmental bodies established to deal with problems with international implications. Such conferences may be called by any minister or deputy-minister to discuss working problems and/or prepare recommendations to the Cabinet.[2] Though, formally, the official level of interdepartmental communication is that of deputy-minister, in practice lower level personnel frequently act as departmental representatives. On the other hand some ministers may attend interdepartmental conferences in which they are particularly interested. Various factors such as departmental interest, personal competence, and chance determine who will be chairman. There is no custom that any Department should have any special or automatic claims to chairmanship. Conference recommendations are normally made to the Cabinet by the Department calling the conference. If any department so desires it may submit supplementary comments to the Cabinet through its minister.

Interdepartmental conferences are a fundamental part of the policy planning process for probably the majority of international policies decided upon by the Cabinet. Such conference recommendations of course in no way obligate the Cabinet to accept them. Nevertheless, since the man who represents a department in a conference is quite often the same man who advises its minister and since the Cabinet cannot be expected

[2] The deputy-minister in Canada is the permanent departmental head. The Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs has the rank of deputy-minister.

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to go as deeply into particular matters as do interdepartmental conferences, it stands to reason that the Cabinet will not generally be disposed to reject totally recommendations submitted, to say the least. The widespread use of interdepartmental conferences serves to lessen some of the work pressure which would otherwise fall on the Cabinet, ensures a more thorough investigation than would normally be possible at the Cabinet level, permits the ironing out of disagreements between departments without troubling the Cabinet, and at the same time reserves to the Cabinet its constitutional responsibility for the ultimate determination of policy.

II. Democratic Control and Responsibility

At this point the emphasis of this discussion shifts from the more positive aspects of initiating, preparing, and determining policy to the checking, limiting, and controlling of policy and its execution. It should be emphasized at the outset that the two are an integral part of the planning process and the line between them is largely one of emphasis. It is fully recognized, for instance, that Parliament and public opinion have initiating as well as limiting and controlling functions, but they are discussed here rather than in Part I because, in Canadian foreign policy, the latter functions are, in the main, more important.

It may be argued that because responsibility for policy is so clearly focused on the Cabinet in Canada and because it is possible to remove the Cabinet from time to time through the general election procedure, a discussion of means, of control, beyond what has been already said of the cabinet, is of secondary importance. This is wrong. Though a system of Cabinet government such as that of Canada does not put the premium which the American system does on detailed Congressional investigation, opinion pressures and interest group activities, it nevertheless requires that the broad outlines of government policy be scrutinized and the tolerances of public opinion be defined by legislative and other controls. It requires as well a high sense of individual responsibility in permanent officials.

The problem of democratically controlling the making and execution of foreign policy is in some respects more difficult than is the case for other fields of government activity in Canada.

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There are, first of all, the obvious difficulties of secrecy. Apart from fiscal policy there are few areas where secrecy restrictions are so stringent. In the name of Canada policies may be developed and carried to a stage where it is difficult to turn back before they can be revealed to the public. In the second place, there is far less significant and penetrating critical scrutiny of foreign relations by pressure groups and mass public opinion than is found in many other fields of government. There are a few obvious exceptions such as recent policies on the recognition of Palestine, the new status of Ireland, and the disposition of Polish art treasures in Canada, where particular groups were active. In most matters, however, the most that can be said for the controlling function of public opinion is that it sets very broad limits beyond which the makers of foreign policy dare not tread. In respect to particular choices of foreign policy, the government has a greater freedom from public opinon pressures than it has in most domestic matters.

Nevertheless, legislative bodies provide some external controls on those who plan Canadian foreign policies. The most important bodies are the House of Commons and the House of Commons Committee on External Affairs. The concern of the House of Commons with foreign relations has increased steadily in the past fifteen years. A few years ago a Member of Parliament remarked that at the time of one of the world's great crises, in 1936, the House devoted twenty-seven minutes to external affairs and over eight hours to a tariff on asparagus. In the 1948 session of Parliament, discussions of international problems filled about five hundred and fifty pages of House of Commons Hansard and this count does not include references to foreign affairs in the debate in reply to the speech from the throne. As a matter of fact before 1947 full-dress debates on foreign policy were infrequent; foreign affairs came to the attention of the House largely in debates on treaties and other international obligations. Department of External Affairs estimates were commonly presented late in the session when time for discussion was short. In 1947 a general debate on foreign policy took place on July 4. This was preceded by a short statement by the Secretary of State for External Affairs. In 1948 the general debate came much earlier, on April 29, and extended for

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four days. The Minister's statement was longer and far more thorough. Eighteen members participated in the 1947 debate while thirty spoke in 1948. The 1948 debate seemed to be of a higher order than that of the previous year because most participants appeared to know more and to have thought more deeply about a broader range of problems. As is quite common in the Canadian House of Commons the majority of speakers in both debates were members of opposition parties. These general debates on foreign affairs took place after a motion had been made that the House go into Committee of Supply. Other discussions on more specific matters of foreign relations normally occur at various times during each session of Parliament when the House is asked to approve treaties and legislation and pass on departmental estimates. Reflecting the preeminent role of the Cabinet and parliamentary limits on procedures in financial matters, discussions on appropriations in the Canadian House of Commons are generally cursory. The House hears from time to time, as well, short government statements on items of foreign policy. Like every other topic of government, the conduct of foreign affairs is the subject of many questions in the House. These may be answered orally or in writing by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, the Prime Minister, or another minister. In 1947 a Member of Parliament was appointed Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs to relieve him of some of his Parliamentary work and he frequently replies to questioners on behalf of the Secretary. Normally no debate takes place on questions.

During and since World War II the amount of work referred to select and standing committees of the House has increased sharply.[3] A standing committee is now concerned with foreign affairs. The External Affairs Committee examines the estimates of the Department of External Affairs and its annual report, as well as such Government bills on foreign relations as are referred to it. Senior officers of the Department of External Affairs and some outside individuals appear as witnesses. Committee-

[3] Fifteen to twenty such committees are now appointed in each session to deal with particular topics. Although not all of them have been active, some like the committee on radio broadcasting have been investigation and policy committees in a very positive way. During the latter half of the Parliamentary session most members of Parliament spend more time in their committees than they do in the House.

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men of all parties have shown very little partisanship and in the years since the committee has been established they have generally questioned all witnesses in a sympathetic and friendly manner. They have shown little disposition to engage in searching battles of wits with witnesses. Committee reports have been brief and innocuous and have not been considered as important as the committee discussions. Before 1948 a Cabinet Minister was a member of the committee though he rarely attended. There was no Cabinet Minister on the 1948 committee though the Parliamentary Assistant to the Secretary of State for External Affairs was an active participant. The committee's chairman was a Liberal and the vice-chairman a representative of the Opposition. There have been few evidences of pressures of party discipline from either the chair or the representative of the Government. Chairman J. A. Bradette reported to the House on the 1947 committee: "We dealt with matters more or less in an academic way and in the abstract." This was a fairly accurate description not only of the 1947 committee but of those of other years as well. And, as one member of Parliament commented to the writer, Mr. Bradette's description would probably be sufficient to ruin many politicians in any other field but external affairs!

Since 1945 the External Affairs Committee has had thirty-five members and its composition has changed very little. In 1947 and 1948 the total average attendance at committee meetings was about eighteen for each year. In 1947 and 1948 nineteen Liberals were members. A Liberal majority was not present, however, at any meeting in 1947 though in 1948 Liberal attendance improved. The 1946 committee had twenty meetings, that of 1947 fifteen, and that of 1948 ten. The attendance figures reflect the initiative which is commonly taken by opposition parties in discussing the government's conduct of foreign affairs. Opposition parties have some of their best parliamentarians on the committee, including party leaders in some cases. The declining number of meetings may indicate an effort by the government to shift the discussion of external relations to the larger and more publicized forum of the House of Commons. In recent years there has been some concern in high places on Parliament Hill that Parliamentary committees might usurp

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what are regarded as the proper functions of the House of Commons and this decline in committee activity may also have been brought about to meet such apprehension.

No reference has yet been made to the Senate or the Senate External Affairs Committee. Canadian Senators are appointed for life by the government in power. Though, with the exception of money bills, the powers of the Senate may be legally equal to those of the House the upper chamber has shown very little desire to stand up to the House in recent years. The Liberal government throughout its years of office appears to have regarded the Senate as a secondary partner in the legislative process and has progressively limited its work. The only Senator in the Cabinet is the government leader in the Senate and he is a minister without portfolio. Legislation is customarily sent to the Senate late in the Parliamentary session when little time for debate is available. Most of the Senate's work is done in committees. Its External Affairs Committee has made useful recommendations improving the drafting of bills and has been a forum for interesting discussions on problems of international relations. However, it is somewhat removed from political dynamics and few government witnesses have made important statements before it. Discussions in the Senate chamber itself on foreign affairs have been rare and brief. For example, when in 1947 the government introduced legislation respecting its powers under Article 41 of the United Nations Charter debates in the Senate, from the introduction of the bill to its passage after third reading, occupied a total of five pages of Senate Hansard as compared with forty pages on the same bill in the House. On foreign relations the main functions of the Senate and its External Affairs Committee have been to defer to the House on matters of policy and politics but to provide secondary amendments and attend to matters with which the House has not time to deal.

What may one conclude about the role of Canadian legislative bodies in the making of Canadian foreign policy? The major functions of the House and its External Affairs Committee and to a lesser extent the Senate and its External Affairs Committee appear to be fourfold. First, as constituents of the legislative process they pass on proposed legislation and govern-

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ment finances. In doing so, however, they seldom make amendments in principle, and in practice never do so without Cabinet agreement. Secondly, they educate the country and themselves on matters of foreign affairs. Walter Bagehot referred to the English Parliament as the political schoolmaster of the nation. His comment is equally applicable to the Canadian Parliament. The debates of its member bodies are reported throughout the country by means of the press and radio and through the efforts of Members of Parliament themselves. Foreign policy is thus brought before the attention of the common man and information and arguments are provided for his consideration. At the same time, in the course of Parliamentary and committee work, legislators are exposed to large quantities of information and discussion and those who are interested may thereby obtain better intellectual means of judging government policies. Thirdly, the Parliamentary bodies, as forums for debate, may provide the Cabinet and the Department of External Affairs with very useful ideas in developing foreign policy. Quite often legislators make suggestions which are of positive value to the analysis of particular problems. Finally, and perhaps most important at present, members of the House of Commons, and in a secondary manner Senators, provide negative limits on the planning and execution of government policies. They force the government to justify its actions and the official to act in such a way that his actions can be justified. They remind the planners of policy that they are the servants of the country and not its masters. The legislators make known what they think are the broad configurations of public opinion and point out the controversial areas where the policy makers must walk warily. Since World War II the Cabinet appears to have concluded that it is in the public interest that the fundamentals of its foreign policies should receive as nearly as possible the unanimous support of all political parties. It has thus been particularly careful to mould its policies to avoid antagonizing the opposition parties and to compromise if possible where significant criticism develops.

Public opinion pressures and legislative institutions represent only a part of the process of controlling the making of foreign policy. In a broad way they tell the people who make the decisions and carry them out how broad is the range of their discre-

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tion and what they should not do. Nor are the controls of the Cabinet and the Secretary of State for External Affairs adequate in themselves. Heads of government lack the time to examine all the daily workings of the decision making process and cannot judge thoroughly all the criteria on which recommendations submitted to them are based. Further, while they can demand that officials work according to certain standards they alone cannot ensure that these officials will work according to the best that is in them. All the controls discussed so far take for granted a wide range of discretionary responsibility. They assume officials who can be trusted, even behind the protections of diplomatic secrecy, to do their best work and decide issues in a competent and responsible manner. Here the most important controls must be those of one person over another and each person over himself. This is fully recognized in the Department of External Affairs. It is reflected in a recruitment policy which tries to gauge an applicant's character as well as his knowledge. It is reflected in personnel policies which reward careful treatment of subordinates and try to encourage by various incentives the development in the official of a sense of moral responsibility to do his work according to what he regards as his best capacities of competence and objectivity. It is reflected also in a policy making process which emphasizes the pooling of points of view by consultation and conference and stresses the contingency of individual authority. To some extent these intradepartmental controls have been promoted by the development of professional ethics, *esprit de corps,* and careful supervision, but their practice must rest ultimately with the individual personality. Nobody can assert that the present means of promoting responsibility at the level of the working official are perfect, but the Department of External Affairs deserves commendation for recognizing their need and consciously developing them.

There are, finally, constitutional controls resulting from Canada's federal system. Although the federal government has full power to enter into international obligations the famous Labour Conventions Case in 1937 showed that its power to implement them was limited in certain areas.[4] The case ruled *ultra vires* legislation of the Dominion Parliament implementing certain

[4] Attorney General of Canada v. Attorney General of Ontario, (1937) A. C. 326.

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obligations assumed by Canada under conventions of the International Labor Organization. This and other cases related to the British North America Act indicate that the central government has full power to implement obligations relating to war and national security and other matters covered by Section 91 of the B. N. A. Act as defined by the courts, but that the provinces have jurisdiction in property and civil rights, education, and several other fields. Thus, for example, Canada abstained from voting on November 10, 1947, in the Third Committee of the General Assembly on a resolution on teaching about the United Nations in the schools and made reservations regarding provincial powers on December 10 in the 1948 Assembly on the final vote on the Declaration of Human Rights after abstaining on various committee votes. The legal position places on the Department of External Affairs the responsibility of not accepting international obligations which interfere with provincial jurisdiction unless time is available to consult the several provincial governments. Communication with the provinces may be at the level of the Under-Secretary, the Minister, or the Cabinet. In each province such matters are normally dealt with through the office of the Provincial Secretary or the particular provincial departments directly involved. Technically such communication between the federal government and the provinces takes place through the good offices of the Secretary of State.

III. The Relationship of Process To Policy

It was suggested at the beginning that an examination of the planning process might throw some light on the substance of Canadian foreign policy. The preceding survey allows some concluding generalizations on the relation of process to policy in Canada.

The existence of a highly developed government process in foreign policy, the world-wide scope of Canadian foreign representation, as well as Canada's intimate relations with the United States and the British Commonwealth provide that country with access to information and facilities of a very high order among "middle powers." Canadian foreign policy, at least in its major aspects, is not likely to suffer from inadequate information. In fact the availability of information, in so far as it is re-

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flected in policies, may give those of Canada a definite advantage in international conferences as against the policies of other middle and smaller powers which must depend on less adequate information resources.

The organization of the Canadian government for external relations encourages stability in foreign policy. Permanence of tenure of senior as well as junior civil servants frees Canada of some of the difficulties found in the United States as a result of the rapid turnover of policy personnel in the Department of State and elsewhere in the Administration. The role of Canadian legislative bodies as predominantly checks and controls on foreign policy rather than as concurrent planners and initiators of policy to a considerable extent frees policy from some of the fluctuations and changes which result from legislative influences in the United States. There are no legislative forces of comparable power to the Appropriations Committee, the Ways and Means Committee, and the Rules Committee of the House, the Foreign Relations and Foreign Affairs Committees, and the American Senate. The predominant role of the Canadian Cabinet as an operating as well as a policy making body helps to ensure that decisions reached will be implemented throughout the whole government, and the co-ordinating role of the Cabinet makes it less likely than in the United States that policies reached by one department of government will have to be changed because they are inconsistent with policies reached by other departments. Further, the less significant role of interest groups and public opinion pressures in Canada makes policy changes less necessary. Finally in Canada, as in the United States, the non-partisan approach of the leaders of the main parties to the fundamentals of foreign policy makes unlikely drastic fluctuations in policy resulting from a change of government.

The limitations on the relation of the Canadian policy making process to stability of policy are obvious enough. Two are very important. In the first place, the organic factors of great power high politics and other foreign conditions and the probably increasing importance in foreign policy of Canadian public opinion and the whole ecology of Canadian politics must influence profoundly the substance of foreign policy. In the second place, there is always the danger that stability may become

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unimaginative rigidity. There is no indication of this at present but the experience of some European administrations which had high *esprit de corps,* a career service, professional ethics, a fair amount of political insulation, and standard recruitment criteria suggests that in the future the problem may be worth considering. The advantages of bringing into the Department some new personnel at all levels and continuing the present policy of appointing about half the heads of foreign missions from outside the service cannot be overemphasized.

It will be noted that there is nothing in the Canadian foreign policy process comparable to the Policy Planning Division of the Department of State. Canadian government tends to rely heavily on planning by operating personnel rather than on staff planning. The role of the Cabinet and the permanence of tenure of policy personnel tend to make a staff Division labelled "Policy Planning" less necessary. Supporters of staff planning would contend that somebody should be responsible for thinking about the relation of day-to-day operations to long-run policy. The defense of the Canadian position is, first, that it is usually very difficult for predominantly planning staff divisions to get the attention of line officials, and secondly, that people who have been thinking about foreign policy most of their lives tend to develop a long-range frame of reference which places daily operations in perspective and, thirdly, that policies made by operating officers may be better related to the conditions for carrying them out than those made by planners *per se.* It is interesting to note that the Hoover Commission accepts something of both positions in recommending that the United States Department of State retain a unit comparable to the Policy Planning Division concerned with long range planning and at the same time establish an Operations Planning Committee composed of operating departmental officers.

Another related conclusion suggested by the nature of the planning process in Canadian foreign relations is that the process encourages particular Canadian foreign policies to be consistent with each other and within a broad world-wide perspective. This is partly to be explained by some of the factors discussed in regard to the stability of policy, particularly the co-ordinating role of the Canadian Cabinet, and partly by the

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emphasis on broad perspective in the recruitment policy of the Department of External Affairs and the practice of fairly rapid movement of personnel to various posts at home and abroad. As was suggested before there may be some need in the future to employ more specialists so that depth of analysis may not be sacrificed for breadth.

The Canadian foreign policy planning process enables timing and discretion in negotiations to become important elements in diplomacy. The existence of a somewhat less complex machinery of government, the smaller size of the governmental organization for foreign policy, and the focusing of decisive policy making power in the Cabinet sometimes make Canadian foreign policy decisions less time-consuming than in the United States. At the same time the discretion of the Canadian Cabinet in foreign policy and the limited external controls on its operations between elections make it possible to give fairly wide discretionary powers to Canadian representatives at international conferences. The ability of the organization in Ottawa to act fairly rapidly and to delegate broad discretionary powers to negotiators is of considerable advantage in policy discussions with other governments.

Further, the organization of the Canadian government, and particularly the executive role of the Cabinet, makes it possible to put forth international policies and accept international obligations with considerable confidence that they will be carried out. A policy which has been adopted by the Cabinet will normally be implemented unless, for example, it contravenes provincial jurisdiction or strong unforeseen political pressures develop against it.

Finally it may be said that the Canadian policy making process has in several instances worked to produce policies of extremely high quality. There are, of course, many criteria of "quality" but it is probable that policies which show evidence of careful thought, originality, awareness of relevant facts and related world problems, and intelligibility of presentation possess some of the most important of these criteria. It could be contended, by analogy with the United States, that the Canadian Cabinet and Department of External Affairs would be greatly aided in their tasks of policy formulation if they had

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at their disposal more adequate resources for external criticism. Nevertheless many of the contributions of Canada to the San Francisco Conference, the Canadian proposals on international aviation, including the "freedoms" doctrine at the time of the Chicago Conference in 1944, many of the policies of Canada at the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and the Canadian proposals on the North Atlantic Pact are among some of the policies emerging from the process discussed here which meet the criteria of high quality. It is certainly in the interests of Canadian diplomacy that such quality be always present, for everyone knows that there is a significant area in international relations where national power is not the only element of persuasion. In that area the wishes of the middle powers may prevail in the councils of the great powers if diplomacy is persuasive and proposals are good.

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REVIEW ARTICLES

WARTIME POLICIES TOWARD VICHY AND FRANCO

By EUGENE V. ROSTOW

Herbert Feis, *The Spanish Story,* New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948, pp. x, 282. $3.50.
William L. Langer, *Our Vichy Gamble,* New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1947, pp. ix, 412. $3.75.

THESE two books are the only products so far of a policy which has given certain scholars untrammeled access to the files and personnel of the Department of State, and other branches of the government. The policy is highly individual, selective and personal. Its object is not to produce "official" histories, but to bring out reasonably adult studies of our wartime diplomatic program many years before the routine publication and long-term historical analysis of official documents can be accomplished. One great advantage of such studies is that they permit an evaluation of oral in the light of documentary evidence, and a reading of documents in the light of conversation, during the lifetime of those who witnessed and shared in the process of decision. The purpose of the program is to inform, and perhaps to form opinion. As Professor Langer makes clear in his introduction, his book had its origin in Secretary Hull's desire to meet the violent public criticism of his Vichy policy, criticism which he felt was based on inadequate information, and hence mistaken judgments. And Mr. Feis, while not officially inspired to write his book, is loyal to his long and devoted association with Secretary Hull. Yet these are both books of individual scholarship, and not apologetics. Professor Langer's work, unlike Mr. Feis', was officially authorized for publication by three agencies of government, and it is less critical and analytical than *The Spanish Story.* Nonetheless, it is fair to infer that neither Feis nor Langer was censored by authority, beyond the official coloration which

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comes into their work, by osmosis, from the fact that both men were wartime officers of the government, and were honored by that government in being given official permission to write these books.

Although *The Spanish Story* is a more mature book than *Our Vichy Gamble,* the two belong together. They concern phases of our wartime diplomacy which were violently criticized at home and abroad, and for similar reasons. Both our French and our Spanish policies seemed to put us in the humiliating position of kow-towing to fascist leaders. Moreover, what happened in France and in Spain was closely linked. Events in France and Spain after 1940 were of vital consequence to the history, and perhaps even the outcome of the war. Feis believes that if Spain had marched on Gibraltar and French Africa in 1940, the war would have been lost.[1] Langer is similarly convinced that Hitler's failure to take North Africa in 1940 was a fatal error. On that basis he defends the French armistice decision as one profoundly in the interests of France, and perhaps also of the Grand Alliance.[2]

Once Hitler had decided on the armistice policy—to keep the French fleet out of the war, to divide the Allies further, and to help persuade the British in their turn to accept the inevitable—he created the conditions which made it impossible for either Pétain or Franco to cooperate with him effectively. Franco would not enter the war without specific promises of French territory. Hitler could not give him such promises for various reasons—among them the fear that promising Spain French territory would push the French colonial generals back

[1] "We may pause for a note upon the ingratitudes of history. Serrano Suñer believed that a quick German victory was certain; he tried his utmost to govern Spanish policy in this belief; he was wrong; he failed in his effort; and he became the next Foreign Minister. Beigbeder believed that Britain would be able to sustain resistance; he tried his utmost to shape Spanish policy in that belief; he was right; he was effective; and he was dismissed from office. In a large sense Beigbeder made his own belief come true; for by deterring Spain's entry into the war in the autumn of 1940, he prevented it from being a short war." Herbert Feis, *The Spanish Story,* p. 59.

[2] William L. Langer, *Our Vichy Gamble,* p. 64. Langer's defense of the French decision is striking for what it omits in its estimate of French national interest. There is no reference, for example, to the possible long-run political and strategic interest of a nation in its record of loyalty to treaties. Beyond that, his evaluation of the immediate elements of the decision present debatable, if unanswerable issues. It is by no means certain, to take one of his points, that the Germans could have gone to French North Africa, or have stayed in Libya, if the French fleet had remained in the war.

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into the war on the Allied side. After all, General Noguès' wife was Delcassé's daughter. On the other hand, Spanish and Italian colonial ambitions made it hard for Hitler to give to the French the assurances which might have made their collaboration easier. The interplay of French, Spanish, Italian—and German—African interests helped materially to reduce the value to Hitler of all three of his Mediterranean Allies. The arrogant and unimaginative German handling of their lesser friends helped to stiffen French, and especially Spanish resistance to German wishes. As so often in the history of war, failure to pursue a defeated and retreating enemy turned out to be a major strategic blunder.

On the other side, there were differing American and British opinions and responses on many points, and considerable disagreement within the United States over the course of policy to be pursued. Both these books, enriched by the examination of German leaders and documents, and by the record of the French trials, are of value as primary sources; as studies of how (and how not) to wage diplomacy in war; and as case histories in the immensely difficult art of making diplomatic decisions and judgments on the basis of inadequate information, particularly within the free, vigorous, opinionated and undisciplined setting of the government of the United States.

It does not derogate from the utility of Langer's book to say that Feis' *Spanish Story* is something of a masterpiece. Although Feis took an active part in the making of our wartime Spanish policy, his book is far more than a memoir. It is, like Clarendon's, historical analysis in full perspective, written with the special advantage of a detached, sensitive and thoughtful participant. While it is always a pleasure to be reminded that history is a branch of literature, *The Spanish Story* has value far beyond its literary distinction. It presents the doubts, questions, and judgments of an outstanding mind on the entire course of our relations with Spain during the war. Feis' comments on people and issues have none of the haste or partisanship which mar some of Langer's conclusions. Feis gives an unequalled sense of the American government as a whole—the interdepartmental rivalries, the leaks to the press, the independence of our officers, and the national tone of vigor,

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optimism, and righteousness, so conspicuous in the conduct of our foreign relations.

As it emerges in Feis' analysis, the Spanish problem presented both to the belligerents and to the Spanish was simple but not easy.

Germany wanted Spain in the war, in order to cut off the Western Mediterranean, and to keep us out of Africa. At the least, she wanted this until German strategy was overwhelmed by the war in the East, ending all real chance of German initiative in the West. We wanted to keep Spain neutral, and later to keep Spanish supplies away from German industry. The Spanish wanted to be on the winning side, and to make as much as possible out of the war, at minimal risk. Confident at first of German victory, the Spanish, with the spectacle of Italy at war before them, were reluctant to start hostilities without supplies, and positive promises of territorial gain. At the same time, they early became aware of the unpleasant fact that entering the war would mean German military control of their forces. And there was alarming talk from the beginning of permanent German naval bases in the Spanish Atlantic islands and perhaps the Spanish African colonies. Franco apparently has an extraordinary talent for viscous and persistent double-talk. Hitler told Mussolini after the Hendaye meeting that he would rather have three or four teeth pulled out than go through another interview with the Caudillo.[3]

We appreciated the risks, but could never be sure of where the Spanish stood, beyond knowing very well that Franco was no friend of ours, and that if the war in general went badly, he too would join the jackal herd. Franco was short of wheat and oil. Luckily for us, the Germans would spare neither commodity until the Spanish began to shoot. At first, we had to give Spain enough supplies to limp along, for we were convinced that if Spain could get supplies nowhere else, she would have to enter the war on German terms; or, alternatively, that a breakdown in Spain, leading to a renewal of the Civil War, would bring the Germans in to restore order. We did not then know—nor do we now know fully—the extent to which Hitler mishandled his diplomacy. We had to play along as

[3] Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 95.

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best we could, to make neutrality attractive, without strengthening Franco enough to permit him to fight, or even to make him overpoweringly strong against his domestic opposition.

Up to this point, Allied policy toward Spain was agreed, although the task of reaching accord even on these fundamentals was strenuous. There was conflict both within our government, and between us and the British, who were, by an arrangement between Churchill and Roosevelt, to take the Allied lead in Spain.[4] Beyond these simple propositions lie the ultimate questions of Feis' analysis. Assuming that we had to give Spain some oil, wheat and other supplies, during the period of our weakness, how much did our national interest require us to spare, and for how long? Here counsel became badly divided. Some participants, by a familiar but mysterious psychological process, not only favored shipping Franco some oil and wheat at a given moment, but passionately advocated that we help Franco indefinitely. Hayes, to a lesser extent Hoare, and some minor officers of the State Department seem to have shared this curious disease, though not Weddell, Acheson or Hull. On the other side, Morgenthau, Wallace, Milo Perkins, Drew Pearson, and *PM*, all active partners in the process of American decision, were vociferously against any and all economic aid to Franco at any time. These critics were so conscious of the evil of fascism that they underrated the danger to us, in the time of our weakness, of forcing Franco to buy oil and wheat on Hitler's terms. Morgenthau, Hull's cross throughout the war, pressed his position strongly, although he recoiled from accepting full responsibility when Hull offered it to him.[5]

Even if one accepts the main principle of Allied Spanish policy for 1940, 1941, 1942, and 1943, what of 1944 and 1945? Should we have resumed a strict oil embargo at a time when the German danger in Spain no longer existed, to bring down a member of the Axis, placed in power by Axis arms, who had signed a treaty to enter the war against us? After all, it was the narrowest kind of good luck, and only good luck, that in Franco's eyes the right moment for fulfilling his pledge to

[4] Langer, *op. cit.*, p. 289.
[5] Feis, *op. cit.*, p. 42.

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Hitler never came. To have cut off oil for Fanco in 1944 and 1945, for a variety of conveniently available reasons, would almost certainly have forced Franco out of power. Would such an act on our part have been morally right and politically wise?

The Spanish question was never quite put in this way. During April, 1944, we had a bitter dispute over Spain with the British. The conflict was not overtly about the future of Franco but over total or partial victory in the war between us and the Germans over our respective purchases of wolfram in Spain. We wanted the Spanish to embargo wolfram to Germany before oil shipments were resumed, the British merely to get Spanish agreement to a cut in wolfram shipments to Germany. All Hull's formidable capacity for irritation was aroused by the dispute, in which he was able to express the contempt for Franco he had so long and so patiently had to control. From the point of view of actually influencing German steel production, the British were undoubtedly right. The wolfram that might reach Germany from Spain after the spring of 1944 was not going to hurt us. Military events in the summer of 1944 forced the Germans to leave behind many tons of wolfram. But there was more to the argument than wolfram. The issue became one of the most heated of the war between us and the British, and among the individual participants on both sides. Churchill finally forced his views. After that row, there was no major step that could threaten the stability of Franco.

> Franco was forgiven. But not in Washington. There was no outflow of warm satisfaction either from public officers or in the press. Rather a sense of a job half done. But the moving reason was probably deeper and beyond this dispute over wartime trade.
>
> Was it not the knowledge that the crisis had come and gone, and left the "Spanish problem," not the wolfram problem, unsolved? Germany and Italy would fall, but Franco would stand, his past behind him. He would remain part of our universe, an affront to our sense of justice. We were committed, and in some ways more firmly than ever before, to continue to supply Spain with the means to maintain its economic life. But no document of the time records such thoughts. They are only dim notions that have rubbed off this page of the past like dust on the hands of the scholar. Or perhaps the other way about—dust rubbed over the documents by the hands of the scholar. In either case they are only dust.[6]

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 254.

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The French episode is more tangled, passionate, and tragic. The fall of France, the capitulation of the French government, and the conflict which followed in French minds and souls is one of the dynamic events in the modern history of Europe. It has had, and will continue to have, long-term effects in world politics. In part it represented a phase in the ebb and flow of the unresolved French Revolution of 1789, which has its counterpart in the social structure of almost every Continental country. The counter-revolutionary force in French life, always strong in the Army, and, in 1940, allied with modern fascist groups among the middle classes, was tempted to bid for power by the opportunity of military defeat. Other events helped to numb the normally predominant republican and patriotic sentiments of the French people. The failure of Allied diplomacy to contain Germany in the period between wars had deeply depressed the French, who rightly saw that the blindness of British and American policy would require them once again to suffer the heaviest casualties of all in a long and unnecessary war of liberation. The two most recent stages of the misguided era in Allied diplomacy—the Anglo-German Naval Treaty and the British initiative in the Munich crisis,—had profoundly weakened the solidarity of the Entente, and fortified the bitter and suicidal impulse of *sauve qui peut*. The handling of war problems between France and Britain in 1939 and 1940 lacked the determined sense of Allied unity which was created, over very real resistance, between the British and Americans after 1942.

When the crisis came, in 1940, a majority of the French cabinet were nominally loyal to the principle of continuing the war and adhering to the obligations of the Alliance with Britain. But Reynaud lost his nerve, and Laval asserted himself with violent strength in favor of capitulation and collaboration. There was no Churchill or Roosevelt or Clemenceau in the Cabinet, no Marshall, Foch, or Eisenhower among the generals, capable of holding the line by the human force of his being. Herriot was old and confused; Mandel was a Jew whose potential effectiveness was reduced in the setting of a struggle with Hitlerism; others were loyal enough, but not up to a challenge requiring greatness. Not a soul really believed

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that the war could be won. If the French army was defeated, what chance was there for the amateurish Anglo-Saxons? So, in a series of steps designed to conceal from themselves what they were doing, the grave-diggers of France accepted the Armistice.

From that moment until far past the end of the war, the Armistice became the dominant fact in French politics and life. There was guilt at having broken a treaty of alliance, shame in defeat, a profound need to justify and defend what had been done, a sense of frustration amounting to impotence in the face of the issues of the war. Above all, there was a retreat into introspection, and a consequent distortion of perspective. Many of the French lost a broad strategic sense of the war as a whole, in their myopic concentration on the local problems of France and its grievances: the sins of others, particularly of the British and Americans; the details of inter-Allied friction; the slowness of British and American mobilization; and the future of the French colonies. Later on, and by way of reaction, there was a special and rather pathetic quality of deference in French appreciation of the staunch British fight, and the magnitude and spirit of the American war effort. In French eyes, the Anglo-American Alliance gained in the war a moral stature the scale of which measured the depth and intensity of French self-criticism.

The problem which France presented for Allied diplomacy was as complex as the catastrophe itself. We wished if possible to encourage those French leaders who might be expected to return to the war, or at least to resist further German demands for French cooperation in the war. We wished to keep the fleet and the colonies out of German hands. We wanted to do nothing that would prejudice the restoration of a strong and democratic France, closely associated with us in the looming difficulties of the postwar world. In part, the task of allied diplomacy toward France was comparable to that in Spain; in part it was profoundly different. We could be content with Spanish neutrality. But history, geography, and politics pushed us hard, consciously and often unconsciously, to restore the France and the French Alliance of 1914-1918.

The conduct of Allied diplomacy towards France was even

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more divided and confused than the course of our relations with Spain. The British, who took the lead in propitiating Franco, often seemed suspicious of a like policy towards Pétain, despite the firm agreement of Churchill and Eden on the broad lines of American action in Vichy. The British sponsored de Gaulle, who rapidly became a symbol of trouble and difficulty to Roosevelt and Hull. Some American officials, particularly those who were expert in African and Arabian rather than European affairs, took a vigorous part in formulating American policy towards France. These men, among the least sophisticated of our career officers, found in the turn of events far more exciting responsibilities than they had ever had before. By the most normal and dangerous of the psychological processes which imperil the judgment of bureaucrats, they became determined advocates not only of temporary American aid to the Vichy government and its French African proconsuls, but defenders of some of the Vichy officials and proconsuls themselves, against their French and foreign opponents. A genuine Vichy party emerged within the American government, which found endless excuses for Pétain, and endless objections to de Gaulle and other spokesmen of French resistance. This group of officials, moreover, fell into the temptation of another and even more dangerous policy. Flattered by hearing that the French greatly preferred us to the British, they allowed a mistaken national pride to weaken in this vital instance the force of Allied unity—the basic principle of our program for waging war.

Unfortunately, Langer lends himself to the point of view of this rather small and, in the long run, unimportant set. A considerable part of the analytic value of his report is dissipated by sectarianism. All critics of the Vichy policy, for example, are labeled uniformly as "liberal or radical"—a revealing trick of language, which does something less than justice (or more, depending on one's prejudices) to the *New York Herald Tribune*. He spends a good deal of his time in needless and often inconsistent defense of the positions taken by a particular segment of the American government.[7] Thus much of his

[7] Thus Pétain is described as a fascist and a weakling, though a fine old soldier, a grand old man, and a loyal patriot. But one of the reasons for not having anything to do with

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analysis of the course of our diplomacy is conducted from the superficial vantage point of a debater, not an historian. The result is that by claiming perfection for a special point of view, his exposition of the Vichy policy of the United States government as a whole is far weaker than it could have been. And at many points he is in the position not of presenting the whole story, in its fascinating complexity, but of defending the State Department—or rather one part of the State Department—against its manifold critics, domestic and foreign. The book has a tone of contentiousness which conceals the value and importance of the materials it presents, and often creates doubts about the fairness of its argument. For example, in discussing the celebrated episode of the "so-called" Free French capture of St. Pierre and Miquelon, Robert Sherwood points out that Langer "failed to give the most significant passages" of a memorandum by Hull, and he generally differs with Langer's version of the entire affair.[8]

All the standard reasons advanced in defense of our Vichy policy turned out to be wrong. Almost all the information we received was unreliable. In the event, Giraud had no support among the generals of North Africa. Darlan, who saved the day, was spurned by our representatives when he made overtures before the landings. General Juin, who contributed materially to the success of our landings, was outside the circle of the plot. Weygand, on whom our representatives had banked, refused to help. Pétain, often described as an honorable patriot, aided our enemies in Indo-China, Syria and Tunisia; he may or may not have sent Darlan in Algiers the secret telegrams which Darlan used to get over the hump of legality in ending the North African fighting. Pétain, who had repeatedly promised us to defend unoccupied France, the colonies and the fleet, let the Germans into Syria, did not fire on them when they overran unoccupied France in 1942, did not send the fleet out of Toulon, and ordered Admiral Estéva

de Gaulle was the suspicion that he was also an authoritarian royalist in philosophy. At one point it is contended that de Gaulle had no popular support, at another that no one could know what his popular support was, and later, that his popular support, though real, was purely symbolic. Compare Langer, *op. cit.*, pp. 220, 221, 225, 260, 291-92.

[8] Robert E. Sherwood, *Roosevelt and Hopkins, an Intimate History*, New York, Harper & Bros., 1948, p. 484, and generally Ch. 21.

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to help the Germans into Tunis. The Tunisian episode almost certainly prolonged the war by six months. While it permitted us to train our combat troops on the relatively safe terrain of North Africa, it could hardly be defended on any other grounds. The scuttling of the French fleet was an irreparable blow to France, the effects of which will be felt for a generation or more. On the other hand, French resistance in Oran and Morocco was costly, and, as General Eisenhower reported, "existing French sentiment" in North Africa did "not remotely agree with prior calculations."[9]

Nonetheless, our Vichy policy was and is defensible, not because, as Langer tries to prove, it worked perfectly and according to plan—it did not—but because at the time, and in the light of our terrible weakness, it reasonably seemed to be the least dangerous of alternatives. It was sensible to keep listening posts in Vichy and North Africa, even if all the reports that came through were not reliable. It was right to fight a rear-guard action in Vichy, to try to influence the Vichy government as much as it could be influenced, at least up to the point where our presence in Vichy began to have more negative than positive results. It was reasonable to try to work with resistance elements, even if our representatives seemed to gravitate to resisters of the extreme right, rather than to the bourgeois and labor forces of the Republic which have most strongly sustained modern France.

Looking back, one can identify two classes of errors in our Vichy program, one strategic and the other tactical.

Tactically, our difficulties were in part the inevitable result of the novel task we were attempting, and of differences among our staff and operating personnel, both in ability and in insight. The situation was tangled beyond belief, and mistaken estimates, both of men and of situations, were to be expected. In this connection, it is important that Robert Murphy, often castigated as the symbol of the worst parts of our Vichy policy, should receive credit also, both for his judgments and for his constructive work. Murphy is an effective diplomatic negotiator who has the capacity to alter preconceptions in the

[9] Dwight David Eisenhower, *Crusade in Europe*, Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday, 1948, p. 109.

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light of facts. He strove hard and faithfully to bring about a union of all French resistance groups on the basis of the laws of the French Republic.[10] His views, however, were not decisive in Washington on broader aspects of French policy. There, through the St. Pierre-Miquelon affair, the handling of French occupation currency, and a dozen other episodes, each minor in itself, we built up a cumulative impression of sympathy for Vichy and hostility to the resistance which confused our friends and delighted our enemies.

Differences in the abilities of our staff do not, however, account for the principal part of our troubles in relation to France. Many if not most of our officers dealing with French policy were operating on political premises which turned out to be incorrect. Their premises derived from an inadequate understanding of French history and social development, and of the cataclysmic force of the pressures generated by the Armistice. Modern France is a Republic and the modern French population is republican, with all that that word implies in the setting of French history. Civil war on constitutional issues is never far below the surface of French politics—a fact which many Americans, trained in a stable constitutional system, find it impossible to understand. Power had been seized in 1940 by an anti-republican coalition in France. Under the circumstances, that group had to share in the renunciation of its authority. The issue of legality is clearly put in a memorandum either by Hopkins or Roosevelt, dated December 24, 1942—the day of Darlan's assassination:

> The basis of legitimacy which permitted Darlan to effectively bring North Africa alongside the Allies, is due to the fact that he represented what was then the existing constituted authority of Vichy. He was thus able to give orders which were followed by the local military commanders and the local administration. Indeed, while as it has been proved since, most responsible officials wanted at heart to cooperate with America and Great Britain, their action had to be determined by an order from the regular central authority. Men entrusted with authority in an orderly society are not revolutionaries, and it is to be revolutionary to act contrary to the orders of the central accepted authority. Admiral Darlan gave the order that was wished

[10] Perhaps the reviewer should note, to correct possible bias, that he worked with Murphy for some time during 1943.

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for—but the order had to be given. He alone could give it, not General Giraud at that time.

But now that this has been done, and that the various local commanders have sided with the Allies, it is important to prevent the use which Darlan made of Pétain's authority from being developed into a legitimacy recognized or fostered by the Allies. Such a development in North Africa would be a denial of those conditions which alone will enable the French people to give free expression to their sovereignty.[11]

We could not readily undo the effect of the Armistice without the help of its architects, the men of Vichy. At the same time, our policy for France could gain the warm support of France and Europe only if it rested firmly on the premise of French Republicanism, that is, only if it repudiated Vichy and declared the Armistice and its consequences void. To get France back into the war required the French both to accept and to reject the legality of Vichy.

It was an inadequate appreciation of the second half of this paradox which led us into strategic error in our French policy. Our strategic error was that, having determined to maintain diplomatic relations with Vichy, we refused to develop cordial or significant relations with de Gaulle, and with the republican forces of resistance which gradually rallied under his banner. We allowed the waspishness and lack of perspective of some of our minor officials to creep from time to time into the attitude of our government as a whole. Luckily, so far as events were concerned, no irreparable damage was done. When we entered France, we did not precipitate total confusion or civil war by working with Vichy representatives. The broader views of Stimson, Acheson, Dunn, McCloy and Hopkins, and the ultimate sense of reality of Hull and Roosevelt prevailed. De Gaulle was given status, with our blessing, as the effective head of the resistance movement and the provisional government, and organized the constitutional steps which led to the formation of the Fourth Republic.[12]

The net effect of our strategic error, however, coupled with the cumulative effect of various tactical errors, was that

[11] Sherwood, *op. cit.*, p. 681.

[12] Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, *On Active Service in Peace and War*, New York, Harper & Bros., 1948, pp. 545-53.

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we allowed ourselves quite unnecessarily to appear before European opinion as sponsors of the most reactionary kind of politics and politicians. In a war which was (and is) also a war for the soul of Europe, our policy was not rooted in a sense of European politics. We did not take adequate account of the curious vision of America which exists in many European minds. The America of Roosevelt's New Deal allowed itself to be impressed on the mind of many Europeans as an Art Young or George Grosz cartoon—fat, oily, and covered with dollar signs—an intensely conservative, banker-ridden, capitalist oligarchy, linked to arch-conservative European clericals, generals, financiers and industrialists. Against the background of what we seemed to be doing, our occasional statements to the contrary did not carry full conviction. The basic structure of our Vichy policy, the absence of sympathetic cooperation with the resistance forces, the tone of irritability that seemed like suspicion—all these things grievously weakened America's position in Europe—and do so to this day.

Both the Franco story and the Vichy episode are among the living images which reduce the effect of our leadership in Europe and give the Communists ammunition with which to create doubt and difficulty in the minds of ordinary, forward-looking Europeans. This impression need never have arisen, at least in the case of France, for it was never in any sense a part of American policy to keep the men or the ideas of Vichy in power. Langer's book is an anthology of the reasons why this unfortunate stereotype developed, and of the shortcomings, both in vision and in insight, which can lead to equally costly errors in the conduct of foreign relations again. Even a Secretary of State of Cordell Hull's stature, can be misled by an inadequate staff.

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THE BOMB AND BLACKETT*

By LOUIS N. RIDENOUR, JR.

P. M. S. Blackett, *Fear, War, and the Bomb,* New York, Whittlesey House, 1949, pp. 238. $3.50.

P. M. S. BLACKETT, Nobel Laureate in Physics for 1948, is a scientist of distinction and outstanding ability. He is therefore capable, as all good scientists should be, of careful and objective reasoning concerning matters that do not impinge too closely upon his faiths and implicit beliefs. Unfortunately, the subject matter of his book, *Fear, War, and the Bomb,* suggests that Blackett has allowed his pronounced political sympathies to warp his observations and his reasoning. They have apparently led him to suppress large numbers of pertinent facts, to ignore many crucial technical and political possibilities, and to depreciate the honesty and good faith of his government and of ours to an absurd degree.

Blackett attempts to establish three main theses: First, that the effectiveness of strategic bombardment has been greatly overrated, through a misinterpretation of the evidence of World War II. Second, that the atomic bomb will by no means have the impressive role in future wars which enthusiasts predict for it. Third, that the Soviet reaction to the Anglo-American proposals for atomic energy control has been entirely reasonable, for detailed reasons which we shall examine later.

Most writers who have commented on *Fear, War, and the Bomb* (which was published in England last fall under another title) have paid attention mainly to the political matters that come under the heading of the third thesis. They have usually ignored, or even applauded, Blackett's views on strategic air power and on the atomic bomb. Since he minimizes the military usefulness of these two components of armed strength, and since both are, for the moment, substantially American monopolies, his assertions are a matter of sincere and immediate concern to every American.

* Dean Ridenour's review article is being published jointly in *Scientific American* and *World Politics.*

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Let us first consider the military significance of the strategic air campaign conducted in World War II. Blackett discusses the area attacks upon centers of population which were carried out by the Royal Air Force; he concludes, in agreement with the findings of the United States Strategic Bombing Survey, that the great destruction and loss of life produced by such attacks had little direct effect upon German war production. The United States Army Air Forces, however, devoted its attention not to such area attacks but to an attack upon target systems selected as being vital to the enemy war economy.

Blackett dwells at considerable length upon the well-established fact that the American bombings had little economic effect during all the months that preceded the summer of 1944. He gives this result its correct explanation: The American air commanders, who had started the strategic air war in the belief that attacks on enemy industry could bring a quick decision, soon learned that heavy opposition from defensive fighters of the German Air Force so deranged the bombardment that its accuracy, and therefore its economic effect, was small. This difficulty being appreciated, attention was focused on destroying the GAF. It was required of the bombers only that their attacks be sufficiently annoying to draw the German fighters into battle.

By the spring of 1944, the GAF was wrecked. Just before the Normandy invasion (the success of which hinged largely on Allied air superiority), German ventures into the air were so hazardous that a German pilot would be credited with an operational mission—a sortie in the face of the enemy—when he had merely ferried an airplane from one field in Occupied France to another. The Germans owned the land of France, but we owned the air over it. Once the GAF was finished, the accuracy, weight and effectiveness of our bombardment promptly rose, and Germany's war economy was disrupted. Nearly three quarters of the total weight of bombs dropped on Germany were dropped after July 1, 1944. The attacks on transportation and on the oil industry were especially effective. On March 15, 1945, the German armaments chief Albert Speer reported to Hitler that the total collapse of German industry was only four to eight weeks away.

Thus the American strategic attack had two phases. In the first, which was characterized by the existence of a spirited

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German defense, the primary effort of the United States Army Air Forces was to defeat the GAF. Bombing accuracy was poor, bomb tonnage relatively small, and the damage to German industry unimpressive. In the second phase, the GAF could make no effective resistance. Bombing was accurate, consistent and heavy; German war production fell from its all-time maximum to zero in some 10 months.

Though Blackett describes all this, his conclusion from it is based upon the first phase of the air war over Germany, when the economic effects were small. He thus assumes that in any future war it will be necessary to fight for and win air superiority before substantial economic damage can be inflicted by strategic bombardment. While this may be true of the stable phase of any future war, it is almost entirely beside the point, since effective air superiority will always exist for a few days at the beginning of an air attack, and the atomic bomb is so effective that the destruction that took place in the 300 days that finished Germany can be compressed into those few initial days. Let us examine the background for this view, which differs so sharply from Blackett's.

Blackett justifies his faith in the effectiveness of air defense by an assessment of the future technical developments which he predicts for the next few years. He concludes (a) that piloted aircraft are the only proximate vehicles capable of delivering atomic bombs to strategic targets, (b) that they are of relatively short range, and will require forward bases within one or two thousand miles of the targets, and (c) that piloted defensive fighters can deal capably with attacks by piloted subsonic bombers.

It is possible to quarrel with all but perhaps the first of these assertions. Admittedly the accurate thousand-mile guided missile will not be available until some time in the future. How far off it is, under the present circumstances of vigorous technical development, is hard to predict; Blackett chooses to put it more than 10 years away, and let us join him.

The second conclusion is wrong on the record. It is perfectly true that the B-29s of World War II needed bases within 1,500 miles of their targets. However, the standard heavy bomber of the United States Air Force today is the formidable B-36, the actual combat range of which, on the basis of published state-

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ments, appears to be at least 3,000 miles. Also, Blackett's book was written too early to include any observations on the bomber range which can be attained by refueling in the air. The USAF has recently announced trials which indicate that this simple technique will give B-29s and B-50s substantially a global range.

Thus today's USAF bombers will deliver today's atomic bombs from here to anywhere, provided that they are not successfully intercepted. Blackett contends that they will be, and that the cost of operating unescorted long-range bombers in the face of enemy opposition will be prohibitive. This contention, too, can be debated. It rests upon an assumption that the fighter's advantage over the bomber depends only upon the fighter's edge in speed, and that this advantage is essentially independent of the actual speed at which the interception must be made. The assumption is grossly wrong, for reasons so lengthy and so technical that they are only hinted at here. At high speeds, the maneuverability of a fighter is greatly reduced by the pilot's tolerance for acceleration and a turn, and by the danger of stalling out of a high-altitude turn that is too sharp. This reduced maneuverability requires that interception commence at ranges which are often greater than the maximum distance at which a fighter pilot can see a bomber, even under perfect visibility conditions. Several other major difficulties beset the problem of bomber interception at high subsonic speeds, even granting that the interceptors have a substantial speed advantage.

In any case, the point need not be labored. Granting that unescorted bombers would not be safe against air defenses in the stable phase of an air war fought in the near future, it is important to turn our attention to the conditions that would obtain during the early days of an attack. It is my contention that the entire strategic air effort could be carried out without effective opposition in those few days.

All defenses in all history, particularly such complicated coordinated defenses as those involved in air defense, have required time and actual combat experience to build up to maximum efficiency. Thus, for example, the German daylight air attack on England in 1940, quickly opposed and mastered by the RAF as it was, nevertheless deposited on its targets a weight

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of bombs which would have been decisive *if they had been atomic bombs*. So did the German night campaign of late 1940 and early 1941, though improving RAF defenses made the raids so costly that they were soon abandoned. I have documented this point with other examples in my chapter "There is No Defense," in the symposium *One World or None* (Whittlesey House, 1946). Blackett quotes extensively from that book, but nowhere refers to or refutes the present argument. The reason for the early failure of the defense is not far to seek. The defense must be eternally alert everywhere against any form of attack, while the offense chooses its time and place and weapons, and thus achieves initial surprise in most instances, and local superiority in all.

So long as the initial unmolested air attack had to be delivered in terms of old-fashioned "high explosives" and incendiaries, it could achieve a significant local success (as at Pearl Harbor), but could not be decisive. With atomic bombs, all this is changed. Blackett quotes, and agrees with, current estimates that one bombing aircraft carrying one atomic bomb is equivalent in terms of practical destructive power to between 50 and 250 heavy bombers with old-fashioned bombs. Unlike most other experts, he asks us to take comfort from the circumstance that the number is not bigger. The German economy was destroyed completely, according to the argument which Blackett himself makes, in the 300 days from July, 1944, to April, 1945. Since there had been no significant economic effect earlier, we can draw no other conclusion. This means that the bomber forces of World War II could have achieved the same result in perhaps two days if they had used atomic bombs.

General H. H. Arnold has made a similar calculation with relation to the Pacific war. He says: "The Twentieth Air Force, using atomic bombs, could in one day's raid destroy more of Japan's industry than was actually done in the entire B-29 campaign." During the one or two days that we are discussing here, by all the evidence of history and experience and in the expectation of our own experienced air defense commanders, air defenses would be so disoriented and inefficient, so saturated under sudden heavy attack, that they would be helpless.

What targets would be attacked in those two days? Blackett assumes that we would desire to destroy the cities of the enemy.

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He even depreciates the value of strategic air attack on the grounds that the Russians might, in another war, occupy the whole of Western Europe; he argues that we would not, and dare not, bomb the cities of our friends.

In terms of capabilities, we could surely use our brief initial air superiority to lay waste all the major cities of an enemy. In terms of military realities, we would almost certainly not do so. Blackett himself has shown that attacks on cities had small result in World War II, while attacks on specific industrial target systems brought the Germans to collapse. This being so, even though there is some evidence that an atomic-bomb attack on civilian populations might be much more effective than were such attacks with old-time "high explosives," our decision would undoubtedly be to launch our strategic attack against carefully chosen points in the fabric of the enemy's industry. There would be two cogent reasons for making this choice: (1) the proved military value of such attacks; (2) the fact that the tremendous loss of irrelevant lives in city bombing is repugnant to any proper conscience.

Since industries are not usually *in* cities but on the periphery, they could be attacked even though they were in occupied friendly countries. In the absence of effective opposition during the first apocalyptic days, the bombing would be accurate, and there need be little indiscriminate killing of people living in the nearby cities. It is even possible that the raids could be announced beforehand, as Major General Curtis E. LeMay announced his targets in a late phase of the Pacific air war, without such an announcement aiding the initial air defense in any significant way. This, however, is speculation, and the risk might well be regarded as too great to take.

In any case, another war is likely to involve, early in the conflict, the destruction by one power of certain vital economic target systems of the other. The aircraft producing this destruction would carry atomic bombs; one of them would be more terrible than an entire old-fashioned combat wing, while half a dozen would be equivalent to an old-time thousand-plane raid. The weapons could be so used that the lingering radioactivity spewed over the factories and the installations that were hit would deny their further use by men for months or years.

Other arms, no doubt, would be involved in such a conflict.

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There is no quarrel on that point; indeed, our present pattern of military expenditure suggests that we put no complete reliance on strategic bombing with atomic weapons. But to say, as Blackett does, that long-range bombers cannot be decisive, and that the atomic bomb changes nothing, is to assert that the war economy of a nation is of no value to that nation in a war. Reduced to these basic terms, Blackett's military contentions are preposterous.

The view here presented is not a pleasant one to take. Yet in today's nervous and hostile world, we are committed to a national policy of maintaining our armed strength. The long-range striking arm of that military strength is the strategic bomber, with its atomic weapons. Blackett does the Western world no service when he affects to deny the usefulness of strategic bombardment.

It may be that the very curious nature and the obvious bias of Blackett's political remarks will warn the reader that the military considerations he advances are also suspect. In the latter part of the book, Blackett presents the following astonishing arguments: First, that the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan in August, 1945, was the first move in the cold war, designed to forestall a Russian offensive in the Far East. Second, that the Baruch proposals for the international control of atomic energy, based with devilish ingenuity on the altruistic program of a group of high-minded men, were another move in the same game, and were designed to put the Soviet Union at a moral disadvantage. Third, that the scheme for control contained a thinly disguised attempt to deprive the Russians of an unparalleled opportunity to raise the living standards of their masses by the peaceful exploitation of atomic power.

The usual reason given in the United States for the timing of the use of the first atomic bombs is that they were not ready any earlier. The usual reason for the nature of their use is that a dramatic demonstration of the bomb's power was felt to be necessary to convince the enemy of its effectiveness, as promptly as could be done. The whole affair is said to have been calculated to result in the speediest termination of the war, and the smallest loss of American and Japanese lives. We have all this on the solemn public testimony of the men responsible for the decisions. Blackett brushes it aside; he does not even summarize

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these arguments as meriting serious attention. The closest that he comes to them is in what he calls the "Roman holiday" theory: that, having spent two billion public dollars on a weapon, the American people were entitled to the bloodiest possible demonstration of its effectiveness. He states that many Americans espouse this view; I know one who does not.

In Blackett's assumption that we dropped the bombs to prevent the Russian grab in Manchuria (he does not call it that), how did we succeed? Russia took Manchuria, a proceeding that we could not have prevented even though we wished to do so.

The second of Blackett's political assertions that I have mentioned above is best dealt with by stating it in his own words. He says, comparing the Baruch and the Gromyko proposals for atomic energy control, "It is hardly likely that either the American or the Russian Governments had serious expectations that their proposals for control would be accepted by the other. As has already been emphasized, the American proposals constituted a very shrewd move in the diplomatic cold war, promising concrete advantages in the event either of their acceptance or their rejection. American diplomacy had maneuvered Russia into the disadvantageous position of having to reject a speciously fair offer."

Nothing I can say will make this assertion seem more absurd than it shows itself to be. Quite apart from the obvious sincerity with which the United States approached this problem, it is more than I can manage to believe that our democratically cumbersome and bumbling foreign policy can have reached the heights of guile suggested by Blackett.

As to his argument concerning the industrial applications of atomic energy, and Russia's need for atomic power, one can only say that this is nonsense. To be the great industrial nation that she hopes to become, Russia needs power, indisputably; but the sources of it now lie ready to her hand. Her coal reserves are the second largest in the world; her potential of water power is the largest; by her own assertion her petroleum resources are larger than those of any other country. With this great wealth in the conventional power sources, Russia should be less dependent on atomic power than any other country, not excluding ours.

Further, the development of power from conventional sources

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is a straightforward business which is well understood by engineers. We are only in the faltering beginnings of the engineering of atomic power. How shall we deal with the great intensity of lethal radiation? What structural materials best resist it without change and failure? How do we transfer heat efficiently in a structure the design of which is dominated by the necessities of its service as a reactor? How shall we dispose of the intensely radioactive wastes? Can we make a reactor that will both deliver useful power and "breed" new atomic fuel? How shall we guard against explosions? In view of these and other vital questions, practical atomic power is too far off to be a factor of significance in past or current policy.

Altogether, Blackett's book appears to be an elaborate and lengthy defense of a set of fixed ideas held at the start. J. B. S. Haldane, one of Blackett's colleagues in the British left, has said of him: "He has a mind which seems to be much happier with real things, which he can count and measure, than with the more abstract forms. . . . What is more, he finds the things he is looking for." Haldane's remark, made in an altogether different context, is particularly apt as a description of the way in which the ideas and arguments of Blackett's book must have been arrived at.

His ideas coincide remarkably with the standard Russian views. He belittles the atomic bomb—which Russia has not got, but wants. He depreciates strategic air power—which is the only arm we have that can strike a blow at Russia (she does not fear our armies, surely, and she has no vital seaborne commerce to defend). He indulges in the most remarkable gymnastics of rationalization to convict us of chicanery in our external atomic policy—despite a U. S. proposal whose generosity is unparalleled in the history of diplomacy. Blackett, and the Russians too, consistently refer to the limited world government which so many Americans desire as a "world hegemony" that will be dominated by the United States.

Blackett's argument carries its own antidote. The excesses and the absurdities of the political views he urges are so clearly the result of bias, and so clearly dominated by pro-Soviet prejudice, that the whole work is suspect, and will appear so even to the least discerning.

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IN DEFENSE OF DIPLOMACY

By HAROLD SPROUT

Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace,* New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1948, pp. xvi, 489, xix. $5.50 trade; $4.25 text.

PUBLICATION of *Politics Among Nations* is another important milestone in the development of systematic studies of international political phenomena into an established and recognized branch of higher learning.

Comparison of this impressive treatise with any work published before 1914 reveals in dramatic fashion how much ground has already been covered. Before World War I, as Grayson Kirk has described,[1] the study of international relations was largely carried on in the sterile atmosphere of international law and conventionalized diplomatic history. The crusade for the League of Nations opened up a new field and gave great impetus to the study of world organization. This newcomer practically stole the show during the 1920's. But the course of world events did not fulfill the bright hopes fostered by schemes for disarmament, outlawry of war, collective security, judicial settlement of disputes, and codification of international law. Teachers and writers, however, continued to play the same old records, which sounded more and more unconvincing as the dictators prepared the stage for another world war.

Gradually during the 1930's, and against great initial resistance, a few pioneers chopped a new trail through the forest. Frederick Schuman was one of those pioneers. The first edition of his *International Politics*[2] swept a fresh breeze of new thinking into the academic classrooms of the middle 1930's. Frank Simonds and Brooks Emeny followed with a different but equally realistic approach in *The Great Powers in World Politics,* first published in 1935.[3]

[1] *The Study of International Relations in American Colleges and Universities,* New York, Council on Foreign Relations, 1947.

[2] New York, McGraw-Hill, 1933. The fourth edition of this widely used text appeared in 1948.

[3] New York, American Book Company.

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A distinctive feature of these and other new works appearing in this period was the emerging conception of international politics as a separate and important branch of social science. This development was recognition, more often tacit than explicit, that diplomacy, war, and other aspects of interstate relations within the society of nations presented many problems that remained stubbornly refractory under the tools and techniques of international law and international organization.

One conspicuous need, for which little or no help was forthcoming from those systems of thought, was the need for a conceptual structure and methodology with which to explore and analyze the nature and role of power in the relations of national states. One of the pioneers who tackled this problem was E. H. Carr. In *The Twenty Years Crisis,* published in 1939,[4] he presented a critique of earlier writing and a theory of international politics based squarely upon a concept of power that combined psychological and economic as well as military elements.

Nicholas Spykman was another scholar who developed a theory of international power politics, but within an essentially geopolitical framework.[5] Death cut short Spykman's career in 1943, but he had already made a heavy impact and his influence continued. It was revealed in various wartime writing and study projects,[6] in the new attention paid to the writings of Sir Halford Mackinder previously almost unknown in the United States,[7] and in the postwar writings of many students of world politics.

There is today considerable area of agreement as to what subject-matter the study of international politics should embrace. There is less agreement as to the field's basic methodology. The following schematic outline indicates this reviewer's own tentative and fallible notions of the scope and structure of the field:

1. *Objectives of foreign policy:* What are the aims or objectives of each state's foreign policy? What, if any, generalizations are possible?

[4] London and New York, Macmillan Co.

[5] *America's Strategy in World Politics,* New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1942.

[6] For example, the ASTP textbook, *Geographical Foundations of National Power,* Army Service Forces Manual, M-103, Govt. Printing Office, 1944.

[7] Mackinder's *Democratic Ideals and Reality,* first published in 1919, and long out of print, was reprinted in 1942, with an introduction by Edward M. Earle.

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2. *Motivations of statesmen:* Why do given states pursue particular foreign policy objectives? What motivations or other causative influences shape the behavior of national statesmen in particular situations? What, if any, generalizations are possible?

3. *Tools and techniques of statecraft:* By what means do statesmen try to attain desired ends vis-a-vis other states? What generalized categories of comparison are possible?

4. *State capabilities:* Why do the efforts of statesmen succeed or fail? What categories and principles can be formulated for estimating and comparing the relative capabilities of states involved in particular situations or relationships?

5. *Interstate relationships:* What relationships arise from the simultaneous and often antagonistic efforts of states to attain their foreign policy objectives?

6. *Regulatory mechanisms:* What regulatory mechanisms and procedures exist to accommodate mutually antagonistic national aims, and to prevent the behavior of states from disrupting, or even destroying, not only the society of nations but also the very foundations of modern urban-industrial civilization?

7. *Efficacy of regulatory mechanisms:* How effective are existing mechanisms and procedures either for maintaining the *status quo* or for achieving necessary change without disruptive violence in the society of nations?

8. *Reform of regulatory mechanisms:* How can existing regulatory mechanisms and procedures be improved or strengthened, or new and more effective ones instituted and developed? What standards or criteria can be devised for evaluating specific reform proposals?

Applying this schematic outline as a yardstick to *Politics Among Nations* as a whole, one discovers that Morgenthau is more concerned with interstate relationships and with the mechanisms, tried and proposed, for regulating such relationships, than he is with the basic conditions and forces out of which interstate relationships and consequent regulatory problems arise.

The point is not that questions 5 to 8 in the above scheme should receive less attention, but that questions 1 to 4 should receive a great deal more. This would have necessitated a longer book, but one considerably more useful to teachers of international relations.

To attempt a thumbnail summary of the author's main thesis, is to risk distorting it. As I understand that thesis, it runs approximately as follows: International politics is an eternal struggle for power among sovereign states, a struggle of

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each against all in an environment akin to anarchy, slightly alleviated by rudimentary and only partially effective regulatory mechanisms such as the balance of power, international law and international organization. Substitution of a bi-polar pattern of power for the traditional multilateral balance of power, enormous increase in the destruction potential of weapons, growth of "nationalistic universalism," and other developments, now confront mankind with the prospect of a third world war of truly frightening dimensions and consequences. Such a "total war waged by total populations for total stakes . . . may end in world dominion or in world destruction or in both." In the long run only a "world state" can save us from such a catastrophe. Yet the "transformation of the present society of sovereign nations into a world state is unattainable under the moral, social, and political conditions which prevail in the world of our time." As the prime requisite for the creation of such a world state, our author suggests "the mitigation and minimization of those political conflicts which in our time pit the two superpowers against each other and evoke the specter of a cataclysmic war." In the final analysis, the "instrument" for "establishing the preconditions for permanent peace" is "diplomacy," and the method is one of "accommodation," by which the author apparently means honest compromise without appeasement.

Applying in detail the yardstick suggested in an earlier paragraph, one discovers that Morgenthau devotes remarkably little space to consideration of the objectives of national policy. There is little methodological guidance on how to go about determining what are the purposes towards which state action is directed; or how one distinguishes between purposes which statesmen deem absolute or desirable *per se*, and purposes which they regard as transient or as merely tactical steps towards longer range and more important objectives.

In chapter I we read that "international politics, like all politics, is a struggle for power"; that "whatever the ultimate aims of international politics, power is always the immediate aim." Power is defined as "man's control over the minds and actions of other men"; and "political power," as "the mutual relations of control among the holders of public authority and between the latter and the public at large." *Political* power, it

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is emphasized, is not the same thing as *military* power. "In international politics . . . armed strength as a threat or a potentiality is the most important material factor making for the political power of a nation." But, Morgenthau continues, "the actual exercise of physical violence substitutes for the psychological relation between two minds, which is of the essence of political power, the physical relation between two bodies, one of which is strong enough to dominate the other's movements."

Psychologists and other specialists in human behavior may not recognize so clear-cut a distinction between "minds" and "bodies." Political analysts may question whether in practice the distinction between political and military power is as sharp, or as important, as Morgenthau makes it seem. But one has only praise for his attempt to define power (a tricky word if there ever was one) in terms essentially non-military.

More difficult to appraise is Morgenthau's unqualified statement that power is always the "immediate" objective of state policy. Given his definition of power, the position can perhaps be sustained. Yet the subtle effect on most readers may well be to exaggerate coercion and conflict, and to minimize unduly such factors as persuasion and compromise. Power, as noted above, is one of the "fighting words." No matter how carefully one defines it and posts guard over it, he presently discovers it "on the loose," tripping emotional triggers that close the mind to rational analysis of the phenomena of international politics. Too insistent emphasis on power as the universal objective of state policy may easily depreciate in the reader's mind the importance of other specific objectives, their relative priority in the state's political strategy, and possible cause-and-effect relationships between short and longer term objectives.

Take, for example, the hotly debated subject of Soviet foreign policy. To say that power is the immediate aim of Soviet foreign policy, tells one nothing new or distinctive. What one wants to know is which has higher priority in Russian statecraft: security, territorial expansion, or world communism; and how these and other aims may be intertwined in Russian thinking. How does one approach such a problem? Does one merely select official Soviet statements which seem to him convincing—in other words, those which coincide with his own presuppositions? What help can the social psychologist afford

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in interpreting inconsistent public utterances? What can one infer about Soviet aims from Russian history? From Russian geography? From traditional and post-revolutionary patterns of Russian social behavior? From physical and social conditions inside the Soviet Union? From Russia's external strategical position and political and economic relations?

The subject of state aims does come in for some generalized treatment here and there through *Politics Among Nations.* One notes, in particular, the chapters on imperialism and "nationalistic universalism." But a more extended statement of the problem confronted in identifying and analyzing state aims, and more discussion of various approaches to this problem would, in my judgment, have greatly enhanced the value of this generally admirable treatise.

Closely related to the question of state aims is the question of motivations, raised in point 2 of the reviewer's suggested outline of the field. What conditions and influences impel statesmen to pursue certain specific goals? What part does a state's internal stresses and strains play in shaping its foreign policy? Does a state's political and social structure predispose its government towards a particular brand of foreign policy? What influence can be attributed to ideology and patterns of approved social behavior inside the state? Such questions are not entirely ignored in *Politics Among Nations;* but they receive scattered and casual rather than systematic and thorough consideration.

The third point—relating to the tools and techniques of statecraft—likewise suffers from inadequate treatment. In order to compare the ways of particular states, or of states differently structured and situated, one needs some categories into which to classify behavior. For this purpose I have found it helpful to classify the tools and techniques of statecraft into four categories: (1) diplomacy and variants thereof; (2) economic inducements and pressures; (3) propaganda and subversion; (4) physical violence and threats thereof. Most of these tools and techniques, which statesmen employ in ever varying combinations, are discussed or mentioned somewhere in the volume. There is a remarkably fine discussion of diplomacy, of which more will be said later. But again one feels the lack of systematic consideration of the tools and techniques as a whole.

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Point 4—relating to the relative capabilities of states—is treated expressly and systematically in chapters VI-VIII. Morgenthau discusses the "elements of national power" under eight categories and in the following order: geography, natural resources, industrial capacity, military preparedness, population, national character, national morale, and the quality of diplomacy.

The most reliable methodology for estimating and comparing the capabilities of states is still very much an open question. This is one of the most baffling problems of international politics. Detailed consideration of this problem is obviously beyond the scope of a general textbook. Morgenthau presents briefly some of the elements to be considered, but in what seems to me a slightly illogical order. This reviewer would prefer to proceed from geography and physical resources, to human resources, to science and technology (tools and skills), to economic development (equipment and capacity), to economic institutions, to social organization, to state structure and form of government, to military institutions and traditions, to political behavior (leadership, morale, etc.), to ideology (attitudes, ideas, outlook, etc.), to political and strategical opportunities and limitations.

Numerous factors included in the latter list, it will be noted, are missing from Morgenthau's. To some degree he covers these missing items under other terminology or elsewhere in the book. But he has very little to say about the ways in which the institutional structure of a state affects not only its policies but also its capabilities. Many important aspects of ideology and behavior are likewise omitted or merely noted in passing. How, for example, does a particular society's attitude towards women and towards their employment in industry and in the armed forces, or the society's attitude towards racial or other minority groups, affect its economic and military potential, or its abilities to carry on successful propaganda in other countries? Does X-state provide conditions as favorable as Y-state, for scientific and technological advancement, for economic development, for the reporting and analysis of events in other countries, etc.?

The remainder of the book seems to this reviewer to be gen-

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erally more adequate in scope and treatment. One has little but praise for Morgenthau's brief but lucid discussion of the complexities involved in estimating state capabilities. He also nails "typical errors" frequently made in comparing the capabilities of two or more states. His discussion of the balance of power as a limitation on state action is commendable. His analysis of moral force, public opinion, and international law as limitations on national power is depressing but hard to refute.

The chapters on "world politics in the mid-twentieth century" focus on "the new moral force of nationalistic universalism," on the bi-polarization of power into a "two-bloc system," and on the enormous increase in the scale, intensity, and destructiveness of war. The concurrence of these three developments creates the world crisis summarized early in this review.

Morgenthau explores with almost consistently negative results the different schemes attempted or advocated to alleviate the crisis. "Disarmament or at least regulation of armaments," he concludes, "is an indispensable step in a general settlement of international conflicts," but "a mutually satisfactory settlement of the power contest is a precondition for disarmament." Collective security is depicted as a two-edged sword. "It is the supreme paradox of collective security that any attempt to make it work with less than ideal perfection will have the opposite effect from what it is supposed to achieve." In this connection, one recalls the cynical remark made about the League of Nations, that the inexorable tendency of collective security procedures is to transmute little wars into great wars. "An international police force in a society of sovereign states is," in Morgenthau's judgment, "a contradiction in terms."

Judicial procedures for settling international controversies have very limited value, since "the disputes which are most likely to lead to war cannot be settled by judicial means." Proposals for "peaceful change" collide head-on with national interests, and "sovereign nations are moved to action by what they regard as their national interests rather than by the allegiance to a common good which, as a common standard of justice, does not exist in the society of nations."

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Experiments with international government have led to equally negative results. The latest, the United Nations, built upon the assumption of the United States and the Soviet Union acting together, "is constitutionally unable to prevent a war between those two countries. Yet it is such a war which today threatens . . . all mankind."

World states, Morgenthau contends, are not created by drafting charters. A world "moral and political community . . . must antedate a world state." But development of a world community "presupposes at least the mitigation and minimization of international conflicts so that the interests which unite members of different nations may outweigh the interests which separate them."

To attain this end, our author concludes, the best available tool is diplomacy, under which he evidently includes all the mechanisms of international negotiation. The great task is to revive the art of diplomacy. He exposes the vices of diplomatic business carried on before the microphone (it will be television next). He condemns the "vice of majority decision" and the "vice of fragmentation" (*i.e.*, breaking international issues into isolated cases).

The book draws to a close with some sound sense on the practice of diplomacy. "Diplomacy must be divested of the crusading spirit"; "the objectives of foreign policy must be defined in terms of the national interest, and must be supported with adequate power"; "diplomacy must look at the political scene from the point of view of the other nations"; "nations must be willing to compromise on all issues that are not vital to them." Governments are admonished to "give up the shadow of worthless rights for the substance of real advantage"; to "never put yourself in a position from which you cannot retreat without losing face and from which you cannot advance without grave risks"; to "never allow a weak ally to make decisions for you"; and never to forget that "armed forces are the instrument of foreign policy, not its master."

To practice diplomacy on this level presupposes, of course, "extraordinary moral and intellectual qualities" on the part of the "leading participants" of all nations, especially those of the greater powers. "A mistake in the evaluation of one of the

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elements of national power made by one or the other of the leading statesmen," Morgenthau warns, "may spell the difference between peace and war." Diplomacy, in short, may be the "best means" for "preserving peace," available in a society of sovereign states, but "it is not good enough." In the end he finds no substitute for a world state. "Yet, as there can be no permanent peace without a world state, there can be no world state without the peace-preserving and community-building processes of diplomacy."

With no mean dialectical skill Morgenthau advances from one position to the next until he reaches the above destination. It will take much rereading, brooding, and reflection to locate possible flaws in Morgenthau's argument.

My own second thoughts include the following points: Morgenthau may have considerably overestimated the ability of either the United States or the Soviet Union to conquer and rule a world empire. He may have seriously underestimated the capacity of the "in-between world" to resist the pressures and blandishments of both Moscow and Washington. He may have misread the meaning of the cold war and underestimated the possibility of its continuing over a long period without ever flaring into total shooting war. He may have given insufficient consideration to the possibility that, the more destructive weapons become, and the greater the certainty of prompt and devastating reprisal in kind, the more reluctant statesmen may become to turn loose military weapons, and the more reliance they may come to place on economic pressures, subversion, propaganda, and diplomacy to attain their ends.

Such considerations do not seriously dim the bright luster of this work. Morgenthau has set a high standard for all who would venture into the treacherous quicksands of system-building in international politics. *Politics Among Nations* is a work of major importance. It should do much to promote better teaching and scholarship in the critically important field of international politics.

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THE YUGOSLAV-RUSSIAN DISPUTE AND ITS IMPLICATIONS

By ADAM B. ULAM

The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London and New York, 1948, pp. 79. 50¢.

THE Royal Institute of International Affairs has made available almost all of that correspondence between the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia and the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R.[1] which culminated in the open break between Tito and Moscow and between the Yugoslav Communist Party and the sister parties associated in the Communist Information Bureau.

The letters are most revealing. Not only do they give us a picture of the dispute, much clearer than we could glean from previous accusations and counter-accusations; their tone and material also provide a valuable insight into the workings of international communism. Here we have an instance of a "live" dispute within the highest circles of international communism rather than a case of resurrected quarrels from the past. There is no doubt as to the authenticity of the documents concerned. For once we have in our grasp material of first class importance and relevance.

The Yugoslav letters usually bear the signature of Tito and Kardelj, either in their individual capacity or (in most cases) as they speak for their Central Committee. Each letter is addressed to "Comrades Stalin and Molotov." Yet the Russion answer is always forthcoming from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The visible causes of the conflict can be divided into two classes. The Russians (who of course took the initiative in raising the issue and starting the formal quarrel) originally alleged a series of unfriendly acts and pronouncements by various Yugoslav officials. But along with these unfriendly

[1] Two Yugoslav letters, those of March 18, and May 20, 1948, referred to in the correspondence are missing in the collection.

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acts, the Yugoslav Party was soon accused of lacking in inner-party democracy, of pursuing an incorrect policy on the agrarian issue, and of a series of other serious deviations from the principles of Marxism and Leninism.

The root of the trouble from the Soviet point of view was the unsatisfactory attitude of Yugoslav leaders toward their great ally. The letter of the C. P. S. U. of May 4 mentions the two earliest examples of Yugoslav intransigeance. In a speech of May, 1945, Tito was guilty of the following statement:

> It is said that this war is a just war and we have considered it as such. However, we seek also a just end; we demand that everyone shall be master in his own house; we do not want to pay for others; we do not want to be used as a bribe in international bargaining; we do not want to get involved in any policy of spheres of interest.[2]

About the same time Djilas, head of the Propaganda Department of the Yugoslav Party, was supposed to have made derogatory remarks about the behavior of Soviet officers in Yugoslavia. The Russians had reacted promptly to both these statements. The Russian ambassador Sadchikov protested to Kardelj about the implications of Tito's speech, and Stalin himself sent a telegram to Tito about Djilas' slight of the Red Army.[3] Kardelj begged Sadchikov to excuse Tito, and supposedly criticized his boss; while Djilas had to go in person to Moscow to apologize to Comrade Stalin.

The Soviet letter which mentions these two examples of Yugoslav intransigeance considers them as the opening round in a whole series of insults to Russian officials in Yugoslavia. Not only had the Russian ambassador been treated like a diplomatic representative of a bourgeois country; close supervision of Soviet agents had followed; and, finally, as the direct cause of the break, the Yugoslav military leaders had demanded that the number of Soviet military advisers be reduced by 60 per cent, as they were too expensive for Yugoslavia.[4]

> We know that there are anti-Soviet rumours circulated among the leading comrades in Yugoslavia [the Russian letter went on], for instance that "the C. P. S. U. is degenerate," "great power chauvinism is rampant in the U. S. R. R.," "the U. S. S. R. is trying to domi-

[2] Quoted in *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, p. 35. [3] Quoted *ibid.*, p. 39.
[4] The letter of C. P. S. U., March 27, in *ibid.*, p. 12.

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> nate Yugoslavia economically," and "the Cominform is a means of controlling the other parties by the C. P. S. U." etc. . . . We readily admit that every Communist Party, among them the Yugoslav, has the right to criticize the C. P. S. U. But Marxism demands that criticism be above-board, and not under-hand and slanderous.[5]

Let us note that the Soviet Government "put up" with this state of affairs for three years without making the dispute public. It put up with conditions under which it had to deal with people like the then Assistant Foreign Minister Velebit, whom the Russian letters call, without mincing words, an English spy. What, then, were the Russians doing in these years? In their rejoinder Tito and Kardelj imply that there was a constant effort on the part of Soviet representatives in Yugoslavia to build an anti-Tito bloc within the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and that they recruited at least two members of the Central Committee of C. P. Y., Hebrang and Zhujovic, who were, as of April 1948, deprived of their positions and thrown in jail.[6] This fits in with the Soviet complaint of March 27 that there is lack of democracy within the C. P. Y., that its Congress has not been held since 1940, and that a majority of its Central Committee has been co-opted and not elected. The Russians are saying, without the slightest element of self-consciousness, that the hand of Rankovic, the Minister of State Security, is resting heavily upon the Yugoslav Party, and that consequently the widespread dissatisfaction of its membership with the regime of the Big Four—Tito, Kardelj, Djilas, and Rankovic—cannot be expressed in action.[7]

Those who read *For A Lasting Peace* (the organ of the Cominform) will remember that its issues of June 1 and June 15, 1948, still printed in Belgrade, carried thinly veiled allusions to a Communist Party which allowed itself to be submerged in a People's Front, which abandoned intra-Party democracy, and which refused to admit its mistakes. Since these accusations had already been leveled before the break was made public it is reasonable to assume that the Russians were trying to obtain some leverage within the Yugoslav Party.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 15. [6] See *ibid.*, p. 18.

[7] In the attacks of the Russian press and the Cominform's organ, *For A Lasting Peace*, these four names have been joined together while other prominent Yugoslav leaders have been usually and significantly not mentioned.

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An effort was even made, though not very skilfully, whether the facts be true or not, to cast suspicions upon Tito's closest lieutenants. Kardelj was supposed, in 1945, to have said to the Soviet ambassador that he thought Yugoslavia should become an integral part of the U. S. S. R.[8] Such allegations have a transparent purpose, and they enable the Russian leaders to classify Kardelj's reasoning as "primitive and fallacious."

The Yugoslav attitude is summarized in the statement by Tito and Kardelj that "no matter how much each of us loves the land of Socialism, the U. S. S. R., he can in no case love his country less, which also is developing socialism."[9] There is an element of hurt pride and deep injury in the Yugoslav attitude. Tito and Kardelj protest their loyalty to the Soviet Union and to Stalin, yet they are unwilling to bow to Moscow's dictates. For their part they speak quite bluntly about the activity of the Soviet Intelligence Service on Yugoslav territory and of their splitting tactics within the Yugoslav Party.

Moscow's rejoinders emphasize the arrogance of Tito and his lieutenants. Speaking of their letters the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. writes: "our attention is drawn to the tone of the documents, which can only be described as exaggeratedly ambitious. In the documents one does not see any desire to establish the truth, honestly to admit errors, and to recognize the necessity of eliminating those errors."[10] Yugoslav conceit, according to Moscow, extends to the point of claiming to have invented a new type of partisan warfare which is at least 140 years old, dating from the Spanish exploits against Napoleon I![11] The Yugoslavs stand out among other Communist Parties in their intransigeance. Why is the C. P. S. U.'s information about other

[8] "Kardelj said he would like the Soviet Union to regard them, not as representatives of another country, capable of solving questions independently, but as representatives of one of the future Soviet republics, and the C. P. Y. as a part of the All-Union Communist Party; that is, that our relations should be based on the prospect of Yugoslavia becoming in the future a constituent part of the U. S. S. R." Soviet ambassador, quoted in Soviet letter of May 4, 1948, *ibid.*, p. 38. [9] *Ibid.*, p. 19. [10] *Ibid.*, p. 31.

[11] *Ibid.*, p. 52. It would be interesting but fruitless to speculate who actually composed the Russian part of the correspondence. The Russian letters are straightforward and blunt, and their authors are obviously fond of historical and military analogies and examples. It would not be surprising if they were actually composed by the highest element of the Soviet hierarchy.

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sister parties correct and why do other parties submit to Russian criticisms while only the Yugoslavs stand unconvinced and obstinate?

Again a student of the Cominform from its inception in the fall of 1947 will be struck by the correctness of Soviet remarks in the sense that the Yugoslav leaders right from the beginning adopted a much more independent attitude than did the rest of the associated Communist Parties. At the September meeting in Poland Kardelj's speech was the only one which omitted extensive references to the Red Army and Comrade Stalin. Instead, the Yugoslav leader emphasized that his Party arose against the Germans *before* Hitler's attack upon the U. S. S. R. He was equally insistent upon his Party's independence and denounced as a slander the idea that the Yugoslav Party was thinking not of national independence but of "other interests."[12] The root cause of the difficulty between the two parties seems to be the Yugoslav feeling that with all due respect to "the land of Socialism," they (the Communist Party of Yugoslavia) will not be bossed by Moscow; nor will they discuss their stand before the Cominform, where the Russians proposed to refer the dispute, since that tribunal is obviously not impartial.[13]

How about the other basis for Soviet accusations that the Yugoslav party has deviated from the line of Marxism and Leninism? On this count the Russian letter of May 4 accuses the Yugoslav leaders of three specific sins: allowing the Party to become submerged in the People's Front; allowing the capitalist elements to increase, especially in the villages; and finally, failing to encourage, or even tolerate, inner-Party democracy. To understand the spirit of these accusations, whether the facts stated are correct or not, one has to realize that they are not made independently of other considerations. It is as though the Soviet leaders have asked themselves: "What has made the Yugoslav party disloyal to us? What has made them behave so differently from other Communist Par-

[12] See *For A Lasting Peace*, November 10, 1947.

[13] "We do not flee from criticism about questions of principle, but in this matter we feel so unequal that it is impossible for us to have this matter decided now by the Cominform. Even before we were informed, the nine Parties received your first letter and took their stand in resolutions." Tito and Kardelj in their letter of May 17, 1948, *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, p. 53.

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ties?" It would be inconceivable from the point of view of communism, that the answer should be found only in the ambitions and personalities of a few men. There must be a deeper ideological cause, discoverable in the corruption of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia as well as as in the "opportunism" of its leaders.

Concerning the substance of Soviet charges it is difficult to arrive at a definite judgment. In so far as the issue of intra-Party democracy is concerned, the Yugoslav Party does not appear very different from its great prototype. Shortly after the dispute broke into the open, a Party Congress met and lined up solidly behind Tito. The fate of Tito's opponents within the Party, notably Hebrang and Zhujovic, has not been different in kind from that of Stalin's opponents within the Russian Party. General Rankovic and his Secret Police act in the tradition of Yezhov and Beria, if we are to believe the Soviets.

Yet the Russians are not acting as hypocrites. They simply operate within a set of assumptions which does not allow a situation of this kind to develop without a presumption of bad faith on the part of the opponent.

The Central Committee of the C. P. of the U. S. S. R. was particularly emphatic in condemning Tito's regime for its lack of watchfulness on the issue of class struggle.

> Where, as in Yugoslavia, there is no nationalization of the land, where private ownership of the land exists and land is bought and sold, where considerable portions of land are concentrated in the hands of the kulaks, where hired labour is used, etc. the Party cannot be educated in the spirit of camouflaging the class struggle and smoothing over class controversies without disarming itself for the struggle with the main difficulties in the development of socialism. This means that the C. P. Y. is being lulled to sleep by the decadent opportunist theory of the peaceful infiltration of capitalist elements into socialism, borrowed from Bernstein, Vollmar and Bukharin.[14]

Let us keep in mind that these accusations are addressed to a country which emerged only three years before from war and occupation. To set the Soviet charges in a perspective let us see what the Russian Communists did under similar circumstances. In 1925 the Fourteenth Party Conference of the Soviet

[14] *Ibid.*, p. 42.

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Communist Party decided to abolish the system of requisitions in the villages, to authorize leasing of land by the peasants, and to *allow hiring of labor* by individual peasants.[15] Those decisions were criticized by the "Left Opposition" of Zinoviev and Kamenev as leading to the strengthening of the kulak element among the peasants, and as a further step in making Russia turn, not toward socialism, but toward state capitalism.[16] It was not until 1928, eight years after the war and eleven years after the Revolution, that an intensive collectivization campaign was decided upon.

The Cominform repeated the old charges of Zinoviev and Kamenev against Tito. Its organ, *For A Lasting Peace*, specified that since the regime fixed the maximum land-holding at between 15 and 35 hectares it was encouraging the kulaks.[17] Yet readers of the paper must be aware that in some other Eastern European countries the Communists have allowed a much higher maximum of land-holding. It had been assumed all along that the whole process would be a gradual one, paralleling Soviet experiences and yet avoiding their mistakes of forcible and overhasty collectivization in 1929-31.

The relationship of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia to the People's Front might also have been expected to parallel Soviet experience. But to the Russians, "In this lies the greatest error of the Yugoslav comrades. They are afraid openly to acclaim the Party and its decisions before the entire people so that the people may know that the leading force is the Party, that the Party leads the Front and not the reverse."[18] Yet the process of elimination of non-Communist political influences had gone further, by the summer of 1948, in Yugoslavia than in any other satellite country in Europe, except perhaps Bulgaria. In its structure, functions, and powers, the People's Front resembled similar organizations in Bulgaria and Rumania. It has been a cardinal point of Communist strategy in Eastern Europe to have a wider organization, a coalition of parties, or a "front" for a while at least; then to turn the screws and assume a less disguised form of leadership. The

[15] N. N. Popov: *Ocherk Istorii Vsesoiuznoy Kommunisticheskoy Partii*, 3rd edition, Moscow, 1927, p. 296. [16] *Ibid.*, pp. 302-303. [17] July 15, 1948.
[18] *The Soviet-Yugoslav Dispute*, p. 49.

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Yugoslav leaders therefore stand on firm ground when in replying to such accusations they state:

> We are sorry that such things are written about us and we would like to draw attention to the fact that in some countries some Communist Parties are changing, not only the forms of work, but also the name of the Party, as is the case in Bulgaria and Poland, and this is not without the approval of the C. P. S. U.[19]

The whole dispute has a peculiar flavor. Underlying the various ideological charges of the Russians is their irritation with the air of independence and national pride worn by the Yugoslavs. The charges, as repeated by the Cominform in its communiqué of June 28, 1948, bear a self-contradictory character, for, linked with the accusation that the regime tolerates capitalism, is the claim that the Yugoslav leaders ". . . tried to bring in a number of new leftist laws. They hastily decreed the nationalization of medium industry and trade, though the basis for this is completely unprepared."[20] Thus, according to the Cominform, "left" and "right" deviations coexist in Yugoslavia.

There is no doubt that there are grounds, from the point of view of Marxist orthodoxy, for accusing Tito and his regime of serious deviations, and of "opportunism." Where the Russians and the Cominform fail to make their case is in demonstrating that the Yugoslav Party stands alone among other Communist Parties in having committed these deviations. And yet a Western observer would be unjustified in dismissing casually the Soviet charges. They manifest only too clearly the basic conviction that personal disloyalty must be connected somehow with ideological deviations. The aftermath of the crisis was, in fact, a re-examination of the issues of collectivization and party organization in the Communist Parties of the other satellite countries. The process is still going on, and we see that leaders like Gomulka in Poland, who exhibited some degree of independence, are being pushed out, again for a combination of disloyal thoughts and "incorrect" historical analysis, to be replaced with more reliable men.

What about the crisis itself and its present state? Tito is now outside the pale of World Communism. Party organs in

[19] *Ibid.*, p. 26. [20] *Ibid.*, p. 66.

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Moscow and elsewhere abuse him in the language reserved for traitors. There is no road back for him, nor for Kardelj (who is obviously thought of by Moscow as Tito's evil spirit and is a particular object of their hatred). Rankovic, the Minister of Security, and Djilas, the head of Propaganda, also fall into this category. As for the Yugoslav Party, it has a standing invitation to free itself of the shackles of the quadrumvirate and seek Moscow's forgiveness.

For their part the leaders of the Yugoslav Party maintain the position that they are building a socialist, one-party state. Their official stand is that they are willing to seek reconciliation with Moscow, but not on terms which would endanger their national independence. They claim that they follow the teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Stalin; and they have scrupulously refrained from lining up with the Western Powers. The impasse can continue, assuming that Tito can preserve his control over the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, and assuming that he can satisfy the conflicting aspirations of the various nationalities within the state. The Russians may try to use the national problem as an instrument for disrupting the Yugoslav Party, and signs are multiplying that the latter is not monolithic in its support of Tito.

But aside from its immediate significance the conflict and the correspondence regarding it offer a rich field of study for those who are interested in the development of World Communism. Indeed, the correspondence affords an insight which enables us to suggest a few hypotheses as to the meaning of recent developments in World Communism. What are these hypotheses?

1. We are struck by the deep historical sense of Russian Communism. Today's events are interpreted according to the past, or rather, an attempt is constantly made to fit recent developments into a historical niche. Thus Tito's error in relation to the question of the Party's identity with the People's Front is described as a replica of the position taken by the Mensheviks in 1907.

> . . . like the Mensheviks in 1907 so, today, Tito and Kardelj forty years later, are equally debasing the Marxist Party, equally denying the role of the Party as the supreme form of organization which stands

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over all other mass workers' organizations, equally dissolving the Marxist Party into a non-party non-organization.[21]

The Yugoslav Party's lack of alertness, as to the class struggle ". . . means that the C. P. Y. is being lulled to sleep by the decadent opportunist theory of the peaceful infiltration of capitalist elements into socialism, borrowed from Bernstein, Vollmar, and Bukharin."[22] Those statements are not meant as figures of speech, but as an exact description of the source of Yugoslav behavior. They indicate a conscious attempt to study history—the Soviet interpretation of it—as a guide to action.

2. We are repeatedly struck by the tone of the letters written by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. The letters are not meant, primarily, as propaganda documents. They are written with an openness not to be found in many other Soviet statements.[23] Whatever one may think about the veracity of statements contained in the correspondence—whether one believes that Tito wanted Russia to go to war with the West on the issue of Trieste, or that Kardelj slandered his leader before the Russian ambassador—one can hardly describe these letters as being written by conscious Machiavellians. They are written with passion and self-righteousness by men who are hardly aware that what they attribute to Tito's regime could be tossed back at Stalin's. There is no hesitation to quote frankly various pieces of supposedly libelous rumors circulated about the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R. To the world it cannot be unimportant to note this evidence of Soviet attitude.

3. The letters throw an interesting light upon the whole problem of the relationship of Moscow to the various Communist Parties. To be sure, the Yugoslav Party has been in a peculiar position both in so far as its leadership and the circumstances of obtaining power are concerned. We can see, however, that even before the break with Russia, relations between Moscow and Belgrade were not of a command-and-obedience nature. We see Djilas making what the Russians

[21] *Ibid.*, p. 45. [22] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

[23] Typical of this fact is a most notable statement. In its letter of May 4, 1948, the Central Committee of the C. P. S. U. writes: "In his time Trotsky also rendered revolutionary service . . . ." *ibid.*, p. 52. No man in public life in Russia, no Soviet historian, would have dared to make this statement in the past twenty years.

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thought were derogatory remarks about the Red Army. He has to apologize to Stalin, but remains in a position of power and importance within the Yugoslav Party, and the Russians at the time let the matter go at that. Other incidents are described which would show that a certain amount of give-and-take goes on between Moscow and other Communist controlled governments, at least in the sense that the Soviets would not press an issue of this kind immediately or directly. On the other hand, the Yugoslavs showed a tendency to meet some of the Soviet charges half-way. Two officials whom the Soviets called, without adducing any evidence, English spies were removed from their posts, but in no sense liquidated or discredited.

Nevertheless, these are only incidents. We must await further evidence before judging the pattern of Soviet relations with the other satellite governments, and the impact on it of the Tito affair.

4. The conflict illuminates the whole issue and purpose of the Cominform. That organization was set up in September, 1947; it included the representatives of nine Communist parties (those of France and Italy as well as of the satellite countries). At the time of its organization the tension in Soviet-Yugoslav relations had existed for two years. Yet the seat of the organization was placed in Belgrade, and remained there until the summer of 1948. Why? Two explanations, not necessarily mutually exclusive, suggest themselves.

The Cominform may have been organized, largely, to appease the nationalist ambitions of the various parties, to assuage their feelings, and to create an impression of equality, as between the Russian party and the other parties. Placing the Cominform in Belgrade would have been a conciliatory gesture toward Tito. This theory finds some support in the reports of the speeches delivered at the opening meeting.[24] They all stress the theme of equality among the participating parties, and emphasize the differences between the new organization and the Comintern, which, according to Zhdanov, was too centralized to suit the new pattern of collaboration among Communist Parties.

The other theory would view the Cominform, among other

[24] They are found in *For A Lasting Peace*, November 10 and December 1, 1947.

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things, as a useful tool in dealing with the kind of trouble Tito presented. An offender would be condemned not only by the Communist Party of the U. S. S. R., but also by a body wearing an international label. The fact that the office of the Cominform and its publication settled in Belgrade may have reflected Soviet hopes that the two agencies would serve as an entering wedge to weaken or to remove the influence of the Tito-Kardelj-Djilas-Rankovic group in the Yugoslav Party.[25]

To summarize: The data relating to the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute are among the most important documents for understanding World Communism and Soviet Russia. They are a sudden illumination of what most of the time remains in relative darkness. The facts we have entitle us only to tentative conclusions, but they re-emphasize the need for the study of ideology and party history as necessary aids to an understanding of Communism.

[25] Of course, a thing like this works both ways. Gomulka at the time of his removal from the post of the Secretary-General of the Polish Workers' (Communist) party was accused of having evidenced "nationalist deviations" right after the September meeting.

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RESEARCH NOTES

MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By GRAYSON KIRK

THE student of international relations knows from sad experience what it means to starve in the midst of plenty. His vast sprawling field is the subject of almost endless writing and comment. Memoirs, documents, autobiographies, newspapers, government hand-outs, propaganda publications, and the like pour over his desk in a dismaying stream which grows greater year by year, defying him to master it. If he seeks to preserve his sanity by arbitrarily limiting his interests and investigations to certain geographic areas, he is acutely conscious of the inter-relationship between what happens in his chosen field and developments outside in the *terra incognita*. If he selects certain topical aspects of his field, such as the study of population, or raw materials, or commercial policy for emphasis, he is quickly enmeshed in the same web of frustrations. He cannot master the entire field and he cannot safely limit himself to a narrow specialization.

In the field of international politics the student's primary task is to study the influences that bear upon the shaping of foreign policy, the mechanisms used to carry out policy, and the devices which have been developed for the pacific adjustment of policy conflicts. By definition, therefore, the student must do all that is humanly possible to effect a synthesis of a bewildering variety of materials, many of which are studied independently by specialists who are unconcerned about the inter-relationship of their fields with international politics. For example, the student quickly realizes that the study of population is important to his understanding of international relations, but he will find almost as quickly that the demographers have generally refrained from trying to assess the influences of demographic trends upon international political affairs.

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The problem, therefore, which confronts the generalist in the field of international politics is extremely difficult. He cannot become an expert economist, demographer, geographer, social psychologist, or cultural anthropologist, yet he must make use of the findings of specialists in these and many other fields of study if he is to do his own job satisfactorily. And he cannot find in the writings of the specialists the interpretations and implications which are the indispensable grist for his mill.

In a sense this problem seems to admit of only three types of solutions. One would be for individual students of international politics to undertake to become as expert as possible in a single contributory field and to try to draw from the study of that field all possible conclusions relevant to the understanding of international relations. Another solution would be to reverse the process and to encourage specialists in the contributory fields to bring their knowledge to bear upon international political problems. A third approach would be to bring together generalists and contributory specialists in joint seminars or some other form of organized collaboration in which each group would learn from the other.

All three devices, to some extent, are being tried out today. Because of background, training, or some specially developed interests, most generalists have a topical or geographic field to which they give special attention and study. The results, however, are frequently more apparent in teaching than in writing. The scholars probably feel unsure of themselves, because of the sense of a lack of mastery of the special subject, and they hesitate to expose themselves in writing to the sniping of the experts. Similarly, there are specialists in contributory fields who are concerned with international politics, but those who have undertaken to write about this "No Man's Land" are relatively few. Understandably, most specialists feel that their professional careers will be better advanced by digging deeper in their specialization than by trying to apply their findings to the study of international affairs. There have been a few notable exceptions, especially in the fields of geography and economics, but unhappily, they are still exceptions to a general rule. Finally, of course, there have been some successful "joint"

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efforts, such as university courses and seminars in which generalists and specialists work together to achieve some semblance of that much-derided process of cross-fertilization. In this last connection, special mention should be made of the successful summer seminars conducted by the Brookings Institution wherein scholars in different fields meet with journalists, business men, and government practitioners of foreign affairs for extended group analyses of current problems in American foreign policy. Also, for example, at Wisconsin, where so much pioneer work in international relations was carried on by Professor Paul Reinsch, there is a successful course in international relations given jointly by a geographer and a political scientist.

The need of the present is not to select any one of these approaches as the best. Only time and greater experimentation will enable one to say with any authority which method is the most useful. For the present, all three should be encouraged in the hope that one or all of them will help us to overcome the current dismal shortage of interpretative materials. Somehow the "plenty" of ephemeral writing must be supplemented by a growing volume of writing of a genuinely scholarly nature. The work of the explorer and the prospector now must be followed by the surveyor and the geologist.

One current project, based on the second of the three approaches described above, promises to contribute a modest increment to the literature of international politics. It was set up in the belief that something ought to be done to encourage persons with specialized interests and competence to make a systematic exploration of what their special fields had to contribute to the understanding of international affairs. This contribution might consist of suggestions about research methods and ways of thinking; it might be in the form of conclusions which would give a special and new insight into the nature of international political processes. But whatever the precise nature of the contribution, it should serve a dual purpose. First, it should provide students of international politics with a body of materials hitherto unavailable or available only by a considerable expenditure of time and energy in working over the literature of the specialized fields. Secondly,

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it ought to have the effect of encouraging other specialists in these fields to think more and more about their possible contributions to the study of international relations. If successful, such a project thus would make the crossing of disciplinary boundaries more fruitful as to results and less hazardous to the traveller.

Thanks to the generous assistance of the Carnegie Corporation, this project has now been set up and is a "going concern." The funds are being administered through the instrumentality of Columbia University and under the direction of the author of this research note. The series is not yet complete, but eight volumes are actively in preparation, another was terminated by the unfortunate death of the prospective author, and several others may shortly be authorized. It is hoped that at least a few of the manuscripts will be ready for publication within the present calendar year.

Assistance is now being given to the following studies:

1. Geography and International Relations. This will be a new textbook in political geography with special emphasis upon international relations. The author is Professor Richard Hartshorne, of the University of Wisconsin.

2. Modern Technology and International Relations. This will be a monographic study which will attempt to assess the influence of recent technological developments in various fields upon international relations. The author is Colonel Andrew Goodpaster, USA, now in residence at Princeton University.

3. Social Psychology and International Relations. Professor Jerome Bruner, of Harvard, has agreed to enlist the collaboration of a group of leading social psychologists in the preparation of this volume.

4. Demography and International Relations. This book, which will deal with population movements, trends and policies, is to be prepared by Professor Kingsley Davis, of Columbia.

5. Political and Social Institutions. This volume will attempt to make an application of certain aspects of the field of political science to the study of international affairs. It will endeavor to assess the influences of political and social institutions within a state upon the nature and conduct of its international

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relations. The author is Professor Sigmund Neumann, of Wesleyan University.

6. Military Power and International Relations. Dr. Alfred Vagts, author of many works in the field of military history, has undertaken to write this volume which will deal with the effects of military organization, civilian-military relations, and changes in the science of warfare upon the history of international relations.

7. International Organization and International Politics. Dr. C. Easton Rothwell, Vice-Chairman of the Hoover Library and Institute, is preparing a monographic study which will explore the interaction between international organization and international politics. Numerous case studies will be used as a basis for the general conclusions.

8. Propaganga and International Relations. The role of propaganda as an instrument of foreign policy has become so prominent in modern times that its capacities and limitations require careful assessment. This volume is being prepared by Dr. Daniel Lerner, also of the Hoover Library and Institute staff.

Other volumes yet to be arranged will deal with the interaction of economics and politics as factors in policy making, with social anthropology, etc. It is quite possible that arrangements may be concluded for another volume which will attempt to set forth a theory of international relations through the systematic examination of the conceptual structure which appears to be present in modern thinking about the subject.

The titles of the volumes indicated in the foregoing list are, of course, merely tentative designations of the field of inquiry, and they may bear little relationship to the final titles which the books will have. Publication arrangements for the series are not yet ready for announcement.

The editor of the series will welcome inquiries from persons interested in the scope and nature of this project.

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